/* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back
* and ABORT. Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being
- * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user isses close().
+ * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user issues close().
* Since the socket and all its associations are going away, we
* can treat this OOTB
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED));
- /* SCTP-AUTH: genereate the assocition shared keys so that
- * we can potentially signe the COOKIE-ECHO.
+ /* SCTP-AUTH: generate the association shared keys so that
+ * we can potentially sign the COOKIE-ECHO.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, SCTP_NULL());
goto nomem_init;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Now that we've populate required fields in
- * sctp_process_init, set up the assocaition shared keys as
+ * sctp_process_init, set up the association shared keys as
* necessary so that we can potentially authenticate the ACK
*/
error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(new_asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Add all the state machine commands now since we've created
* everything. This way we don't introduce memory corruptions
- * during side-effect processing and correclty count established
+ * during side-effect processing and correctly count established
* associations.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
commands);
/* Reset init error count upon receipt of COOKIE-ACK,
- * to avoid problems with the managemement of this
+ * to avoid problems with the management of this
* counter in stale cookie situations when a transition back
* from the COOKIE-ECHOED state to the COOKIE-WAIT
* state is performed.
struct sctp_chunk *reply;
/* Send a heartbeat to our peer. */
- reply = sctp_make_heartbeat(asoc, transport);
+ reply = sctp_make_heartbeat(asoc, transport, 0);
if (!reply)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
+/* send hb chunk with padding for PLPMUTD. */
+enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_send_probe(struct net *net,
+ const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ const union sctp_subtype type,
+ void *arg,
+ struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands)
+{
+ struct sctp_transport *transport = (struct sctp_transport *)arg;
+ struct sctp_chunk *reply;
+
+ if (!sctp_transport_pl_enabled(transport))
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
+
+ sctp_transport_pl_send(transport);
+
+ reply = sctp_make_heartbeat(asoc, transport, transport->pl.probe_size);
+ if (!reply)
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(reply));
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PROBE_TIMER_UPDATE,
+ SCTP_TRANSPORT(transport));
+
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
+}
+
/*
* Process an heartbeat request.
*
if (hbinfo->hb_nonce != link->hb_nonce)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+ if (hbinfo->probe_size) {
+ if (hbinfo->probe_size != link->pl.probe_size ||
+ !sctp_transport_pl_enabled(link))
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
+ sctp_transport_pl_recv(link);
+ if (link->pl.state == SCTP_PL_COMPLETE)
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
+
+ return sctp_sf_send_probe(net, ep, asoc, type, link, commands);
+ }
+
max_interval = link->hbinterval + link->rto;
/* Check if the timestamp looks valid. */
commands);
/* Since we are not going to really process this INIT, there
- * is no point in verifying chunk boundries. Just generate
+ * is no point in verifying chunk boundaries. Just generate
* the SHUTDOWN ACK.
*/
reply = sctp_make_shutdown_ack(asoc, chunk);
goto nomem_chunk;
/* Do all the commands now (after allocation), so that we
- * have consistent state if memory allocation failes
+ * have consistent state if memory allocation fails
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP, SCTP_ULPEVENT(ev));
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent
- * potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks.
+ * potential boomming attacks from additional bundled chunks.
* This is documented in SCTP Threats ID.
*/
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/*
- * SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receiving authenticated chukns
+ * SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receiving authenticated chunks
*
* The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in the HMAC
* Identifier field. If this algorithm was not specified by the
/* Handle protocol violation of an invalid chunk bundling. For example,
* when we have an association and we receive bundled INIT-ACK, or
- * SHUDOWN-COMPLETE, our peer is clearly violationg the "MUST NOT bundle"
+ * SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE, our peer is clearly violating the "MUST NOT bundle"
* statement from the specs. Additionally, there might be an attacker
* on the path and we may not want to continue this communication.
*/
* Inputs
* (endpoint, asoc)
*
- * The RFC does not explcitly address this issue, but is the route through the
+ * The RFC does not explicitly address this issue, but is the route through the
* state table when someone issues a shutdown while in COOKIE_ECHOED state.
*
* Outputs
/* RFC2960 9.2 If the timer expires, the endpoint must re-send the SHUTDOWN
* with the updated last sequential TSN received from its peer.
*
- * An endpoint should limit the number of retransmissions of the
+ * An endpoint should limit the number of retransmission of the
* SHUTDOWN chunk to the protocol parameter 'Association.Max.Retrans'.
* If this threshold is exceeded the endpoint should destroy the TCB and
* MUST report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and
}
/*
- * ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF CHunk Procedures
+ * ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF Chunk Procedures
* If the T4 RTO timer expires the endpoint should do B1 to B5
*/
enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire(
chunk->ecn_ce_done = 1;
if (af->is_ce(sctp_gso_headskb(chunk->skb))) {
- /* Do real work as sideffect. */
+ /* Do real work as side effect. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ECN_CE,
SCTP_U32(tsn));
}
projects / linux-2.6-microblaze.git / blobdiff