X-Git-Url: http://git.monstr.eu/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=Documentation%2Fadmin-guide%2Fhw-vuln%2Fcore-scheduling.rst;h=0febe458597c52a0cb1dc6b2db9b011f343d283d;hb=4ac6d90867a4de2e12117e755dbd76e08d88697f;hp=7b410aef9c5cb400c10b0f3253f2c978c1684fb7;hpb=588b3eee528873d73bf777f329d35b2e65e24777;p=linux-2.6-microblaze.git

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
index 7b410aef9c5c..0febe458597c 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
@@ -181,10 +181,12 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
 --------------------------------------------------------
 1. For MDS
 ~~~~~~~~~~
-Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
-user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
-which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
-attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
+Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings
+running in user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all
+siblings run tasks which trust each other, when the kernel is executing
+code on behalf of a task, it cannot trust the code running in the
+sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes
+(host or guest mode).
 
 2. For L1TF
 ~~~~~~~~~~~