vsprintf: Consistent %pK handling for kptr_restrict == 0
authorPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Wed, 17 Apr 2019 11:53:42 +0000 (13:53 +0200)
committerPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Fri, 26 Apr 2019 14:19:04 +0000 (16:19 +0200)
restricted_pointer() pretends that it prints the address when kptr_restrict
is set to zero. But it is never called in this situation. Instead,
pointer() falls back to ptr_to_id() and hashes the pointer.

This patch removes the potential confusion. klp_restrict is checked only
in restricted_pointer().

It actually fixes a small race when the address might get printed unhashed:

CPU0                            CPU1

pointer()
  if (!kptr_restrict)
     /* for example set to 2 */
  restricted_pointer()
/* echo 0 >/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict */
proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin()
  klpr_restrict = 0;
    switch(kptr_restrict)
      case 0:
break:

    number()

Fixes: ef0010a30935de4e0211 ("vsprintf: don't use 'restricted_pointer()' when not restricting")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417115350.20479-3-pmladek@suse.com
To: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
To: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
lib/vsprintf.c

index eb7b4a0..2af4894 100644 (file)
@@ -725,8 +725,8 @@ char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
 {
        switch (kptr_restrict) {
        case 0:
-               /* Always print %pK values */
-               break;
+               /* Handle as %p, hash and do _not_ leak addresses. */
+               return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
        case 1: {
                const struct cred *cred;
 
@@ -2041,8 +2041,6 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
                        return buf;
                }
        case 'K':
-               if (!kptr_restrict)
-                       break;
                return restricted_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec);
        case 'N':
                return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, spec, fmt);