int ima_appraise;
#endif
-int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
static int hash_setup_done;
static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = {
}
__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
+enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
+{
+ return ima_hash_algo;
+}
+
/* Prevent mmap'ing a file execute that is already mmap'ed write */
static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
char **pathbuf, const char **pathname,
int xattr_len = 0;
bool violation_check;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+ unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
- mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL);
+ mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
+ &allowed_algos);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
rc = 0;
+
+ /* Ensure the digest was generated using an allowed algorithm */
+ if (rc == 0 && must_appraise && allowed_algos != 0 &&
+ (allowed_algos & (1U << hash_algo)) == 0) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file),
+ pathname, "collect_data",
+ "denied-hash-algorithm", rc, 0);
+ }
out_locked:
if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) &&
!(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
- &pcr, &template, NULL);
+ &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
return 0;
}
-/*
+/**
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
* @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
* @buf_hash: measure buffer data hash
+ * @digest: buffer digest will be written to
+ * @digest_len: buffer length
*
* Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
+ * has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
+ * a negative value otherwise.
*/
-void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
- const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr, const char *func_data,
- bool buf_hash)
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+ const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int pcr, const char *func_data,
+ bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
{
int ret = 0;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
int action = 0;
u32 secid;
- if (!ima_policy_flag)
- return;
+ if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!ima_policy_flag && !digest)
+ return -ENOENT;
template = ima_template_desc_buf();
if (!template) {
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
- func_data);
- if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
- return;
+ func_data, NULL);
+ if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
+ return -ENOENT;
}
if (!pcr)
event_data.buf_len = digest_hash_len;
}
+ if (digest)
+ memcpy(digest, iint.ima_hash->digest, digest_hash_len);
+
+ if (!ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE)))
+ return 1;
+
ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
if (ret < 0) {
audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
func_measure_str(func),
audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
- return;
+ return ret;
}
/**
process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
- NULL, false);
+ NULL, false, NULL, 0);
fdput(f);
}
* @buf: pointer to buffer data
* @buf_len: length of buffer data (in bytes)
* @hash: measure buffer data hash
+ * @digest: buffer digest will be written to
+ * @digest_len: buffer length
*
* Measure data critical to the integrity of the kernel into the IMA log
* and extend the pcr. Examples of critical data could be various data
* structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can
* impact the integrity of the system.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
+ * has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
+ * a negative value otherwise.
*/
-void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
- const char *event_name,
- const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
- bool hash)
+int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
+ const char *event_name,
+ const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
+ bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
{
if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
- return;
+ return -ENOPARAM;
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
- CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_label,
- hash);
+ return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
+ event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
+ event_label, hash, digest,
+ digest_len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
if (!error)
- ima_update_policy_flag();
+ ima_update_policy_flags();
return error;
}
projects / linux-2.6-microblaze.git / blobdiff