bpf: Add _kernel suffix to internal lockdown_bpf_read

Rename LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ into LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL so we have naming
more consistent with a LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER option that we are adding.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 24eda04..724d7a4 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
        LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
        LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
        LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
-       LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
+       LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL,
        LOCKDOWN_PERF,
        LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
        LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 62cf003..0b04553 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -1070,12 +1070,12 @@ bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user:
                return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
-               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
                       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
                return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
-               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
                       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
        case BPF_FUNC_snprintf_btf:
                return &bpf_snprintf_btf_proto;

diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index b4916ef..1836591 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -999,19 +999,19 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user:
                return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
-               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
                       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
                return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
-               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
                       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
-               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
                       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
        case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
-               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+               return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
                       NULL : &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 09533cb..6b83ab4 100644 (file)
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
        [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
        [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
        [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
-       [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
+       [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
        [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
        [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
        [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",