proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener
authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tue, 25 May 2021 19:37:35 +0000 (12:37 -0700)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tue, 25 May 2021 20:24:41 +0000 (10:24 -1000)
Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
fs/proc/base.c

index 3851bfc..58bbf33 100644 (file)
@@ -2703,6 +2703,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
        void *page;
        int rv;
 
+       /* A task may only write when it was the opener. */
+       if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred())
+               return -EPERM;
+
        rcu_read_lock();
        task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
        if (!task) {