syzbot is reporting OOB read at fbcon_resize() [1], for
commit
39b3cffb8cf31117 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change
from causing potential out-of-bounds access") is by error using
registered_fb[con2fb_map[vc->vc_num]]->fbcon_par->p->userfont (which was
set to non-zero) instead of fb_display[vc->vc_num].userfont (which remains
zero for that display).
We could remove tricky userfont flag [2], for we can determine it by
comparing address of the font data and addresses of built-in font data.
But since that commit is failing to fix the original OOB read [3], this
patch keeps the change minimal in case we decide to revert altogether.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=
ebcbbb6576958a496500fee9cf7aa83ea00b5920
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=Patch&x=
14030853900000
[3] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=
6fba8c186d97cf1011ab17660e633b1cc4e080c9
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+b38b1ef6edf0c74a8d97@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes:
39b3cffb8cf31117 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change from causing potential out-of-bounds access")
Cc: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f6e3e611-8704-1263-d163-f52c906a4f06@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
struct fb_var_screeninfo var = info->var;
int x_diff, y_diff, virt_w, virt_h, virt_fw, virt_fh;
- if (ops->p && ops->p->userfont && FNTSIZE(vc->vc_font.data)) {
+ if (p->userfont && FNTSIZE(vc->vc_font.data)) {
int size;
int pitch = PITCH(vc->vc_font.width);