struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
};
-#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64
int access_size;
s64 msize_smax_value;
u64 msize_umax_value;
- int ptr_id;
+ int ref_obj_id;
int func_id;
};
type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL;
}
-static bool type_is_refcounted(enum bpf_reg_type type)
-{
- return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET;
-}
-
-static bool type_is_refcounted_or_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
-{
- return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL;
-}
-
-static bool reg_is_refcounted(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
-{
- return type_is_refcounted(reg->type);
-}
-
static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
return reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
map_value_has_spin_lock(reg->map_ptr);
}
-static bool reg_is_refcounted_or_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
+static bool reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
- return type_is_refcounted_or_null(reg->type);
+ return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
+ type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL ||
+ type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
+ type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL;
}
-static bool arg_type_is_refcounted(enum bpf_arg_type type)
+static bool arg_type_may_be_refcounted(enum bpf_arg_type type)
{
- return type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET;
+ return type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
}
/* Determine whether the function releases some resources allocated by another
static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
{
return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp ||
- func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp;
+ func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp ||
+ func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp;
+}
+
+static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
+{
+ return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock ||
+ func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock;
}
/* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
verbose(env, ",call_%d", func(env, reg)->callsite);
} else {
verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id);
+ if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t))
+ verbose(env, ",ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id);
if (t != SCALAR_VALUE)
verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off);
if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t))
*/
subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
- if (env->log.level > 1)
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start);
struct bpf_reg_state *parent)
{
bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
+ int cnt = 0;
while (parent) {
/* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
parent->var_off.value, parent->off);
return -EFAULT;
}
+ if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ)
+ /* The parentage chain never changes and
+ * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ.
+ * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and
+ * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ.
+ * This case happens when the same register is read
+ * multiple times without writes into it in-between.
+ */
+ break;
/* ... then we depend on parent's value */
parent->live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
state = parent;
parent = state->parent;
writes = true;
+ cnt++;
}
+
+ if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt)
+ env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt;
return 0;
}
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
+ verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
* need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
* to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
*/
- if (env->log.level)
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
print_verifier_state(env, state);
/* The minimum value is only important with signed
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
}
+static int __check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+ int off, int access_size,
+ bool zero_size_allowed)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
+
+ if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
+ access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
+ regno, off, access_size);
+ } else {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d var_off=%s access_size=%d\n",
+ regno, tn_buf, access_size);
+ }
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
* bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
* and all elements of stack are initialized.
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
- int off, i, slot, spi;
+ int err, min_off, max_off, i, slot, spi;
if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
return -EACCES;
}
- /* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
- if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- char tn_buf[48];
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + reg->off;
+ err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ } else {
+ /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
+ * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
+ * Spectre masking for stack ALU.
+ * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
+ */
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
+ char tn_buf[48];
- tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
- regno, tn_buf);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
- if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
- access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
- verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
- regno, off, access_size);
- return -EACCES;
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "R%d indirect variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
+ regno, tn_buf);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
+ * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
+ * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on
+ * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may
+ * cause uninitialized stack leaking.
+ */
+ if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
+ meta = NULL;
+
+ if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
+ reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d unbounded indirect variable offset stack access\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off;
+ max_off = reg->smax_value + reg->off;
+ err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed);
+ if (err) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of stack bound\n",
+ regno);
+ return err;
+ }
+ err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, max_off, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed);
+ if (err) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of stack bound\n",
+ regno);
+ return err;
+ }
}
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
return 0;
}
- for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
+ for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
u8 *stype;
- slot = -(off + i) - 1;
+ slot = -i - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot)
goto err;
goto mark;
}
err:
- verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
- off, i, access_size);
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+ min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
+ } else {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
+ tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
+ }
return -EACCES;
mark:
/* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent);
}
- return update_stack_depth(env, state, off);
+ return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off);
}
static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
/* Any sk pointer can be ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON */
if (!type_is_sk_pointer(type))
goto err_type;
- } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET) {
- expected_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
- if (type != expected_type)
- goto err_type;
- if (meta->ptr_id || !reg->id) {
- verbose(env, "verifier internal error: mismatched references meta=%d, reg=%d\n",
- meta->ptr_id, reg->id);
- return -EFAULT;
+ if (reg->ref_obj_id) {
+ if (meta->ref_obj_id) {
+ verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n",
+ regno, reg->ref_obj_id,
+ meta->ref_obj_id);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id;
}
- meta->ptr_id = reg->id;
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) {
if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) {
if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true))
return true;
}
-static bool check_refcount_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
+static bool check_refcount_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id)
{
int count = 0;
- if (arg_type_is_refcounted(fn->arg1_type))
+ if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg1_type))
count++;
- if (arg_type_is_refcounted(fn->arg2_type))
+ if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg2_type))
count++;
- if (arg_type_is_refcounted(fn->arg3_type))
+ if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg3_type))
count++;
- if (arg_type_is_refcounted(fn->arg4_type))
+ if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg4_type))
count++;
- if (arg_type_is_refcounted(fn->arg5_type))
+ if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg5_type))
count++;
+ /* A reference acquiring function cannot acquire
+ * another refcounted ptr.
+ */
+ if (is_acquire_function(func_id) && count)
+ return false;
+
/* We only support one arg being unreferenced at the moment,
* which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
*/
return count <= 1;
}
-static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
+static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id)
{
return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) &&
check_arg_pair_ok(fn) &&
- check_refcount_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ check_refcount_ok(fn, func_id) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
}
/* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]
}
static void release_reg_references(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct bpf_func_state *state, int id)
+ struct bpf_func_state *state,
+ int ref_obj_id)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
- if (regs[i].id == id)
+ if (regs[i].ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
if (!reg)
continue;
- if (reg_is_refcounted(reg) && reg->id == id)
+ if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
__mark_reg_unknown(reg);
}
}
* resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference.
*/
static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
+ int ref_obj_id)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+ int err;
int i;
+ err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
- release_reg_references(env, vstate->frame[i], meta->ptr_id);
+ release_reg_references(env, vstate->frame[i], ref_obj_id);
- return release_reference_state(cur_func(env), meta->ptr_id);
+ return 0;
}
static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
/* and go analyze first insn of the callee */
*insn_idx = target_insn;
- if (env->log.level) {
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
verbose(env, "caller:\n");
print_verifier_state(env, caller);
verbose(env, "callee:\n");
return err;
*insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1;
- if (env->log.level) {
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n");
print_verifier_state(env, callee);
verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx);
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
- err = check_func_proto(fn);
+ err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return err;
}
} else if (is_release_function(func_id)) {
- err = release_reference(env, &meta);
+ err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) {
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL;
- if (is_acquire_function(func_id)) {
- int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
-
- if (id < 0)
- return id;
- /* For release_reference() */
- regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
- } else {
- /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */
- regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
- }
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
+ } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL) {
+ mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL;
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) {
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) {
+ /* For release_reference() */
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
+ } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id)) {
+ int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
+
+ if (id < 0)
+ return id;
+ /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
+ /* For release_reference() */
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
+ }
+
do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta);
err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
switch (ptr_reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_STACK:
+ /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in
+ * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here.
+ */
off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
if (mask_to_left)
*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
}
ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
- if (!ptr_is_dst_reg)
+ if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
*dst_reg = tmp;
return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) {
reg->type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK;
}
- if (is_null || !(reg_is_refcounted(reg) ||
- reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg))) {
- /* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore,
- * thus we should better reset it, so that state
- * pruning has chances to take effect.
+ if (is_null) {
+ /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point
+ * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it,
+ * so that state pruning has chances to take effect.
+ */
+ reg->id = 0;
+ reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
+ } else if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) {
+ /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset
+ * in release_reg_references().
+ *
+ * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other
+ * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset.
*/
reg->id = 0;
}
{
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs;
+ u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id;
u32 id = regs[regno].id;
int i, j;
- if (reg_is_refcounted_or_null(®s[regno]) && is_null)
- release_reference_state(state, id);
+ if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null)
+ /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch.
+ * No one could have freed the reference state before
+ * doing the NULL check.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, ®s[i], id, is_null);
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
- if (env->log.level)
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
int i, t;
- insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+ insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
return -ENOMEM;
- insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+ insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_stack) {
- kfree(insn_state);
+ kvfree(insn_state);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
err_free:
- kfree(insn_state);
- kfree(insn_stack);
+ kvfree(insn_state);
+ kvfree(insn_stack);
return ret;
}
}
/* Propagate read liveness of registers... */
BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG);
- /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
- for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
- if (vparent->frame[vparent->curframe]->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
- continue;
- if (vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
- err = mark_reg_read(env, &vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]->regs[i],
- &vparent->frame[vstate->curframe]->regs[i]);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) {
+ /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */
+ for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
+ if (vparent->frame[frame]->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
+ continue;
+ if (vstate->frame[frame]->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
+ err = mark_reg_read(env, &vstate->frame[frame]->regs[i],
+ &vparent->frame[frame]->regs[i]);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
}
}
static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
- struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
+ struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev;
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
- sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
+ pprev = &env->explored_states[insn_idx];
+ sl = *pprev;
+
if (!sl)
/* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
* be doing state search here
while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
+ sl->hit_cnt++;
/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
* prune the search.
* Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
return err;
return 1;
}
- sl = sl->next;
states_cnt++;
+ sl->miss_cnt++;
+ /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial
+ * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view.
+ * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time,
+ * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed.
+ */
+ if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) {
+ /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to
+ * speed up verification
+ */
+ *pprev = sl->next;
+ if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
+ free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
+ kfree(sl);
+ env->peak_states--;
+ } else {
+ /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may
+ * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to
+ * be freed at the end of verification
+ */
+ sl->next = env->free_list;
+ env->free_list = sl;
+ }
+ sl = *pprev;
+ continue;
+ }
+ pprev = &sl->next;
+ sl = *pprev;
}
+ if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt)
+ env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt;
+
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
return 0;
new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_sl)
return -ENOMEM;
+ env->total_states++;
+ env->peak_states++;
/* add new state to the head of linked list */
new = &new_sl->state;
struct bpf_verifier_state *state;
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
- int insn_cnt = env->prog->len, i;
- int insn_processed = 0;
+ int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
bool do_print_state = false;
env->prev_linfo = NULL;
insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
- if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
+ if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
verbose(env,
"BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
- insn_processed);
+ env->insn_processed);
return -E2BIG;
}
return err;
if (err == 1) {
/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
- if (env->log.level) {
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
if (do_print_state)
verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
if (need_resched())
cond_resched();
- if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) {
- if (env->log.level > 1)
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 ||
+ (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL && do_print_state)) {
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
else
verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:",
do_print_state = false;
}
- if (env->log.level) {
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
.cb_print = verbose,
.private_data = env,
env->insn_idx++;
}
- verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d), stack depth ",
- insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS);
- for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
- u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
-
- verbose(env, "%d", depth);
- if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
- verbose(env, "+");
- }
- verbose(env, "\n");
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
return 0;
}
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
- if (!new_prog)
+ if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE)
+ verbose(env,
+ "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n",
+ env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx);
return NULL;
+ }
if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
return NULL;
adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len);
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
int i;
+ sl = env->free_list;
+ while (sl) {
+ sln = sl->next;
+ free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
+ kfree(sl);
+ sl = sln;
+ }
+
if (!env->explored_states)
return;
}
}
- kfree(env->explored_states);
+ kvfree(env->explored_states);
+}
+
+static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) {
+ verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n",
+ div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000));
+ verbose(env, "stack depth ");
+ for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
+ u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
+
+ verbose(env, "%d", depth);
+ if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
+ verbose(env, "+");
+ }
+ verbose(env, "\n");
+ }
+ verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d "
+ "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n",
+ env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS,
+ env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states,
+ env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk);
}
int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
{
+ u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns();
struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
struct bpf_verifier_log *log;
int i, len, ret = -EINVAL;
ret = -EINVAL;
/* log attributes have to be sane */
- if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
- !log->level || !log->ubuf)
+ if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 2 ||
+ !log->level || !log->ubuf || log->level & ~BPF_LOG_MASK)
goto err_unlock;
}
goto skip_full_check;
}
- env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
+ env->explored_states = kvcalloc(env->prog->len,
sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
GFP_USER);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (ret == 0)
ret = fixup_call_args(env);
+ env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time;
+ print_verification_stats(env);
+
if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log))
ret = -ENOSPC;
if (log->level && !log->ubuf) {