Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

[linux-2.6-microblaze.git] / security / loadpin / loadpin.c

diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 670a1ae..b12f7d9 100644 (file)
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
@@ -117,11 +118,21 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
        }
 }
 
-static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+                            bool contents)
 {
        struct super_block *load_root;
        const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
 
+       /*
+        * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents
+        * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged
+        * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were
+        * no associated file struct.
+        */
+       if (!contents)
+               file = NULL;
+
        /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
        if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
            ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
@@ -176,9 +187,9 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
        return 0;
 }
 
-static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
-       return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
+       return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
 }
 
 static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {