1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Integrity Measurement Architecture
5 * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
8 * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
9 * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
10 * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
11 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
14 * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
18 #include <linux/module.h>
19 #include <linux/file.h>
20 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
21 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
22 #include <linux/mount.h>
23 #include <linux/mman.h>
24 #include <linux/slab.h>
25 #include <linux/xattr.h>
26 #include <linux/ima.h>
27 #include <linux/iversion.h>
32 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
33 int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
38 int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
39 static int hash_setup_done;
41 static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = {
42 .notifier_call = ima_lsm_policy_change,
45 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
47 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
53 if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
54 if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
55 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
56 else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
57 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
63 i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str);
72 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
74 /* Prevent mmap'ing a file execute that is already mmap'ed write */
75 static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
76 char **pathbuf, const char **pathname,
82 if ((func == MMAP_CHECK) && mapping_writably_mapped(file->f_mapping)) {
84 inode = file_inode(file);
86 if (!*pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
87 *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf,
89 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, *pathname,
90 "mmap_file", "mmapped_writers", rc, 0);
96 * ima_rdwr_violation_check
98 * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
99 * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
100 * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
101 * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
102 * could result in a file measurement error.
105 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
106 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
109 const char **pathname,
112 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
113 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
114 bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
116 if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
117 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
119 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
120 /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
121 if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
122 &iint->atomic_flags))
127 set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags);
128 if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure)
132 if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
135 *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, filename);
138 ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
139 "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
141 ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
142 "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
145 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
146 struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
148 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
151 if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
154 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
155 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
156 update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
157 &iint->atomic_flags);
158 if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
159 !inode_eq_iversion(inode, iint->version) ||
160 (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
161 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
162 iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
164 ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
167 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
171 * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
172 * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
174 * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
176 void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
178 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
179 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
181 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
184 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
188 ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
191 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
192 u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
195 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
196 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
197 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
198 char *pathbuf = NULL;
199 char filename[NAME_MAX];
200 const char *pathname = NULL;
201 int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0;
202 int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
203 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
204 struct modsig *modsig = NULL;
206 bool violation_check;
207 enum hash_algo hash_algo;
209 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
212 /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
213 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
214 * Included is the appraise submask.
216 action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
217 &template_desc, NULL);
218 violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
219 (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
220 if (!action && !violation_check)
223 must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
225 /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
226 if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
232 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
237 if (!rc && violation_check)
238 ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
239 &pathbuf, &pathname, filename);
248 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
250 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
251 /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */
252 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
253 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
257 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
258 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem.
259 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.)
261 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
262 ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
263 !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) &&
264 !(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
265 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
266 iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
269 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
270 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
271 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
273 iint->flags |= action;
274 action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
275 action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
277 /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
278 if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
279 action ^= IMA_MEASURE;
281 /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */
282 if ((action & IMA_HASH) &&
283 !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) {
284 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
285 if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) &&
286 (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
287 set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
288 iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED;
290 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
293 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
296 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
297 &pathname, filename);
299 rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func);
304 if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
305 strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
306 /* read 'security.ima' */
307 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
310 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow
311 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the
312 * template format and whether the file was already measured.
314 if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
315 rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
317 if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) &&
318 iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
319 action |= IMA_MEASURE;
323 hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
325 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
326 if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
329 if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
330 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
332 if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
333 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
334 xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
336 if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
337 rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr);
340 rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file,
341 pathname, xattr_value,
346 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
347 &pathname, filename);
349 if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
350 ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
352 if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
355 if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) &&
356 !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
358 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
360 ima_free_modsig(modsig);
365 if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
367 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
368 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
374 * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
375 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
376 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
378 * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
381 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
382 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
384 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
388 if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
389 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
390 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
391 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
398 * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
399 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
401 * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
402 * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
403 * would be taken before i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
404 * this point. Eliminate this integrity gap by denying the mprotect
405 * PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.
407 * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
409 int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
411 struct ima_template_desc *template;
412 struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
413 char filename[NAME_MAX];
414 char *pathbuf = NULL;
415 const char *pathname = NULL;
422 /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
423 if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file ||
424 !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
427 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
428 inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
429 action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
430 MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0);
432 /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
433 if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
436 if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
440 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
441 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, pathname,
442 "collect_data", "failed-mprotect", result, 0);
450 * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
451 * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
453 * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
454 * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
455 * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
456 * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
457 * what is being executed.
459 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
460 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
462 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
467 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
468 ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
469 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
473 security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
474 return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
475 MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
479 * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
480 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
481 * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND
483 * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
485 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
486 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
488 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
492 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
493 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
494 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
495 MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
497 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
500 * ima_file_hash - return the stored measurement if a file has been hashed and
501 * is in the iint cache.
502 * @file: pointer to the file
503 * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
504 * @buf_size: length of the buffer
506 * On success, return the hash algorithm (as defined in the enum hash_algo).
507 * If buf is not NULL, this function also outputs the hash into buf.
508 * If the hash is larger than buf_size, then only buf_size bytes will be copied.
509 * It generally just makes sense to pass a buffer capable of holding the largest
510 * possible hash: IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE.
511 * The file hash returned is based on the entire file, including the appended
514 * If IMA is disabled or if no measurement is available, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
515 * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
517 int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
520 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
526 if (!ima_policy_flag)
529 inode = file_inode(file);
530 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
534 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
538 copied_size = min_t(size_t, iint->ima_hash->length, buf_size);
539 memcpy(buf, iint->ima_hash->digest, copied_size);
541 hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
542 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
546 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
549 * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
550 * @file : newly created tmpfile
552 * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed.
553 * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
554 * tmpfiles are in policy.
556 void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode)
558 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
561 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
565 /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
566 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
570 /* needed for writing the security xattrs */
571 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
572 iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
576 * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode
577 * @dentry: newly created dentry
579 * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
580 * file data can be written later.
582 void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
584 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
585 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
588 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
592 /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
593 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
597 /* needed for re-opening empty files */
598 iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
602 * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
603 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
604 * @read_id: caller identifier
605 * @contents: whether a subsequent call will be made to ima_post_read_file()
607 * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
608 * in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of
609 * a file requires a file descriptor.
611 * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
613 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
616 /* Reject all partial reads during appraisal. */
618 if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
623 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
624 * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
625 * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
626 * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
627 * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
632 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
633 [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
634 [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
635 [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
636 [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
637 [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
641 * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
642 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
643 * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
644 * @size: size of in memory file contents
645 * @read_id: caller identifier
647 * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy. Policy rules
648 * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
650 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
651 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
653 int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
654 enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
659 /* permit signed certs */
660 if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
663 if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
664 if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
669 func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
670 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
671 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
676 * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
677 * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
678 * @contents: whether the full contents will be available in a later
679 * call to ima_post_load_data().
681 * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
682 * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file
683 * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image).
685 * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
687 int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
689 bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
692 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
695 case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
696 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
697 && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
698 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
702 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) {
703 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
704 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
707 case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
708 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) {
709 pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
710 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
714 sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
716 if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce
717 && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) {
718 pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
719 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
728 * ima_post_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
729 * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
730 * @size: size of in memory file contents
731 * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
732 * @description: @id-specific description of contents
734 * Measure/appraise/audit in memory buffer based on policy. Policy rules
735 * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
737 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
738 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
740 int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
741 enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
744 if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
745 if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
746 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
747 pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
748 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
757 * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
758 * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
759 * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
760 * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
761 * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
763 * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
764 * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed
766 * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
768 void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
769 const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
770 int pcr, const char *keyring)
773 const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
774 struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
775 struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
776 struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
777 .filename = eventname,
780 struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
782 struct ima_digest_data hdr;
783 char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
789 if (!ima_policy_flag)
793 * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
794 * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
795 * between the LSM hooks and auxilary buffer measurements,
796 * retrieving the policy rule information only for the LSM hook
797 * buffer measurements.
800 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
801 action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
802 &pcr, &template, keyring);
803 if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
808 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
811 template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf");
812 ret = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
814 &(template->num_fields));
816 pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
817 (strlen(template->name) ?
818 template->name : template->fmt), ret);
823 iint.ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
824 iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
825 iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
827 ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
829 audit_cause = "hashing_error";
833 ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
835 audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
839 ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
841 audit_cause = "store_entry";
842 ima_free_template_entry(entry);
847 integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
848 func_measure_str(func),
849 audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
855 * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
856 * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
857 * @buf: pointer to buffer
858 * @size: size of buffer
860 * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
862 void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
869 f = fdget(kernel_fd);
873 process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
874 "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
878 static int __init init_ima(void)
882 ima_init_template_list();
883 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
886 if (error && strcmp(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo],
887 CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH) != 0) {
888 pr_info("Allocating %s failed, going to use default hash algorithm %s\n",
889 hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
891 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
898 error = register_blocking_lsm_notifier(&ima_lsm_policy_notifier);
900 pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
903 ima_update_policy_flag();
908 late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */