Merge tag 'net-next-5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev...

[linux-2.6-microblaze.git] / arch / arm64 / kvm / hypercalls.c

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
index 550dfa3..9824025 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
@@ -24,27 +24,36 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
                feature = smccc_get_arg1(vcpu);
                switch (feature) {
                case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
-                       switch (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor()) {
-                       case KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
+                       switch (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state()) {
+                       case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
                                break;
-                       case KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
+                       case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
                                val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
                                break;
-                       case KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
+                       case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
                                val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED;
                                break;
                        }
                        break;
                case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
-                       switch (kvm_arm_have_ssbd()) {
-                       case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
-                       case KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
+                       switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) {
+                       case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
                                break;
-                       case KVM_SSBD_KERNEL:
-                               val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
-                               break;
-                       case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
-                       case KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED:
+                       case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+                               /*
+                                * SSBS everywhere: Indicate no firmware
+                                * support, as the SSBS support will be
+                                * indicated to the guest and the default is
+                                * safe.
+                                *
+                                * Otherwise, expose a permanent mitigation
+                                * to the guest, and hide SSBS so that the
+                                * guest stays protected.
+                                */
+                               if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
+                                       break;
+                               fallthrough;
+                       case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
                                val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED;
                                break;
                        }