From 6ba43b761c41349140662e223401bec0e48950e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: KP Singh Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2020 20:18:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN - Allow BPF_MODIFY_RETURN attachment only to functions that are: * Whitelisted for error injection by checking within_error_injection_list. Similar discussions happened for the bpf_override_return helper. * security hooks, this is expected to be cleaned up with the LSM changes after the KRSI patches introduce the LSM_HOOK macro: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200220175250.10795-1-kpsingh@chromium.org/ - The attachment is currently limited to functions that return an int. This can be extended later other types (e.g. PTR). Signed-off-by: KP Singh Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200304191853.1529-5-kpsingh@chromium.org --- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 30841fb8b3c0..50080add2ab9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -3710,14 +3710,26 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, nr_args--; } - if ((prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || - prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) && - arg == nr_args) { - if (!t) - /* Default prog with 5 args. 6th arg is retval. */ - return true; - /* function return type */ - t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); + if (arg == nr_args) { + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT) { + if (!t) + return true; + t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); + } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { + /* For now the BPF_MODIFY_RETURN can only be attached to + * functions that return an int. + */ + if (!t) + return false; + + t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, NULL); + if (!btf_type_is_int(t)) { + bpf_log(log, + "ret type %s not allowed for fmod_ret\n", + btf_kind_str[BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info)]); + return false; + } + } } else if (arg >= nr_args) { bpf_log(log, "func '%s' doesn't have %d-th argument\n", tname, arg + 1); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 2460c8e6b5be..ae32517d4ccd 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "disasm.h" @@ -9800,6 +9801,33 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return 0; } +#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" + +static int check_attach_modify_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +{ + struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) prog->aux->trampoline->func.addr; + + if (within_error_injection_list(addr)) + return 0; + + /* This is expected to be cleaned up in the future with the KRSI effort + * introducing the LSM_HOOK macro for cleaning up lsm_hooks.h. + */ + if (!strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name, + sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) { + + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; + } + + verbose(env, "fmod_ret attach_btf_id %u (%s) is not modifiable\n", + prog->aux->attach_btf_id, prog->aux->attach_func_name); + + return -EINVAL; +} static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { @@ -10000,6 +10028,9 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } tr->func.addr = (void *)addr; prog->aux->trampoline = tr; + + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) + ret = check_attach_modify_return(env); out: mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex); if (ret) -- 2.20.1