xfrm: make xfrm_alg_auth_len() return unsigned int

Key lengths can't be negative.

Comparison with nla_len() is left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 2abc0e1..5d5e11b 100644 (file)
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_alg_len(const struct xfrm_algo *alg)
        return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
 }
 
-static inline int xfrm_alg_auth_len(const struct xfrm_algo_auth *alg)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_alg_auth_len(const struct xfrm_algo_auth *alg)
 {
        return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
 }

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 09512d9..465c23d 100644 (file)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int verify_auth_trunc(struct nlattr **attrs)
                return 0;
 
        algp = nla_data(rt);
-       if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
+       if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
                return -EINVAL;
 
        algp->alg_name[sizeof(algp->alg_name) - 1] = '\0';