1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
7 * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
10 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
11 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
12 #include <linux/kernel.h>
13 #include <linux/highmem.h>
14 #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
15 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
16 #include <linux/swap.h>
17 #include <linux/processor.h>
18 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
19 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
21 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
29 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
31 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
32 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
33 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
34 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
35 unsigned int max_sev_asid;
36 static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
37 static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
38 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
39 static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
42 struct list_head list;
49 static int sev_flush_asids(void)
54 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
55 * so it must be guarded.
57 down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
60 ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
62 up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
65 pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
70 static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
72 return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
75 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
76 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
80 /* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
81 pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
85 if (sev_flush_asids())
88 /* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
89 bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
91 bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid);
96 static int sev_asid_new(bool es_active)
98 int pos, min_asid, max_asid;
101 mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
104 * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
105 * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
107 min_asid = es_active ? 0 : min_sev_asid - 1;
108 max_asid = es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
110 pos = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
111 if (pos >= max_asid) {
112 if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids(min_asid, max_asid)) {
116 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
120 __set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
122 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
127 static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
129 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
134 static void sev_asid_free(int asid)
136 struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
139 mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
142 __set_bit(pos, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
144 for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
145 sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
146 sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
149 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
152 static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
154 struct sev_data_decommission decommission;
155 struct sev_data_deactivate deactivate;
160 deactivate.handle = handle;
162 /* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */
163 down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
164 sev_guest_deactivate(&deactivate, NULL);
165 up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
167 /* decommission handle */
168 decommission.handle = handle;
169 sev_guest_decommission(&decommission, NULL);
172 static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
174 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
175 bool es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
178 if (kvm->created_vcpus)
182 if (unlikely(sev->active))
185 asid = sev_asid_new(es_active);
189 ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
194 sev->es_active = es_active;
196 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
205 static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
207 struct sev_data_activate activate;
208 int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
211 /* activate ASID on the given handle */
212 activate.handle = handle;
213 activate.asid = asid;
214 ret = sev_guest_activate(&activate, error);
219 static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
228 ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
234 static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
236 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
238 return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
241 static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
243 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
244 struct sev_data_launch_start start;
245 struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
246 void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
247 int *error = &argp->error;
253 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
256 memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
259 if (params.dh_uaddr) {
260 dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
262 return PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
264 start.dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
265 start.dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
269 if (params.session_uaddr) {
270 session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
271 if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
272 ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
276 start.session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
277 start.session_len = params.session_len;
280 start.handle = params.handle;
281 start.policy = params.policy;
283 /* create memory encryption context */
284 ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, &start, error);
288 /* Bind ASID to this guest */
289 ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
293 /* return handle to userspace */
294 params.handle = start.handle;
295 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
296 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
301 sev->handle = start.handle;
302 sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
311 static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
312 unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
315 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
316 unsigned long npages, size;
318 unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
320 unsigned long first, last;
323 lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
325 if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
326 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
328 /* Calculate number of pages. */
329 first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
330 last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
331 npages = (last - first + 1);
333 locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
334 lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
335 if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
336 pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
337 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
340 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX))
341 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
343 /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
344 size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
345 if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
346 pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
348 pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
351 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
353 /* Pin the user virtual address. */
354 npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
355 if (npinned != npages) {
356 pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
362 sev->pages_locked = locked;
368 unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned);
374 static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
375 unsigned long npages)
377 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
379 unpin_user_pages(pages, npages);
381 sev->pages_locked -= npages;
384 static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
386 uint8_t *page_virtual;
389 if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
393 for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
394 page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
395 clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
396 kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
400 static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx,
401 struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages)
403 unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
404 unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
406 /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
407 paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
409 next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
410 if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
421 static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
423 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i;
424 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
425 struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
426 struct sev_data_launch_update_data data;
427 struct page **inpages;
433 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
436 vaddr = params.uaddr;
438 vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
440 /* Lock the user memory. */
441 inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
443 return PTR_ERR(inpages);
446 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
447 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
449 sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
452 data.handle = sev->handle;
454 for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
458 * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
461 offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
463 /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
464 pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
466 len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
469 data.address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
470 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
475 next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
479 /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
480 for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
481 set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
482 mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
484 /* unlock the user pages */
485 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
489 static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
491 struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
493 /* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
494 if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (save->dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
497 /* Sync registgers */
498 save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
499 save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
500 save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
501 save->rdx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
502 save->rsp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
503 save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
504 save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
505 save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
507 save->r8 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
508 save->r9 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
509 save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
510 save->r11 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11];
511 save->r12 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12];
512 save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
513 save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
514 save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
516 save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
518 /* Sync some non-GPR registers before encrypting */
519 save->xcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.xcr0;
520 save->pkru = svm->vcpu.arch.pkru;
521 save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
524 * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
525 * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
526 * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
527 * for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
529 memcpy(svm->vmsa, save, sizeof(*save));
534 static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
536 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
537 struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
538 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
541 if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
546 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
547 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
549 /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
550 ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
555 * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place
556 * encryption of the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write
557 * the same memory region with the guest's key), so invalidate
560 clflush_cache_range(svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
562 vmsa.handle = sev->handle;
563 vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->vmsa);
564 vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
565 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa,
570 svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected = true;
576 static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
578 void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
579 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
580 struct sev_data_launch_measure data;
581 struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
582 void __user *p = NULL;
589 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params)))
592 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
594 /* User wants to query the blob length */
598 p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
600 if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
603 blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
607 data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
608 data.len = params.len;
612 data.handle = sev->handle;
613 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &data, &argp->error);
616 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
625 if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
630 params.len = data.len;
631 if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
638 static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
640 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
641 struct sev_data_launch_finish data;
646 data.handle = sev->handle;
647 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
650 static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
652 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
653 struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
654 struct sev_data_guest_status data;
660 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
662 data.handle = sev->handle;
663 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, &data, &argp->error);
667 params.policy = data.policy;
668 params.state = data.state;
669 params.handle = data.handle;
671 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
677 static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
678 unsigned long dst, int size,
679 int *error, bool enc)
681 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
682 struct sev_data_dbg data;
685 data.handle = sev->handle;
690 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
691 enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
695 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
696 unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
701 * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
702 * destination has enough space.
704 offset = src_paddr & 15;
705 src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
706 sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
708 return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
711 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
712 unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
713 unsigned long dst_paddr,
716 struct page *tpage = NULL;
719 /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
720 if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
721 !IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) ||
722 !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
723 tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
727 dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
730 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
736 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
737 page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
748 static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
749 unsigned long __user vaddr,
750 unsigned long dst_paddr,
751 unsigned long __user dst_vaddr,
752 int size, int *error)
754 struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
755 struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
758 /* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
759 if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) {
760 src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
764 if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage),
765 (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
766 __free_page(src_tpage);
770 paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
774 * If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
775 * - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
776 * - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
777 * - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
779 if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
782 dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
788 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
789 __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
794 * If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
797 dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
800 memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
801 page_address(src_tpage), size);
803 if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
804 (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
810 paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
811 dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
812 len = round_up(size, 16);
815 ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
819 __free_page(src_tpage);
821 __free_page(dst_tpage);
825 static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
827 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
828 unsigned long dst_vaddr;
829 struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
830 struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
838 if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
841 if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr)
843 if (!debug.dst_uaddr)
846 vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
848 vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
849 dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
851 for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
852 int len, s_off, d_off;
854 /* lock userspace source and destination page */
855 src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
857 return PTR_ERR(src_p);
859 dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
861 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
862 return PTR_ERR(dst_p);
866 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT read or modify
867 * the pages; flush the destination too so that future accesses do not
870 sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
871 sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
874 * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
875 * offset within the page.
877 s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
878 d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
879 len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
882 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
883 __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
885 __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
888 ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
889 __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
891 __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
895 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
896 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n);
901 next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
902 dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
909 static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
911 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
912 struct sev_data_launch_secret data;
913 struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
922 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
925 pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
927 return PTR_ERR(pages);
930 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_SECRET encrypts pages in
931 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
933 sev_clflush_pages(pages, n);
936 * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
937 * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
939 if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
944 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
946 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
947 data.guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
948 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
950 blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
956 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
957 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
959 hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
964 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
965 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
967 data.handle = sev->handle;
968 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, &data, &argp->error);
975 /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
976 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
977 set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]);
978 mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
980 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
984 static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
986 void __user *report = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
987 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
988 struct sev_data_attestation_report data;
989 struct kvm_sev_attestation_report params;
997 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
1000 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1002 /* User wants to query the blob length */
1006 p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
1008 if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
1011 blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1015 data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
1016 data.len = params.len;
1017 memcpy(data.mnonce, params.mnonce, sizeof(params.mnonce));
1020 data.handle = sev->handle;
1021 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT, &data, &argp->error);
1023 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
1032 if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
1037 params.len = data.len;
1038 if (copy_to_user(report, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
1045 /* Userspace wants to query session length. */
1047 __sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
1048 struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
1050 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1051 struct sev_data_send_start data;
1054 data.handle = sev->handle;
1055 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
1059 params->session_len = data.session_len;
1060 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
1061 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1067 static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1069 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1070 struct sev_data_send_start data;
1071 struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
1072 void *amd_certs, *session_data;
1073 void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
1076 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1079 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1080 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1083 /* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
1084 if (!params.session_len)
1085 return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
1088 /* some sanity checks */
1089 if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
1090 !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
1093 /* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
1094 session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1098 /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
1099 pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
1100 params.pdh_cert_len);
1101 if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
1102 ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
1103 goto e_free_session;
1106 plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
1107 params.plat_certs_len);
1108 if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
1109 ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
1113 amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
1114 params.amd_certs_len);
1115 if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
1116 ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
1117 goto e_free_plat_cert;
1120 /* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
1121 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1122 data.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
1123 data.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
1124 data.plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
1125 data.plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
1126 data.amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
1127 data.amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
1128 data.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
1129 data.session_len = params.session_len;
1130 data.handle = sev->handle;
1132 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
1134 if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
1135 session_data, params.session_len)) {
1137 goto e_free_amd_cert;
1140 params.policy = data.policy;
1141 params.session_len = data.session_len;
1142 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms,
1143 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1153 kfree(session_data);
1157 /* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */
1159 __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
1160 struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params)
1162 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1163 struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
1166 data.handle = sev->handle;
1167 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
1171 params->hdr_len = data.hdr_len;
1172 params->trans_len = data.trans_len;
1174 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
1175 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
1181 static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1183 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1184 struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
1185 struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params;
1186 void *hdr, *trans_data;
1187 struct page **guest_page;
1191 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1194 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1195 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
1198 /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */
1199 if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len)
1200 return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, ¶ms);
1202 if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr ||
1203 !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr)
1206 /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
1207 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1208 if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
1211 /* Pin guest memory */
1212 guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
1217 /* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
1219 hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1223 trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1227 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1228 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1229 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1230 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data);
1231 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1233 /* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
1234 data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
1235 data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
1236 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1237 data.handle = sev->handle;
1239 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
1242 goto e_free_trans_data;
1244 /* copy transport buffer to user space */
1245 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr,
1246 trans_data, params.trans_len)) {
1248 goto e_free_trans_data;
1251 /* Copy packet header to userspace. */
1252 ret = copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr,
1260 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
1265 static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1267 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1268 struct sev_data_send_finish data;
1270 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1273 data.handle = sev->handle;
1274 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
1277 static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1279 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1280 struct sev_data_send_cancel data;
1282 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1285 data.handle = sev->handle;
1286 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL, &data, &argp->error);
1289 static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1291 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1292 struct sev_data_receive_start start;
1293 struct kvm_sev_receive_start params;
1294 int *error = &argp->error;
1299 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1302 /* Get parameter from the userspace */
1303 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1304 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start)))
1307 /* some sanity checks */
1308 if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len ||
1309 !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len)
1312 pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len);
1313 if (IS_ERR(pdh_data))
1314 return PTR_ERR(pdh_data);
1316 session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr,
1317 params.session_len);
1318 if (IS_ERR(session_data)) {
1319 ret = PTR_ERR(session_data);
1323 memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
1324 start.handle = params.handle;
1325 start.policy = params.policy;
1326 start.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data);
1327 start.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len;
1328 start.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
1329 start.session_len = params.session_len;
1331 /* create memory encryption context */
1332 ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, &start,
1335 goto e_free_session;
1337 /* Bind ASID to this guest */
1338 ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
1340 goto e_free_session;
1342 params.handle = start.handle;
1343 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1344 ¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) {
1346 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
1347 goto e_free_session;
1350 sev->handle = start.handle;
1351 sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
1354 kfree(session_data);
1361 static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1363 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1364 struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
1365 struct sev_data_receive_update_data data;
1366 void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
1367 struct page **guest_page;
1371 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1374 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1375 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
1378 if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
1379 !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
1380 !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
1383 /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
1384 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1385 if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
1388 hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
1390 return PTR_ERR(hdr);
1392 trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
1393 if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
1394 ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
1398 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1399 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1400 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1401 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
1402 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1404 /* Pin guest memory */
1406 guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
1411 /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
1412 data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
1413 data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
1414 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1415 data.handle = sev->handle;
1417 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, &data,
1420 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
1430 static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1432 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1433 struct sev_data_receive_finish data;
1435 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1438 data.handle = sev->handle;
1439 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
1442 int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
1444 struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
1447 if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev)
1453 if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
1456 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1458 /* enc_context_owner handles all memory enc operations */
1459 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
1464 switch (sev_cmd.id) {
1465 case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
1472 r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1474 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
1475 r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1477 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
1478 r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1480 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
1481 r = sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1483 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
1484 r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1486 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
1487 r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1489 case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
1490 r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1492 case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
1493 r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
1495 case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
1496 r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
1498 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
1499 r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1501 case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
1502 r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1504 case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
1505 r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1507 case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
1508 r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1510 case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
1511 r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1513 case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL:
1514 r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1516 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
1517 r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1519 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
1520 r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1522 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
1523 r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1530 if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
1534 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1538 int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
1539 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1541 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1542 struct enc_region *region;
1545 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1548 /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
1549 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
1552 if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
1555 region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1559 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1560 region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1);
1561 if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) {
1562 ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages);
1563 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1567 region->uaddr = range->addr;
1568 region->size = range->size;
1570 list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list);
1571 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1574 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
1575 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
1576 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
1579 sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
1588 static struct enc_region *
1589 find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1591 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1592 struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
1593 struct enc_region *i;
1595 list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
1596 if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
1597 i->size == range->size)
1604 static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
1605 struct enc_region *region)
1607 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
1608 list_del(®ion->list);
1612 int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
1613 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1615 struct enc_region *region;
1618 /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
1619 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
1622 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1624 if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
1629 region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
1636 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
1637 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
1638 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
1640 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
1642 __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
1644 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1648 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1652 int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
1654 struct file *source_kvm_file;
1655 struct kvm *source_kvm;
1656 struct kvm_sev_info *mirror_sev;
1660 source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
1661 if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
1666 source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
1667 mutex_lock(&source_kvm->lock);
1669 if (!sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
1671 goto e_source_unlock;
1674 /* Mirrors of mirrors should work, but let's not get silly */
1675 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || source_kvm == kvm) {
1677 goto e_source_unlock;
1680 asid = to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info.asid;
1683 * The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't
1684 * disappear until we're done with it
1686 kvm_get_kvm(source_kvm);
1688 fput(source_kvm_file);
1689 mutex_unlock(&source_kvm->lock);
1690 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1692 if (sev_guest(kvm)) {
1694 goto e_mirror_unlock;
1697 /* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */
1698 mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1699 mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm;
1700 mirror_sev->asid = asid;
1701 mirror_sev->active = true;
1703 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1707 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1708 kvm_put_kvm(source_kvm);
1711 mutex_unlock(&source_kvm->lock);
1713 fput(source_kvm_file);
1717 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
1719 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1720 struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
1721 struct list_head *pos, *q;
1723 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1726 /* If this is a mirror_kvm release the enc_context_owner and skip sev cleanup */
1727 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
1728 kvm_put_kvm(sev->enc_context_owner);
1732 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1735 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
1736 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
1737 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
1739 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
1742 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
1743 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
1745 if (!list_empty(head)) {
1746 list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
1747 __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
1748 list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
1753 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1755 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
1756 sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
1759 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
1761 unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
1762 bool sev_es_supported = false;
1763 bool sev_supported = false;
1765 /* Does the CPU support SEV? */
1766 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
1769 /* Retrieve SEV CPUID information */
1770 cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
1772 /* Set encryption bit location for SEV-ES guests */
1773 sev_enc_bit = ebx & 0x3f;
1775 /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
1778 if (!svm_sev_enabled())
1781 /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
1783 sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
1785 /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps */
1786 sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
1787 if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
1790 sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
1791 if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap)
1794 pr_info("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n", max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1);
1795 sev_supported = true;
1797 /* SEV-ES support requested? */
1801 /* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
1802 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
1805 /* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */
1806 if (min_sev_asid == 1)
1809 pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", min_sev_asid - 1);
1810 sev_es_supported = true;
1813 sev = sev_supported;
1814 sev_es = sev_es_supported;
1817 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
1819 if (!svm_sev_enabled())
1822 bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
1823 bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
1829 * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
1830 * returning them to the system.
1832 static void sev_flush_guest_memory(struct vcpu_svm *svm, void *va,
1836 * If hardware enforced cache coherency for encrypted mappings of the
1837 * same physical page is supported, nothing to do.
1839 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT))
1843 * If the VM Page Flush MSR is supported, use it to flush the page
1844 * (using the page virtual address and the guest ASID).
1846 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH)) {
1847 struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
1848 unsigned long va_start;
1851 /* Align start and stop to page boundaries. */
1852 va_start = (unsigned long)va;
1853 start = (u64)va_start & PAGE_MASK;
1854 stop = PAGE_ALIGN((u64)va_start + len);
1857 sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info;
1859 while (start < stop) {
1860 wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH,
1869 WARN(1, "Address overflow, using WBINVD\n");
1873 * Hardware should always have one of the above features,
1874 * but if not, use WBINVD and issue a warning.
1876 WARN_ONCE(1, "Using WBINVD to flush guest memory\n");
1877 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
1880 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
1882 struct vcpu_svm *svm;
1884 if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
1889 if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
1890 sev_flush_guest_memory(svm, svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
1891 __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->vmsa));
1893 if (svm->ghcb_sa_free)
1894 kfree(svm->ghcb_sa);
1897 static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
1899 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->ghcb;
1902 /* Re-use the dump_invalid_vmcb module parameter */
1903 if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
1904 pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
1908 nbits = sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap) * 8;
1910 pr_err("GHCB (GPA=%016llx):\n", svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa);
1911 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_code",
1912 ghcb->save.sw_exit_code, ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb));
1913 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_1",
1914 ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1, ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb));
1915 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_2",
1916 ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2, ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb));
1917 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_scratch",
1918 ghcb->save.sw_scratch, ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb));
1919 pr_err("%-20s%*pb\n", "valid_bitmap", nbits, ghcb->save.valid_bitmap);
1922 static void sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
1924 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
1925 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->ghcb;
1928 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
1930 * GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
1932 * Copy their values, even if they may not have been written during the
1933 * VM-Exit. It's the guest's responsibility to not consume random data.
1935 ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
1936 ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]);
1937 ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX]);
1938 ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX]);
1941 static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
1943 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
1944 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
1945 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->ghcb;
1949 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
1951 * GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
1955 * VMMCALL allows the guest to provide extra registers. KVM also
1956 * expects RSI for hypercalls, so include that, too.
1958 * Copy their values to the appropriate location if supplied.
1960 memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
1962 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(ghcb);
1963 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(ghcb);
1964 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(ghcb);
1965 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(ghcb);
1966 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(ghcb);
1968 svm->vmcb->save.cpl = ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(ghcb);
1970 if (ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb)) {
1971 vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
1972 kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
1975 /* Copy the GHCB exit information into the VMCB fields */
1976 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
1977 control->exit_code = lower_32_bits(exit_code);
1978 control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
1979 control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
1980 control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
1982 /* Clear the valid entries fields */
1983 memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
1986 static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
1988 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
1994 /* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
1995 if (ghcb->ghcb_usage)
1999 * Retrieve the exit code now even though is may not be marked valid
2000 * as it could help with debugging.
2002 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2004 if (!ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2005 !ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2006 !ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb))
2009 switch (ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb)) {
2010 case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
2012 case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
2013 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
2016 case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
2018 case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
2019 if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2022 case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
2023 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2024 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2026 if (ghcb_get_rax(ghcb) == 0xd)
2027 if (!ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb))
2033 if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
2034 if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
2037 if (!(ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
2038 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
2043 if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2045 if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb)) {
2046 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2047 !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
2051 case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
2052 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2053 !ghcb_cpl_is_valid(ghcb))
2056 case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
2058 case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
2060 case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
2061 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2062 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2063 !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
2066 case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
2067 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2068 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2071 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
2072 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
2073 if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
2076 case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
2077 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
2078 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE:
2079 case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
2090 if (ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
2091 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: ghcb usage %#x is not valid\n",
2094 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit reason %#llx is not valid\n",
2099 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2100 vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
2101 vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
2102 vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_code;
2103 vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
2108 static void pre_sev_es_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2113 if (svm->ghcb_sa_free) {
2115 * The scratch area lives outside the GHCB, so there is a
2116 * buffer that, depending on the operation performed, may
2117 * need to be synced, then freed.
2119 if (svm->ghcb_sa_sync) {
2120 kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
2121 ghcb_get_sw_scratch(svm->ghcb),
2122 svm->ghcb_sa, svm->ghcb_sa_len);
2123 svm->ghcb_sa_sync = false;
2126 kfree(svm->ghcb_sa);
2127 svm->ghcb_sa = NULL;
2128 svm->ghcb_sa_free = false;
2131 trace_kvm_vmgexit_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, svm->ghcb);
2133 sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(svm);
2135 kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->ghcb_map, true);
2139 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
2141 struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
2142 int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
2144 /* Perform any SEV-ES pre-run actions */
2145 pre_sev_es_run(svm);
2147 /* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
2153 * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
2154 * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
2156 if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
2157 svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
2160 sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
2161 svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
2162 vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
2165 #define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT (16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
2166 static bool setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
2168 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2169 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->ghcb;
2170 u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
2171 u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
2174 scratch_gpa_beg = ghcb_get_sw_scratch(ghcb);
2175 if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
2176 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
2180 scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
2181 if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
2182 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
2183 len, scratch_gpa_beg);
2187 if ((scratch_gpa_beg & PAGE_MASK) == control->ghcb_gpa) {
2188 /* Scratch area begins within GHCB */
2189 ghcb_scratch_beg = control->ghcb_gpa +
2190 offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
2191 ghcb_scratch_end = control->ghcb_gpa +
2192 offsetof(struct ghcb, reserved_1);
2195 * If the scratch area begins within the GHCB, it must be
2196 * completely contained in the GHCB shared buffer area.
2198 if (scratch_gpa_beg < ghcb_scratch_beg ||
2199 scratch_gpa_end > ghcb_scratch_end) {
2200 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area is outside of GHCB shared buffer area (%#llx - %#llx)\n",
2201 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end);
2205 scratch_va = (void *)svm->ghcb;
2206 scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
2209 * The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
2212 if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
2213 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
2214 len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
2217 scratch_va = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
2221 if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
2222 /* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
2223 pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
2230 * The scratch area is outside the GHCB. The operation will
2231 * dictate whether the buffer needs to be synced before running
2232 * the vCPU next time (i.e. a read was requested so the data
2233 * must be written back to the guest memory).
2235 svm->ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
2236 svm->ghcb_sa_free = true;
2239 svm->ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
2240 svm->ghcb_sa_len = len;
2245 static void set_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value, u64 mask,
2248 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa &= ~(mask << pos);
2249 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa |= (value & mask) << pos;
2252 static u64 get_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 mask, unsigned int pos)
2254 return (svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa >> pos) & mask;
2257 static void set_ghcb_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value)
2259 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
2262 static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2264 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2265 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2269 ghcb_info = control->ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK;
2271 trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
2274 switch (ghcb_info) {
2275 case GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ:
2276 set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
2280 case GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REQ: {
2281 u64 cpuid_fn, cpuid_reg, cpuid_value;
2283 cpuid_fn = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2284 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_MASK,
2285 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_POS);
2287 /* Initialize the registers needed by the CPUID intercept */
2288 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = cpuid_fn;
2289 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = 0;
2291 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_CPUID);
2297 cpuid_reg = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2298 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_MASK,
2299 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_POS);
2301 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
2302 else if (cpuid_reg == 1)
2303 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
2304 else if (cpuid_reg == 2)
2305 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
2307 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
2309 set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, cpuid_value,
2310 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_MASK,
2311 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_POS);
2313 set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP,
2318 case GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ: {
2319 u64 reason_set, reason_code;
2321 reason_set = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2322 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK,
2323 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS);
2324 reason_code = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2325 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_MASK,
2326 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_POS);
2327 pr_info("SEV-ES guest requested termination: %#llx:%#llx\n",
2328 reason_set, reason_code);
2335 trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
2336 control->ghcb_gpa, ret);
2341 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
2343 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
2344 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2345 u64 ghcb_gpa, exit_code;
2349 /* Validate the GHCB */
2350 ghcb_gpa = control->ghcb_gpa;
2351 if (ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
2352 return sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(svm);
2355 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: GHCB gpa is not set\n");
2359 if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, ghcb_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &svm->ghcb_map)) {
2360 /* Unable to map GHCB from guest */
2361 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: error mapping GHCB [%#llx] from guest\n",
2366 svm->ghcb = svm->ghcb_map.hva;
2367 ghcb = svm->ghcb_map.hva;
2369 trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, ghcb);
2371 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2373 ret = sev_es_validate_vmgexit(svm);
2377 sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
2378 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
2379 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
2382 switch (exit_code) {
2383 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
2384 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2))
2387 ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(vcpu,
2388 control->exit_info_1,
2389 control->exit_info_2,
2392 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
2393 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, false, control->exit_info_2))
2396 ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(vcpu,
2397 control->exit_info_1,
2398 control->exit_info_2,
2401 case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
2402 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
2404 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
2405 ret = kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(vcpu);
2407 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE: {
2408 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
2410 switch (control->exit_info_1) {
2412 /* Set AP jump table address */
2413 sev->ap_jump_table = control->exit_info_2;
2416 /* Get AP jump table address */
2417 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
2420 pr_err("svm: vmgexit: unsupported AP jump table request - exit_info_1=%#llx\n",
2421 control->exit_info_1);
2422 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 1);
2423 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb,
2425 SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT |
2432 case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
2434 "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
2435 control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
2438 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
2444 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
2446 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2))
2449 return kvm_sev_es_string_io(&svm->vcpu, size, port,
2450 svm->ghcb_sa, svm->ghcb_sa_len, in);
2453 void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2455 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2457 svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
2458 svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
2461 * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
2462 * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
2463 * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
2465 svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->vmsa);
2467 /* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
2468 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
2469 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
2470 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_READ);
2471 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
2472 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
2473 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
2475 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
2477 /* Track EFER/CR register changes */
2478 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_EFER_WRITE);
2479 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR0_WRITE);
2480 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
2481 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
2483 /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
2484 clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
2486 /* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
2487 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
2489 /* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
2490 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
2491 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
2492 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
2493 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
2494 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
2495 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
2498 void sev_es_create_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2501 * Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when creating
2502 * a vCPU for an SEV-ES guest.
2504 set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
2509 void sev_es_prepare_guest_switch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned int cpu)
2511 struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
2512 struct vmcb_save_area *hostsa;
2515 * As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT,
2516 * of which one step is to perform a VMLOAD. Since hardware does not
2517 * perform a VMSAVE on VMRUN, the host savearea must be updated.
2519 vmsave(__sme_page_pa(sd->save_area));
2521 /* XCR0 is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
2522 hostsa = (struct vmcb_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
2523 hostsa->xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
2525 /* PKRU is restored on VMEXIT, save the curent host value */
2526 hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
2528 /* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
2529 hostsa->xss = host_xss;
2532 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
2534 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
2536 /* First SIPI: Use the values as initially set by the VMM */
2537 if (!svm->received_first_sipi) {
2538 svm->received_first_sipi = true;
2543 * Subsequent SIPI: Return from an AP Reset Hold VMGEXIT, where
2544 * the guest will set the CS and RIP. Set SW_EXIT_INFO_2 to a
2550 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->ghcb, 1);