perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call
authorOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Wed, 24 Feb 2021 21:56:28 +0000 (22:56 +0100)
committerPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Tue, 16 Mar 2021 20:44:43 +0000 (21:44 +0100)
commit08ef1af4de5fe7de9c6d69f1e22e51b66e385d9b
treed8226dbc24dade3a628f9489ebedc697dcd09317
parentff65338e78418e5970a7aabbabb94c46f2bb821d
perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call

Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though
its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in
attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM,
it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation.

SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current
task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission
("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means
that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored
generates a bogus permission check and audit record.

Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when
its result would be honored.

Fixes: b0c8fdc7fdb7 ("lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210224215628.192519-1-omosnace@redhat.com
kernel/events/core.c