During setsockopt(SOL_TCP, TLS_TX), if initialization of the software
context fails in tls_set_sw_offload(), we leak sw_ctx. We also don't
reassign ctx->priv_ctx to NULL, so we can't even do another attempt to
set it up on the same socket, as it will fail with -EEXIST.
Fixes:
3c4d7559159b ('tls: kernel TLS support')
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
}
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ goto free_priv;
}
ctx->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
ctx->tag_size = tag_size;
ctx->overhead_size = ctx->prepend_size + ctx->tag_size;
ctx->iv_size = iv_size;
- ctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE,
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->iv) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
+ goto free_priv;
}
memcpy(ctx->iv, gcm_128_info->salt, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
memcpy(ctx->iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE, iv, iv_size);
rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(sw_ctx->aead_send, ctx->tag_size);
if (!rc)
- goto out;
+ return 0;
free_aead:
crypto_free_aead(sw_ctx->aead_send);
free_iv:
kfree(ctx->iv);
ctx->iv = NULL;
+free_priv:
+ kfree(ctx->priv_ctx);
+ ctx->priv_ctx = NULL;
out:
return rc;
}