module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules

Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else.  Loading a signed module meant for a
kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
force-loaded.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 0b4f3a8..7f21ab2 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2686,13 +2686,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
        int err = -ENOKEY;
        const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
        const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
-       if (info->len > markerlen &&
+       /*
+        * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+        * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+        */
+       if (flags == 0 &&
+           info->len > markerlen &&
            memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
                /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
                info->len -= markerlen;
@@ -2711,7 +2716,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
        return err;
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
        return 0;
 }
@@ -3506,7 +3511,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
        long err;
        char *after_dashes;
 
-       err = module_sig_check(info);
+       err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
        if (err)
                goto free_copy;