powerpc/rtas: block error injection when locked down

The error injection facility on pseries VMs allows corruption of
arbitrary guest memory, potentially enabling a sufficiently privileged
user to disable lockdown or perform other modifications of the running
kernel via the rtas syscall.

Block the PAPR error injection facility from being opened or called
when locked down.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM)
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-3-nathanl@linux.ibm.com

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
index 0b8a858..e847f9b 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
@@ -463,6 +464,9 @@ void rtas_call_unlocked(struct rtas_args *args, int token, int nargs, int nret,
        va_end(list);
 }
 
+static int ibm_open_errinjct_token;
+static int ibm_errinjct_token;
+
 int rtas_call(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...)
 {
        va_list list;
@@ -475,6 +479,16 @@ int rtas_call(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...)
        if (!rtas.entry || token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
                return -1;
 
+       if (token == ibm_open_errinjct_token || token == ibm_errinjct_token) {
+               /*
+                * It would be nicer to not discard the error value
+                * from security_locked_down(), but callers expect an
+                * RTAS status, not an errno.
+                */
+               if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION))
+                       return -1;
+       }
+
        if ((mfmsr() & (MSR_IR|MSR_DR)) != (MSR_IR|MSR_DR)) {
                WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
                return -1;
@@ -1173,6 +1187,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rtas, struct rtas_args __user *, uargs)
        if (block_rtas_call(token, nargs, &args))
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       if (token == ibm_open_errinjct_token || token == ibm_errinjct_token) {
+               int err;
+
+               err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION);
+               if (err)
+                       return err;
+       }
+
        /* Need to handle ibm,suspend_me call specially */
        if (token == rtas_token("ibm,suspend-me")) {
 
@@ -1271,7 +1293,8 @@ void __init rtas_initialize(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_RTAS_ERROR_LOGGING
        rtas_last_error_token = rtas_token("rtas-last-error");
 #endif
-
+       ibm_open_errinjct_token = rtas_token("ibm,open-errinjct");
+       ibm_errinjct_token = rtas_token("ibm,errinjct");
        rtas_syscall_filter_init();
 }
 

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7da801c..a6d6760 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
        LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
        LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
        LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
+       LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION,
        LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
        LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
        LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 400ab5d..3f5aa9d 100644 (file)
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
        [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
        [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
        [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
+       [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection",
        [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
        [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
        [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",