#include <trace/events/sched.h>
+static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
int suid_dumpable = 0;
static LIST_HEAD(formats);
}
/*
- * Like copy_strings, but get argv and its values from kernel memory.
+ * Copy and argument/environment string from the kernel to the processes stack.
*/
-int copy_strings_kernel(int argc, const char *const *__argv,
- struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+int copy_string_kernel(const char *arg, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int r;
- mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
- struct user_arg_ptr argv = {
- .ptr.native = (const char __user *const __user *)__argv,
- };
+ int len = strnlen(arg, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) + 1 /* terminating NUL */;
+ unsigned long pos = bprm->p;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len))
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ /* We're going to work our way backwards. */
+ arg += len;
+ bprm->p -= len;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU) && bprm->p < bprm->argmin)
+ return -E2BIG;
- set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
- r = copy_strings(argc, argv, bprm);
- set_fs(oldfs);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned int bytes_to_copy = min_t(unsigned int, len,
+ min_not_zero(offset_in_page(pos), PAGE_SIZE));
+ struct page *page;
+ char *kaddr;
+
+ pos -= bytes_to_copy;
+ arg -= bytes_to_copy;
+ len -= bytes_to_copy;
+
+ page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1);
+ if (!page)
+ return -E2BIG;
+ kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
+ flush_arg_page(bprm, pos & PAGE_MASK, page);
+ memcpy(kaddr + offset_in_page(pos), arg, bytes_to_copy);
+ flush_kernel_dcache_page(page);
+ kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+ put_arg_page(page);
+ }
- return r;
+ return 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_strings_kernel);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_string_kernel);
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
tsk = current;
old_mm = current->mm;
exec_mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
+ if (old_mm)
+ sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
ret = mutex_lock_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (old_mm) {
- sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
/*
* Make sure that if there is a core dump in progress
* for the old mm, we get out and die instead of going
return 0;
}
-/*
- * This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table,
- * so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without
- * disturbing other processes. (Other processes might share the signal
- * table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().)
- */
static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
tsk->start_boottime = leader->start_boottime;
BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk));
- BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid(tsk));
/*
* An exec() starts a new thread group with the
* TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the
/* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid.
* The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group.
- * Note: The old leader also uses this pid until release_task
- * is called. Odd but simple and correct.
*/
- tsk->pid = leader->pid;
- change_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID, task_pid(leader));
+ exchange_tids(tsk, leader);
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_TGID);
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID);
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID);
}
+/*
+ * This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table,
+ * so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without
+ * disturbing other processes. (Other processes might share the signal
+ * table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().)
+ */
static int unshare_sighand(struct task_struct *me)
{
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = me->sighand;
* Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
* seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
* signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
- * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handlers (see below).
+ * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below).
*/
-int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
+int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
struct task_struct *me = current;
int retval;
+ /* Once we are committed compute the creds */
+ retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure all future errors are fatal.
+ */
+ bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
+
/*
* Make this the only thread in the thread group.
*/
*/
set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
+ /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
+ if (bprm->have_execfd)
+ would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
/*
* Release all of the old mmap stuff
if (retval)
goto out;
- /*
- * After setting bprm->called_exec_mmap (to mark that current is
- * using the prepared mm now), we have nothing left of the original
- * process. If anything from here on returns an error, the check
- * in search_binary_handler() will SEGV current.
- */
- bprm->called_exec_mmap = 1;
bprm->mm = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
*/
retval = unshare_sighand(me);
if (retval)
- goto out;
+ goto out_unlock;
set_fs(USER_DS);
me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD |
* undergoing exec(2).
*/
do_close_on_exec(me->files);
+
+ if (bprm->secureexec) {
+ /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
+ me->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
+ * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
+ * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
+ * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
+ * needing to clean up the change on failure.
+ */
+ if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
+ bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
+ }
+
+ me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
+ * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
+ * bprm->secureexec instead.
+ */
+ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
+ !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
+ gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
+ set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ else
+ set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+
+ perf_event_exec();
+ __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
+
+ /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
+ group */
+ WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1);
+ flush_signal_handlers(me, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * install the new credentials for this executable
+ */
+ security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
+
+ commit_creds(bprm->cred);
+ bprm->cred = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Disable monitoring for regular users
+ * when executing setuid binaries. Must
+ * wait until new credentials are committed
+ * by commit_creds() above
+ */
+ if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ perf_event_exit_task(me);
+ /*
+ * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
+ * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
+ * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
+ */
+ security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+
+ /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */
+ if (bprm->have_execfd) {
+ retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ fd_install(retval, bprm->executable);
+ bprm->executable = NULL;
+ bprm->execfd = retval;
+ }
return 0;
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&me->signal->exec_update_mutex);
out:
return retval;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(flush_old_exec);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec);
void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
{
void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
- /*
- * Once here, prepare_binrpm() will not be called any more, so
- * the final state of setuid/setgid/fscaps can be merged into the
- * secureexec flag.
- */
- bprm->secureexec |= bprm->cap_elevated;
-
- if (bprm->secureexec) {
- /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
- current->pdeath_signal = 0;
-
- /*
- * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
- * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
- * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
- * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
- * needing to clean up the change on failure.
- */
- if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
- bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
- }
-
- arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm, &bprm->rlim_stack);
-
- current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
+ /* Setup things that can depend upon the personality */
+ struct task_struct *me = current;
- /*
- * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
- * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
- * bprm->secureexec instead.
- */
- if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
- !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
- gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- else
- set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+ arch_pick_mmap_layout(me->mm, &bprm->rlim_stack);
arch_setup_new_exec();
- perf_event_exec();
- __set_task_comm(current, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
/* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may
* depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on
* some architectures like powerpc
*/
- current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
-
- /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
- group */
- WRITE_ONCE(current->self_exec_id, current->self_exec_id + 1);
- flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
+ me->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
+ mutex_unlock(&me->signal->exec_update_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
/*
* Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex.
- * install_exec_creds() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
+ * setup_new_exec() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
* Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred and
* and unlock.
*/
{
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
- if (bprm->called_exec_mmap)
- mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
abort_creds(bprm->cred);
}
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
fput(bprm->file);
}
+ if (bprm->executable)
+ fput(bprm->executable);
/* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */
if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
kfree(bprm->interp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp);
-/*
- * install the new credentials for this executable
- */
-void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
-
- commit_creds(bprm->cred);
- bprm->cred = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Disable monitoring for regular users
- * when executing setuid binaries. Must
- * wait until new credentials are committed
- * by commit_creds() above
- */
- if (get_dumpable(current->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
- perf_event_exit_task(current);
- /*
- * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
- * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
- * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
- */
- security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
- mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
-
/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
* - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
}
-static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
{
+ /* Handle suid and sgid on files */
struct inode *inode;
unsigned int mode;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
- /*
- * Since this can be called multiple times (via prepare_binprm),
- * we must clear any previous work done when setting set[ug]id
- * bits from any earlier bprm->file uses (for example when run
- * first for a setuid script then again for its interpreter).
- */
- bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
- bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
-
- if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
+ if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt))
return;
if (task_no_new_privs(current))
return;
- inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode);
if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)))
return;
}
}
+/*
+ * Compute brpm->cred based upon the final binary.
+ */
+static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /* Compute creds based on which file? */
+ struct file *file = bprm->execfd_creds ? bprm->executable : bprm->file;
+
+ bprm_fill_uid(bprm, file);
+ return security_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file);
+}
+
/*
* Fill the binprm structure from the inode.
- * Check permissions, then read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes
+ * Read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes
*
* This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example).
*/
-int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int retval;
loff_t pos = 0;
- bprm_fill_uid(bprm);
-
- /* fill in binprm security blob */
- retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
- if (retval)
- return retval;
- bprm->called_set_creds = 1;
-
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, &pos);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_binprm);
-
/*
* Arguments are '\0' separated strings found at the location bprm->p
* points to; chop off the first by relocating brpm->p to right after
/*
* cycle the list of binary formats handler, until one recognizes the image
*/
-int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
bool need_retry = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULES);
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
int retval;
- /* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
- if (bprm->recursion_depth > 5)
- return -ELOOP;
+ retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ return retval;
retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
if (retval)
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
- bprm->recursion_depth++;
retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
- bprm->recursion_depth--;
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
- if (retval < 0 && bprm->called_exec_mmap) {
- /* we got to flush_old_exec() and failed after it */
- read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
- force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV);
- return retval;
- }
- if (retval != -ENOEXEC || !bprm->file) {
+ if (bprm->point_of_no_return || (retval != -ENOEXEC)) {
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
return retval;
}
return retval;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(search_binary_handler);
static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
- int ret;
+ int ret, depth;
/* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */
old_pid = current->pid;
old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent));
rcu_read_unlock();
- ret = search_binary_handler(bprm);
- if (ret >= 0) {
- audit_bprm(bprm);
- trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
- ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
- proc_exec_connector(current);
+ /* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
+ for (depth = 0;; depth++) {
+ struct file *exec;
+ if (depth > 5)
+ return -ELOOP;
+
+ ret = search_binary_handler(bprm);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (!bprm->interpreter)
+ break;
+
+ exec = bprm->file;
+ bprm->file = bprm->interpreter;
+ bprm->interpreter = NULL;
+
+ allow_write_access(exec);
+ if (unlikely(bprm->have_execfd)) {
+ if (bprm->executable) {
+ fput(exec);
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+ }
+ bprm->executable = exec;
+ } else
+ fput(exec);
}
- return ret;
+ audit_bprm(bprm);
+ trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
+ ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
+ proc_exec_connector(current);
+ return 0;
}
/*
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
- retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
- if (retval < 0)
+ /* Set the unchanging part of bprm->cred */
+ retval = security_bprm_creds_for_exec(bprm);
+ if (retval)
goto out;
- retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm->filename, bprm);
+ retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->filename, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
return retval;
out:
+ /*
+ * If past the point of no return ensure the the code never
+ * returns to the userspace process. Use an existing fatal
+ * signal if present otherwise terminate the process with
+ * SIGSEGV.
+ */
+ if (bprm->point_of_no_return && !fatal_signal_pending(current))
+ force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV);
if (bprm->mm) {
acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
mmput(bprm->mm);
projects / linux-2.6-microblaze.git / blobdiff