#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
-#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
+#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)
#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
- memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof (ctx));
+ memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
return err;
}
if (!chan)
return;
- BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "code 0x%2.2x", code);
iv[0].iov_base = &code;
iv[0].iov_len = 1;
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
- BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io,
+ remote_io);
/* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
* request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
passkey %= 1000000;
put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
- BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", passkey);
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
}
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
int ret;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
u8 confirm[16];
int ret;
- BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
+ conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
__u8 *keydist;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
*keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
}
- BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
security_timer.work);
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
}
static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp;
smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
- BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+ bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
goto zfree_smp;
}
smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
- BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
goto free_shash;
}
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
- hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
+ hci_conn_hold(hcon);
return smp;
if (!hcon->out)
return 0;
- BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
- smp->passkey_round + 1);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u",
+ smp->passkey_round + 1);
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
u32 value;
int err;
- BT_DBG("");
-
if (!conn)
return -ENOTCONN;
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
+
chan = conn->smp;
if (!chan)
return -ENOTCONN;
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
- BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", value);
put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
fallthrough;
case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
int ret;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
- BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
u8 key_size, auth;
int ret;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
- BT_DBG("");
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
return sc_check_confirm(smp);
- BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
if (ret)
u32 passkey;
int err;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
struct smp_chan *smp;
u8 sec_level, auth;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
__u8 authreq;
int ret;
- BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon,
+ sec_level);
/* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
if (!conn)
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
struct smp_ltk *ltk;
u8 authenticated;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
- BT_DBG("");
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
bdaddr_t rpa;
- BT_DBG("");
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "");
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct smp_csrk *csrk;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
int err;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+ /* Check if remote and local public keys are the same and debug key is
+ * not in use.
+ */
+ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags) &&
+ !crypto_memneq(key, smp->local_pk, 64)) {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "Remote and local public keys are identical");
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
- BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "selected method 0x%02x", smp->method);
/* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
int err;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
{
struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
- BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "value 0x%02x", kp->value);
return 0;
}
break;
default:
- BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
goto done;
}
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
- BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
if (chan->data)
smp_chan_destroy(conn);
struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
struct smp_chan *smp;
- BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan);
/* Only new pairings are interesting */
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
- BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR");
/* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
bredr_pairing(chan);
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
/* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
* the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
{
int err;
- BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+ bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
if (err) {
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
- BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
+ bt_dev_dbg(pchan->conn->hcon->hdev, "pchan %p", pchan);
chan = l2cap_chan_create();
if (!chan)
*/
atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
- BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
+ bt_dev_dbg(pchan->conn->hcon->hdev, "created chan %p", chan);
return chan;
}
tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
- BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
kfree_sensitive(smp);
return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
}
tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
- BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
kfree_sensitive(smp);
return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
{
struct smp_dev *smp;
- BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+ bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
smp = chan->data;
if (smp) {
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
- BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
/* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
* there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
projects / linux-2.6-microblaze.git / blobdiff