arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c

   1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
   2 //
   3 // Security related flags and so on.
   4 //
   5 // Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
   6
   7 #include <linux/cpu.h>
   8 #include <linux/kernel.h>
   9 #include <linux/device.h>
  10 #include <linux/nospec.h>
  11 #include <linux/prctl.h>
  12 #include <linux/seq_buf.h>
  13
  14 #include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
  15 #include <asm/code-patching.h>
  16 #include <asm/debugfs.h>
  17 #include <asm/security_features.h>
  18 #include <asm/setup.h>
  19 #include <asm/inst.h>
  20
  21
  22 u64 powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = SEC_FTR_DEFAULT;
  23
  24 enum branch_cache_flush_type {
  25         BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1,
  26         BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW   = 0x2,
  27         BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW   = 0x4,
  28 };
  29 static enum branch_cache_flush_type count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
  30 static enum branch_cache_flush_type link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
  31
  32 bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
  33 static bool no_nospec;
  34 static bool btb_flush_enabled;
  35 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)
  36 static bool no_spectrev2;
  37 #endif
  38
  39 static void enable_barrier_nospec(bool enable)
  40 {
  41         barrier_nospec_enabled = enable;
  42         do_barrier_nospec_fixups(enable);
  43 }
  44
  45 void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
  46 {
  47         bool enable;
  48
  49         /*
  50          * It would make sense to check SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 below as well.
  51          * But there's a good reason not to. The two flags we check below are
  52          * both are enabled by default in the kernel, so if the hcall is not
  53          * functional they will be enabled.
  54          * On a system where the host firmware has been updated (so the ori
  55          * functions as a barrier), but on which the hypervisor (KVM/Qemu) has
  56          * not been updated, we would like to enable the barrier. Dropping the
  57          * check for SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 achieves that. The only downside is
  58          * we potentially enable the barrier on systems where the host firmware
  59          * is not updated, but that's harmless as it's a no-op.
  60          */
  61         enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
  62                  security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
  63
  64         if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
  65                 enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
  66 }
  67
  68 static int __init handle_nospectre_v1(char *p)
  69 {
  70         no_nospec = true;
  71
  72         return 0;
  73 }
  74 early_param("nospectre_v1", handle_nospectre_v1);
  75
  76 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
  77 static int barrier_nospec_set(void *data, u64 val)
  78 {
  79         switch (val) {
  80         case 0:
  81         case 1:
  82                 break;
  83         default:
  84                 return -EINVAL;
  85         }
  86
  87         if (!!val == !!barrier_nospec_enabled)
  88                 return 0;
  89
  90         enable_barrier_nospec(!!val);
  91
  92         return 0;
  93 }
  94
  95 static int barrier_nospec_get(void *data, u64 *val)
  96 {
  97         *val = barrier_nospec_enabled ? 1 : 0;
  98         return 0;
  99 }
 100
 101 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_barrier_nospec, barrier_nospec_get,
 102                          barrier_nospec_set, "%llu\n");
 103
 104 static __init int barrier_nospec_debugfs_init(void)
 105 {
 106         debugfs_create_file_unsafe("barrier_nospec", 0600,
 107                                    powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL,
 108                                    &fops_barrier_nospec);
 109         return 0;
 110 }
 111 device_initcall(barrier_nospec_debugfs_init);
 112
 113 static __init int security_feature_debugfs_init(void)
 114 {
 115         debugfs_create_x64("security_features", 0400, powerpc_debugfs_root,
 116                            &powerpc_security_features);
 117         return 0;
 118 }
 119 device_initcall(security_feature_debugfs_init);
 120 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
 121
 122 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)
 123 static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 124 {
 125         no_spectrev2 = true;
 126
 127         return 0;
 128 }
 129 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 130 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E || CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
 131
 132 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
 133 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 134 {
 135         if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
 136                 do_btb_flush_fixups();
 137         else
 138                 btb_flush_enabled = true;
 139 }
 140 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E */
 141
 142 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
 143 ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 144 {
 145         bool thread_priv;
 146
 147         thread_priv = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV);
 148
 149         if (rfi_flush) {
 150                 struct seq_buf s;
 151                 seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
 152
 153                 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: RFI Flush");
 154                 if (thread_priv)
 155                         seq_buf_printf(&s, ", L1D private per thread");
 156
 157                 seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
 158
 159                 return s.len;
 160         }
 161
 162         if (thread_priv)
 163                 return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: L1D private per thread\n");
 164
 165         if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) &&
 166             !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
 167                 return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 168
 169         return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 170 }
 171
 172 ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 173 {
 174         return cpu_show_meltdown(dev, attr, buf);
 175 }
 176 #endif
 177
 178 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 179 {
 180         struct seq_buf s;
 181
 182         seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
 183
 184         if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR)) {
 185                 if (barrier_nospec_enabled)
 186                         seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization");
 187                 else
 188                         seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable");
 189
 190                 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31))
 191                         seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled");
 192
 193                 seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
 194         } else
 195                 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Not affected\n");
 196
 197         return s.len;
 198 }
 199
 200 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 201 {
 202         struct seq_buf s;
 203         bool bcs, ccd;
 204
 205         seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
 206
 207         bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED);
 208         ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED);
 209
 210         if (bcs || ccd) {
 211                 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: ");
 212
 213                 if (bcs)
 214                         seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)");
 215
 216                 if (bcs && ccd)
 217                         seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ");
 218
 219                 if (ccd)
 220                         seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
 221
 222         } else if (count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
 223                 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush");
 224
 225                 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
 226                         seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
 227
 228         } else if (btb_flush_enabled) {
 229                 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush");
 230         } else {
 231                 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable");
 232         }
 233
 234         if (bcs || ccd || count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
 235                 if (link_stack_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
 236                         seq_buf_printf(&s, ", Software link stack flush");
 237                 if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
 238                         seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
 239         }
 240
 241         seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
 242
 243         return s.len;
 244 }
 245
 246 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
 247 /*
 248  * Store-forwarding barrier support.
 249  */
 250
 251 static enum stf_barrier_type stf_enabled_flush_types;
 252 static bool no_stf_barrier;
 253 bool stf_barrier;
 254
 255 static int __init handle_no_stf_barrier(char *p)
 256 {
 257         pr_info("stf-barrier: disabled on command line.");
 258         no_stf_barrier = true;
 259         return 0;
 260 }
 261
 262 early_param("no_stf_barrier", handle_no_stf_barrier);
 263
 264 /* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
 265 static int __init handle_ssbd(char *p)
 266 {
 267         if (!p || strncmp(p, "auto", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0 ) {
 268                 /* Until firmware tells us, we have the barrier with auto */
 269                 return 0;
 270         } else if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0) {
 271                 handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL);
 272                 return 0;
 273         } else
 274                 return 1;
 275
 276         return 0;
 277 }
 278 early_param("spec_store_bypass_disable", handle_ssbd);
 279
 280 /* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
 281 static int __init handle_no_ssbd(char *p)
 282 {
 283         handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL);
 284         return 0;
 285 }
 286 early_param("nospec_store_bypass_disable", handle_no_ssbd);
 287
 288 static void stf_barrier_enable(bool enable)
 289 {
 290         if (enable)
 291                 do_stf_barrier_fixups(stf_enabled_flush_types);
 292         else
 293                 do_stf_barrier_fixups(STF_BARRIER_NONE);
 294
 295         stf_barrier = enable;
 296 }
 297
 298 void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 299 {
 300         enum stf_barrier_type type;
 301         bool enable, hv;
 302
 303         hv = cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE);
 304
 305         /* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */
 306         if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300))
 307                 type = STF_BARRIER_EIEIO;
 308         else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S))
 309                 type = STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI;
 310         else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206))
 311                 type = STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK;
 312         else
 313                 type = STF_BARRIER_NONE;
 314
 315         enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 316                 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR) ||
 317                  (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && hv));
 318
 319         if (type == STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) {
 320                 pr_info("stf-barrier: fallback barrier available\n");
 321         } else if (type == STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI) {
 322                 pr_info("stf-barrier: hwsync barrier available\n");
 323         } else if (type == STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) {
 324                 pr_info("stf-barrier: eieio barrier available\n");
 325         }
 326
 327         stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 328
 329         if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 330                 stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 331 }
 332
 333 ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 334 {
 335         if (stf_barrier && stf_enabled_flush_types != STF_BARRIER_NONE) {
 336                 const char *type;
 337                 switch (stf_enabled_flush_types) {
 338                 case STF_BARRIER_EIEIO:
 339                         type = "eieio";
 340                         break;
 341                 case STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI:
 342                         type = "hwsync";
 343                         break;
 344                 case STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK:
 345                         type = "fallback";
 346                         break;
 347                 default:
 348                         type = "unknown";
 349                 }
 350                 return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Kernel entry/exit barrier (%s)\n", type);
 351         }
 352
 353         if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) &&
 354             !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
 355                 return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 356
 357         return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 358 }
 359
 360 static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
 361 {
 362         if (stf_enabled_flush_types == STF_BARRIER_NONE)
 363                 /*
 364                  * We don't have an explicit signal from firmware that we're
 365                  * vulnerable or not, we only have certain CPU revisions that
 366                  * are known to be vulnerable.
 367                  *
 368                  * We assume that if we're on another CPU, where the barrier is
 369                  * NONE, then we are not vulnerable.
 370                  */
 371                 return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
 372         else
 373                 /*
 374                  * If we do have a barrier type then we are vulnerable. The
 375                  * barrier is not a global or per-process mitigation, so the
 376                  * only value we can report here is PR_SPEC_ENABLE, which
 377                  * appears as "vulnerable" in /proc.
 378                  */
 379                 return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
 380
 381         return -EINVAL;
 382 }
 383
 384 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 385 {
 386         switch (which) {
 387         case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 388                 return ssb_prctl_get(task);
 389         default:
 390                 return -ENODEV;
 391         }
 392 }
 393
 394 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
 395 static int stf_barrier_set(void *data, u64 val)
 396 {
 397         bool enable;
 398
 399         if (val == 1)
 400                 enable = true;
 401         else if (val == 0)
 402                 enable = false;
 403         else
 404                 return -EINVAL;
 405
 406         /* Only do anything if we're changing state */
 407         if (enable != stf_barrier)
 408                 stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 409
 410         return 0;
 411 }
 412
 413 static int stf_barrier_get(void *data, u64 *val)
 414 {
 415         *val = stf_barrier ? 1 : 0;
 416         return 0;
 417 }
 418
 419 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_stf_barrier, stf_barrier_get, stf_barrier_set,
 420                          "%llu\n");
 421
 422 static __init int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void)
 423 {
 424         debugfs_create_file_unsafe("stf_barrier", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root,
 425                                    NULL, &fops_stf_barrier);
 426         return 0;
 427 }
 428 device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init);
 429 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
 430
 431 static void update_branch_cache_flush(void)
 432 {
 433         u32 *site;
 434
 435 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
 436         site = &patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack;
 437         // This controls the branch from guest_exit_cont to kvm_flush_link_stack
 438         if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
 439                 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
 440         } else {
 441                 // Could use HW flush, but that could also flush count cache
 442                 patch_branch_site(site, (u64)&kvm_flush_link_stack, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
 443         }
 444 #endif
 445
 446         // Patch out the bcctr first, then nop the rest
 447         site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches3;
 448         patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
 449         site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches2;
 450         patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
 451         site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches1;
 452         patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
 453
 454         // This controls the branch from _switch to flush_branch_caches
 455         if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE &&
 456             link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
 457                 // Nothing to be done
 458
 459         } else if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW &&
 460                    link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) {
 461                 // Patch in the bcctr last
 462                 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches1;
 463                 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(0x39207fff)); // li r9,0x7fff
 464                 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches2;
 465                 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(0x7d2903a6)); // mtctr r9
 466                 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches3;
 467                 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BCCTR_FLUSH));
 468
 469         } else {
 470                 patch_branch_site(site, (u64)&flush_branch_caches, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
 471
 472                 // If we just need to flush the link stack, early return
 473                 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
 474                         patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_link_stack_return,
 475                                                ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BLR));
 476
 477                 // If we have flush instruction, early return
 478                 } else if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) {
 479                         patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_count_cache_return,
 480                                                ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BLR));
 481                 }
 482         }
 483 }
 484
 485 static void toggle_branch_cache_flush(bool enable)
 486 {
 487         if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) {
 488                 if (count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
 489                         count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
 490
 491                 pr_info("count-cache-flush: flush disabled.\n");
 492         } else {
 493                 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST)) {
 494                         count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW;
 495                         pr_info("count-cache-flush: hardware flush enabled.\n");
 496                 } else {
 497                         count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW;
 498                         pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
 499                 }
 500         }
 501
 502         if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK)) {
 503                 if (link_stack_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
 504                         link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
 505
 506                 pr_info("link-stack-flush: flush disabled.\n");
 507         } else {
 508                 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_LINK_FLUSH_ASSIST)) {
 509                         link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW;
 510                         pr_info("link-stack-flush: hardware flush enabled.\n");
 511                 } else {
 512                         link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW;
 513                         pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
 514                 }
 515         }
 516
 517         update_branch_cache_flush();
 518 }
 519
 520 void setup_count_cache_flush(void)
 521 {
 522         bool enable = true;
 523
 524         if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 525                 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED) ||
 526                     security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED))
 527                         pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not fully under software control, can't disable\n");
 528
 529                 enable = false;
 530         }
 531
 532         /*
 533          * There's no firmware feature flag/hypervisor bit to tell us we need to
 534          * flush the link stack on context switch. So we set it here if we see
 535          * either of the Spectre v2 mitigations that aim to protect userspace.
 536          */
 537         if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED) ||
 538             security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE))
 539                 security_ftr_set(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK);
 540
 541         toggle_branch_cache_flush(enable);
 542 }
 543
 544 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
 545 static int count_cache_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
 546 {
 547         bool enable;
 548
 549         if (val == 1)
 550                 enable = true;
 551         else if (val == 0)
 552                 enable = false;
 553         else
 554                 return -EINVAL;
 555
 556         toggle_branch_cache_flush(enable);
 557
 558         return 0;
 559 }
 560
 561 static int count_cache_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
 562 {
 563         if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
 564                 *val = 0;
 565         else
 566                 *val = 1;
 567
 568         return 0;
 569 }
 570
 571 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_count_cache_flush, count_cache_flush_get,
 572                          count_cache_flush_set, "%llu\n");
 573
 574 static __init int count_cache_flush_debugfs_init(void)
 575 {
 576         debugfs_create_file_unsafe("count_cache_flush", 0600,
 577                                    powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL,
 578                                    &fops_count_cache_flush);
 579         return 0;
 580 }
 581 device_initcall(count_cache_flush_debugfs_init);
 582 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
 583 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */