1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Integrity Measurement Architecture
5 * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
8 * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
9 * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
10 * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
11 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
14 * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
18 #include <linux/module.h>
19 #include <linux/file.h>
20 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
21 #include <linux/mount.h>
22 #include <linux/mman.h>
23 #include <linux/slab.h>
24 #include <linux/xattr.h>
25 #include <linux/ima.h>
26 #include <linux/iversion.h>
31 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
32 int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
37 int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
38 static int hash_setup_done;
40 static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = {
41 .notifier_call = ima_lsm_policy_change,
44 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
46 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
52 if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
53 if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
54 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
55 else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
56 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
62 i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str);
71 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
73 /* Prevent mmap'ing a file execute that is already mmap'ed write */
74 static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
75 char **pathbuf, const char **pathname,
81 if ((func == MMAP_CHECK) && mapping_writably_mapped(file->f_mapping)) {
83 inode = file_inode(file);
85 if (!*pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
86 *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf,
88 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, *pathname,
89 "mmap_file", "mmapped_writers", rc, 0);
95 * ima_rdwr_violation_check
97 * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
98 * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
99 * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
100 * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
101 * could result in a file measurement error.
104 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
105 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
108 const char **pathname,
111 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
112 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
113 bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
115 if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
116 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
118 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
119 /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
120 if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
121 &iint->atomic_flags))
126 set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags);
127 if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure)
131 if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
134 *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, filename);
137 ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
138 "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
140 ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
141 "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
144 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
145 struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
147 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
150 if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
153 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
154 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
155 update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
156 &iint->atomic_flags);
157 if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
158 !inode_eq_iversion(inode, iint->version) ||
159 (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
160 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
161 iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
163 ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
166 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
170 * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
171 * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
173 * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
175 void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
177 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
178 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
180 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
183 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
187 ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
190 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
191 u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
194 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
195 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
196 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
197 char *pathbuf = NULL;
198 char filename[NAME_MAX];
199 const char *pathname = NULL;
200 int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0;
201 int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
202 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
203 struct modsig *modsig = NULL;
205 bool violation_check;
206 enum hash_algo hash_algo;
208 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
211 /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
212 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
213 * Included is the appraise submask.
215 action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
216 &template_desc, NULL);
217 violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
218 (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
219 if (!action && !violation_check)
222 must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
224 /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
225 if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
231 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
236 if (!rc && violation_check)
237 ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
238 &pathbuf, &pathname, filename);
247 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
249 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
250 /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */
251 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
252 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
256 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
257 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem.
258 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.)
260 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
261 ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
262 !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) &&
263 !(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
264 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
265 iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
268 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
269 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
270 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
272 iint->flags |= action;
273 action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
274 action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
276 /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
277 if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
278 action ^= IMA_MEASURE;
280 /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */
281 if ((action & IMA_HASH) &&
282 !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) {
283 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
284 if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) &&
285 (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
286 set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
287 iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED;
289 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
292 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
295 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
296 &pathname, filename);
298 rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func);
303 if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
304 strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
305 /* read 'security.ima' */
306 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
309 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow
310 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the
311 * template format and whether the file was already measured.
313 if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
314 rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
316 if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) &&
317 iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
318 action |= IMA_MEASURE;
322 hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
324 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
325 if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
328 if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
329 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
331 if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
332 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
333 xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
335 if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
336 rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr);
339 rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file,
340 pathname, xattr_value,
345 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
346 &pathname, filename);
348 if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
349 ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
351 if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
354 if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) &&
355 !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
357 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
359 ima_free_modsig(modsig);
364 if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
366 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
367 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
373 * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
374 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
375 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
377 * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
380 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
381 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
383 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
387 if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
388 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
389 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
390 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
397 * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
398 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
400 * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
401 * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
402 * would be taken before i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
403 * this point. Eliminate this integrity gap by denying the mprotect
404 * PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.
406 * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
408 int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
410 struct ima_template_desc *template;
411 struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
412 char filename[NAME_MAX];
413 char *pathbuf = NULL;
414 const char *pathname = NULL;
421 /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
422 if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file ||
423 !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
426 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
427 inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
428 action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
429 MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0);
431 /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
432 if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
435 if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
439 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
440 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, pathname,
441 "collect_data", "failed-mprotect", result, 0);
449 * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
450 * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
452 * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
453 * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
454 * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
455 * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
456 * what is being executed.
458 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
459 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
461 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
466 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
467 ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
468 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
472 security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
473 return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
474 MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
478 * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
479 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
480 * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND
482 * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
484 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
485 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
487 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
491 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
492 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
493 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
494 MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
496 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
499 * ima_file_hash - return the stored measurement if a file has been hashed and
500 * is in the iint cache.
501 * @file: pointer to the file
502 * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
503 * @buf_size: length of the buffer
505 * On success, return the hash algorithm (as defined in the enum hash_algo).
506 * If buf is not NULL, this function also outputs the hash into buf.
507 * If the hash is larger than buf_size, then only buf_size bytes will be copied.
508 * It generally just makes sense to pass a buffer capable of holding the largest
509 * possible hash: IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE.
510 * The file hash returned is based on the entire file, including the appended
513 * If IMA is disabled or if no measurement is available, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
514 * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
516 int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
519 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
525 if (!ima_policy_flag)
528 inode = file_inode(file);
529 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
533 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
537 copied_size = min_t(size_t, iint->ima_hash->length, buf_size);
538 memcpy(buf, iint->ima_hash->digest, copied_size);
540 hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
541 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
545 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
548 * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
549 * @file : newly created tmpfile
551 * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed.
552 * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
553 * tmpfiles are in policy.
555 void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode)
557 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
560 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
564 /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
565 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
569 /* needed for writing the security xattrs */
570 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
571 iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
575 * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode
576 * @dentry: newly created dentry
578 * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
579 * file data can be written later.
581 void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
583 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
584 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
587 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
591 /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
592 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
596 /* needed for re-opening empty files */
597 iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
601 * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
602 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
603 * @read_id: caller identifier
605 * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
606 * in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of
607 * a file requires a file descriptor.
609 * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
611 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
614 * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
616 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
617 * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
618 * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
624 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
625 [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
626 [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
627 [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
628 [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
629 [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
630 [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
634 * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
635 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
636 * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
637 * @size: size of in memory file contents
638 * @read_id: caller identifier
640 * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy. Policy rules
641 * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
643 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
644 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
646 int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
647 enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
652 if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
653 if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
654 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
655 pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
656 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
661 /* permit signed certs */
662 if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
665 if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
666 if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
671 func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
672 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
673 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
678 * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
679 * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
681 * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
682 * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file
683 * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image).
685 * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
687 int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
689 bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
692 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
695 case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
696 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
697 && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
698 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
702 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) {
703 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
704 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
707 case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
708 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) {
709 pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
710 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
714 sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
716 if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce
717 && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) {
718 pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
719 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
728 * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
729 * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
730 * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
731 * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
732 * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
734 * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
735 * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed
737 * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
739 void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
740 const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
741 int pcr, const char *keyring)
744 const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
745 struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
746 struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
747 struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
748 .filename = eventname,
751 struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
753 struct ima_digest_data hdr;
754 char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
760 if (!ima_policy_flag)
764 * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
765 * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
766 * between the LSM hooks and auxilary buffer measurements,
767 * retrieving the policy rule information only for the LSM hook
768 * buffer measurements.
771 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
772 action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
773 &pcr, &template, keyring);
774 if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
779 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
782 template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf");
783 ret = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
785 &(template->num_fields));
787 pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
788 (strlen(template->name) ?
789 template->name : template->fmt), ret);
794 iint.ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
795 iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
796 iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
798 ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
800 audit_cause = "hashing_error";
804 ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
806 audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
810 ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
812 audit_cause = "store_entry";
813 ima_free_template_entry(entry);
818 integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
819 func_measure_str(func),
820 audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
826 * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
827 * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
828 * @buf: pointer to buffer
829 * @size: size of buffer
831 * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
833 void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
840 f = fdget(kernel_fd);
844 process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
845 "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
849 static int __init init_ima(void)
853 ima_init_template_list();
854 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
857 if (error && strcmp(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo],
858 CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH) != 0) {
859 pr_info("Allocating %s failed, going to use default hash algorithm %s\n",
860 hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
862 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
869 error = register_blocking_lsm_notifier(&ima_lsm_policy_notifier);
871 pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
874 ima_update_policy_flag();
879 late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */