Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:
- Add arm64 Shadow Call Stack support for GCC 12 (Dan Li)
- Avoid memset with stack offset randomization under Clang (Marco
Elver)
- Clean up stackleak plugin to play nice with .noinstr (Kees Cook)
- Check stack depth for greater usercopy hardening coverage (Kees Cook)
* tag 'hardening-v5.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arm64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support
m68k: Implement "current_stack_pointer"
xtensa: Implement "current_stack_pointer"
usercopy: Check valid lifetime via stack depth
stack: Constrain and fix stack offset randomization with Clang builds
stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
gcc-plugins/stackleak: Ignore .noinstr.text and .entry.text
gcc-plugins/stackleak: Exactly match strings instead of prefixes
gcc-plugins/stackleak: Provide verbose mode
def_bool y
depends on ARM_PMU
- # Supported by clang >= 7.0
-config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT
- def_bool y
-
+ # Supported by clang >= 7.0 or GCC >= 12.0.0
config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18)