x86/speculation: Add support for STIBP always-on preferred mode
[linux-2.6-microblaze.git] / arch / x86 / include / asm / nospec-branch.h
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2
3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
5
6 #include <linux/static_key.h>
7
8 #include <asm/alternative.h>
9 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
10 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
11 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
12
13 /*
14  * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
15  *
16  * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
17  * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
18  *
19  * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
20  * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
21  * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
22  * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
23  * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
24  *
25  * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
26  * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
27  * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
28  */
29
30 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS         32      /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
31 #define RSB_FILL_LOOPS          16      /* To avoid underflow */
32
33 /*
34  * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
35  * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
36  * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
37  */
38 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)       \
39         mov     $(nr/2), reg;                   \
40 771:                                            \
41         call    772f;                           \
42 773:    /* speculation trap */                  \
43         pause;                                  \
44         lfence;                                 \
45         jmp     773b;                           \
46 772:                                            \
47         call    774f;                           \
48 775:    /* speculation trap */                  \
49         pause;                                  \
50         lfence;                                 \
51         jmp     775b;                           \
52 774:                                            \
53         dec     reg;                            \
54         jnz     771b;                           \
55         add     $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
56
57 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
58
59 /*
60  * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative.  It tells
61  * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
62  * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
63  * alternatives.
64  */
65 .macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
66         .Lannotate_\@:
67         .pushsection .discard.nospec
68         .long .Lannotate_\@ - .
69         .popsection
70 .endm
71
72 /*
73  * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
74  * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
75  * builds.
76  */
77 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
78         .Lannotate_\@:
79         .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
80         _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
81         .popsection
82 .endm
83
84 /*
85  * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
86  * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
87  * invocation below less ugly.
88  */
89 .macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
90         call    .Ldo_rop_\@
91 .Lspec_trap_\@:
92         pause
93         lfence
94         jmp     .Lspec_trap_\@
95 .Ldo_rop_\@:
96         mov     \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
97         ret
98 .endm
99
100 /*
101  * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
102  * returns to the instruction after the macro.
103  */
104 .macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
105         jmp     .Ldo_call_\@
106 .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
107         RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
108 .Ldo_call_\@:
109         call    .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
110 .endm
111
112 /*
113  * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
114  * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
115  * attack.
116  */
117 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
118 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
119         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
120         ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg),  \
121                 __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
122                 __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
123 #else
124         jmp     *\reg
125 #endif
126 .endm
127
128 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
129 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
130         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
131         ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \
132                 __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
133                 __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
134 #else
135         call    *\reg
136 #endif
137 .endm
138
139  /*
140   * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
141   * monstrosity above, manually.
142   */
143 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
144 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
145         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
146         ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@",                                \
147                 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP))    \
148                 \ftr
149 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
150 #endif
151 .endm
152
153 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
154
155 #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE                             \
156         "999:\n\t"                                              \
157         ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t"                      \
158         ".long 999b - .\n\t"                                    \
159         ".popsection\n\t"
160
161 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
162         "999:\n\t"                                              \
163         ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t"              \
164         _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t"                                    \
165         ".popsection\n\t"
166
167 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
168 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
169
170 /*
171  * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
172  * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
173  */
174 # define CALL_NOSPEC                                            \
175         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE                             \
176         ALTERNATIVE_2(                                          \
177         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
178         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
179         "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n",         \
180         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,                                  \
181         "lfence;\n"                                             \
182         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
183         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
184         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
185 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
186
187 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
188 /*
189  * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
190  * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
191  * here, anyway.
192  */
193 # define CALL_NOSPEC                                            \
194         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE                             \
195         ALTERNATIVE_2(                                          \
196         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
197         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
198         "       jmp    904f;\n"                                 \
199         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
200         "901:   call   903f;\n"                                 \
201         "902:   pause;\n"                                       \
202         "       lfence;\n"                                      \
203         "       jmp    902b;\n"                                 \
204         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
205         "903:   addl   $4, %%esp;\n"                            \
206         "       pushl  %[thunk_target];\n"                      \
207         "       ret;\n"                                         \
208         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
209         "904:   call   901b;\n",                                \
210         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,                                  \
211         "lfence;\n"                                             \
212         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
213         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
214         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
215
216 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
217 #endif
218 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
219 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
220 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
221 #endif
222
223 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
224 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
225         SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
226         SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
227         SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
228         SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
229 };
230
231 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
232 enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
233         SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
234         SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
235         SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
236         SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
237         SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
238 };
239
240 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
241 enum ssb_mitigation {
242         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
243         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
244         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
245         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
246 };
247
248 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
249 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
250
251 /*
252  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
253  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
254  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
255  * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
256  */
257 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
258 {
259 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
260         unsigned long loops;
261
262         asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
263                       ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
264                                   __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
265                                   X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
266                       "910:"
267                       : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
268                       : : "memory" );
269 #endif
270 }
271
272 static __always_inline
273 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
274 {
275         asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
276                 : : "c" (msr),
277                     "a" ((u32)val),
278                     "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
279                     [feature] "i" (feature)
280                 : "memory");
281 }
282
283 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
284 {
285         u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
286
287         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
288 }
289
290 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
291 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
292
293 /*
294  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
295  * before calling into firmware.
296  *
297  * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
298  */
299 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()                    \
300 do {                                                                    \
301         u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;                  \
302                                                                         \
303         preempt_disable();                                              \
304         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,                  \
305                               X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);                 \
306 } while (0)
307
308 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()                      \
309 do {                                                                    \
310         u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base;                                   \
311                                                                         \
312         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,                  \
313                               X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);                 \
314         preempt_enable();                                               \
315 } while (0)
316
317 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
318 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
319 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
320
321 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
322
323 /*
324  * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
325  * for the following assembly:
326  *
327  * With retpolines configured:
328  *
329  *    callq do_rop
330  *  spec_trap:
331  *    pause
332  *    lfence
333  *    jmp spec_trap
334  *  do_rop:
335  *    mov %rax,(%rsp) for x86_64
336  *    mov %edx,(%esp) for x86_32
337  *    retq
338  *
339  * Without retpolines configured:
340  *
341  *    jmp *%rax for x86_64
342  *    jmp *%edx for x86_32
343  */
344 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
345 # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
346 #  define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE    17
347 #  define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT()                               \
348 do {                                                            \
349         EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7);    /* callq do_rop */             \
350         /* spec_trap: */                                        \
351         EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90);       /* pause */                    \
352         EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */                   \
353         EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9);       /* jmp spec_trap */            \
354         /* do_rop: */                                           \
355         EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x04, 0x24); /* mov %rax,(%rsp) */    \
356         EMIT1(0xC3);             /* retq */                     \
357 } while (0)
358 # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
359 #  define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT()                               \
360 do {                                                            \
361         EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7);    /* call do_rop */              \
362         /* spec_trap: */                                        \
363         EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90);       /* pause */                    \
364         EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */                   \
365         EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9);       /* jmp spec_trap */            \
366         /* do_rop: */                                           \
367         EMIT3(0x89, 0x14, 0x24); /* mov %edx,(%esp) */          \
368         EMIT1(0xC3);             /* ret */                      \
369 } while (0)
370 # endif
371 #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
372 # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
373 #  define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE    2
374 #  define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT()                               \
375         EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0);       /* jmp *%rax */
376 # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
377 #  define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT()                               \
378         EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2)        /* jmp *%edx */
379 # endif
380 #endif
381
382 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */