mm/secretmem: make it on by default
authorMike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Mon, 15 May 2023 08:34:00 +0000 (11:34 +0300)
committerAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Fri, 9 Jun 2023 23:25:21 +0000 (16:25 -0700)
commitb758fe6df50daf68fef089d8f3c1cd49fc794ed2
treed2a077fdaff950540fa4cd9c300d9e370584b5dd
parent90ed667c03fe553a41d79057740ed5df951eead0
mm/secretmem: make it on by default

Following the discussion about direct map fragmentaion at LSF/MM [1], it
appears that direct map fragmentation has a negligible effect on kernel
data accesses.  Since the only reason that warranted secretmem to be
disabled by default was concern about performance regression caused by the
direct map fragmentation, it makes perfect sense to lift this restriction
and make secretmem enabled.

secretmem obeys RLIMIT_MEMBLOCK and as such it is not expected to cause
large fragmentation of the direct map or meaningfull increase in page
tables allocated during split of the large mappings in the direct map.

The secretmem.enable parameter is retained to allow system administrators
to disable secretmem at boot.

Switch the default setting of secretmem.enable parameter to 1.

Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/931406/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230515083400.3563974-1-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
mm/secretmem.c