io_uring: make loop_rw_iter() use original user supplied pointers

[linux-2.6-microblaze.git] / arch / Kconfig

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 76ec339..958be05 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ config MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER
        bool
        depends on MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE
 
+config ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM
+       bool
+       help
+         Temporary select until all architectures can be converted to have
+         irqs disabled over activate_mm. Architectures that do IPI based TLB
+         shootdowns should enable this.
+
 config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
        bool
 
@@ -450,10 +457,23 @@ config ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC
        select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
        bool
 
+config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
+       bool
+       help
+         An arch should select this symbol to support seccomp mode 1 (the fixed
+         syscall policy), and must provide an overrides for __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
+         and compat syscalls if the asm-generic/seccomp.h defaults need adjustment:
+         - __NR_seccomp_read_32
+         - __NR_seccomp_write_32
+         - __NR_seccomp_exit_32
+         - __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32
+
 config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
        bool
+       select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
        help
          An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
+         - all the requirements for HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
          - syscall_get_arch()
          - syscall_get_arguments()
          - syscall_rollback()
@@ -464,6 +484,23 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
            results in the system call being skipped immediately.
          - seccomp syscall wired up
 
+config SECCOMP
+       prompt "Enable seccomp to safely execute untrusted bytecode"
+       def_bool y
+       depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
+       help
+         This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+         that may need to handle untrusted bytecode during their
+         execution. By using pipes or other transports made available
+         to the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+         syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in their
+         own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is enabled via
+         prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) or the seccomp() syscall, it cannot be
+         disabled and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe
+         syscalls defined by each seccomp mode.
+
+         If unsure, say Y.
+
 config SECCOMP_FILTER
        def_bool y
        depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET