Merge tag 'rpmsg-v5.20-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/remoteproc...
[linux-2.6-microblaze.git] / security / apparmor / task.c
index d17130e..503dc08 100644 (file)
  * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
  */
 
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/task.h"
 
 /**
@@ -177,3 +182,112 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 
        return 0;
 }
+
+/**
+ * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+       switch (mask) {
+       case MAY_READ:
+               return "read";
+       case MAY_WRITE:
+               return "trace";
+       case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
+               return "readby";
+       case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
+               return "tracedby";
+       }
+       return "";
+}
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+       struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+       if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+               audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+                                audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
+
+               if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+                       audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+                                        audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+               }
+       }
+       audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+       aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+                       FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
+/* TODO: conditionals */
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+                            struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+                            struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+       struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+       aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+       aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+                              &perms);
+       aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+       return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+                              struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+                              struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+       if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+           !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+               return 0;
+
+       return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+                              struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+                              struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+       if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+               return 0;
+
+       if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+               return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+       /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+       if (&tracer->label == tracee)
+               return 0;
+
+       aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
+       aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
+       aad(sa)->request = 0;
+       aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+                                   CAP_OPT_NONE);
+
+       return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task label to be traced
+ * @request: permission request
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+                 u32 request)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *profile;
+       u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
+       DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
+
+       return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+                       profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+                       profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+}