The Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) ======================================== Overview -------- *Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)* is a dynamic data race detector for kernel space. KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based data race detector. Key priorities in KCSAN's design are lack of false positives, scalability, and simplicity. More details can be found in `Implementation Details`_. KCSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to instrument memory accesses. KCSAN is supported in both GCC and Clang. With GCC it requires version 7.3.0 or later. With Clang it requires version 7.0.0 or later. Usage ----- To enable KCSAN configure kernel with:: CONFIG_KCSAN = y KCSAN provides several other configuration options to customize behaviour (see their respective help text for more info). Error reports ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A typical data race report looks like this:: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in generic_permission / kernfs_refresh_inode write to 0xffff8fee4c40700c of 4 bytes by task 175 on cpu 4: kernfs_refresh_inode+0x70/0x170 kernfs_iop_permission+0x4f/0x90 inode_permission+0x190/0x200 link_path_walk.part.0+0x503/0x8e0 path_lookupat.isra.0+0x69/0x4d0 filename_lookup+0x136/0x280 user_path_at_empty+0x47/0x60 vfs_statx+0x9b/0x130 __do_sys_newlstat+0x50/0xb0 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x37/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x85/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 read to 0xffff8fee4c40700c of 4 bytes by task 166 on cpu 6: generic_permission+0x5b/0x2a0 kernfs_iop_permission+0x66/0x90 inode_permission+0x190/0x200 link_path_walk.part.0+0x503/0x8e0 path_lookupat.isra.0+0x69/0x4d0 filename_lookup+0x136/0x280 user_path_at_empty+0x47/0x60 do_faccessat+0x11a/0x390 __x64_sys_access+0x3c/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x85/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 6 PID: 166 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 ================================================================== The header of the report provides a short summary of the functions involved in the race. It is followed by the access types and stack traces of the 2 threads involved in the data race. The other less common type of data race report looks like this:: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x551/0xb10 race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff933db8a2ae6c of 1 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x551/0xb10 e1000_clean+0x533/0xda0 net_rx_action+0x329/0x900 __do_softirq+0xdb/0x2db irq_exit+0x9b/0xa0 do_IRQ+0x9c/0xf0 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x18 default_idle+0x3f/0x220 arch_cpu_idle+0x21/0x30 do_idle+0x1df/0x230 cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20 rest_init+0xc5/0xcb arch_call_rest_init+0x13/0x2b start_kernel+0x6db/0x700 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 ================================================================== This report is generated where it was not possible to determine the other racing thread, but a race was inferred due to the data value of the watched memory location having changed. These can occur either due to missing instrumentation or e.g. DMA accesses. Selective analysis ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ It may be desirable to disable data race detection for specific accesses, functions, compilation units, or entire subsystems. For static blacklisting, the below options are available: * KCSAN understands the ``data_race(expr)`` annotation, which tells KCSAN that any data races due to accesses in ``expr`` should be ignored and resulting behaviour when encountering a data race is deemed safe. * Disabling data race detection for entire functions can be accomplished by using the function attribute ``__no_kcsan`` (or ``__no_kcsan_or_inline`` for ``__always_inline`` functions). To dynamically control for which functions data races are reported, see the `debugfs`_ blacklist/whitelist feature. * To disable data race detection for a particular compilation unit, add to the ``Makefile``:: KCSAN_SANITIZE_file.o := n * To disable data race detection for all compilation units listed in a ``Makefile``, add to the respective ``Makefile``:: KCSAN_SANITIZE := n debugfs ~~~~~~~ * The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan`` can be read to get stats. * KCSAN can be turned on or off by writing ``on`` or ``off`` to ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan``. * Writing ``!some_func_name`` to ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan`` adds ``some_func_name`` to the report filter list, which (by default) blacklists reporting data races where either one of the top stackframes are a function in the list. * Writing either ``blacklist`` or ``whitelist`` to ``/sys/kernel/debug/kcsan`` changes the report filtering behaviour. For example, the blacklist feature can be used to silence frequently occurring data races; the whitelist feature can help with reproduction and testing of fixes. Data Races ---------- Informally, two operations *conflict* if they access the same memory location, and at least one of them is a write operation. In an execution, two memory operations from different threads form a **data race** if they *conflict*, at least one of them is a *plain access* (non-atomic), and they are *unordered* in the "happens-before" order according to the `LKMM <../../tools/memory-model/Documentation/explanation.txt>`_. Relationship with the Linux Kernel Memory Model (LKMM) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The LKMM defines the propagation and ordering rules of various memory operations, which gives developers the ability to reason about concurrent code. Ultimately this allows to determine the possible executions of concurrent code, and if that code is free from data races. KCSAN is aware of *atomic* accesses (``READ_ONCE``, ``WRITE_ONCE``, ``atomic_*``, etc.), but is oblivious of any ordering guarantees. In other words, KCSAN assumes that as long as a plain access is not observed to race with another conflicting access, memory operations are correctly ordered. This means that KCSAN will not report *potential* data races due to missing memory ordering. If, however, missing memory ordering (that is observable with a particular compiler and architecture) leads to an observable data race (e.g. entering a critical section erroneously), KCSAN would report the resulting data race. Race conditions vs. data races ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Race conditions are logic bugs, where unexpected interleaving of racing concurrent operations result in an erroneous state. Data races on the other hand are defined at the *memory model/language level*. Many data races are also harmful race conditions, which a tool like KCSAN reports! However, not all data races are race conditions and vice-versa. KCSAN's intent is to report data races according to the LKMM. A data race detector can only work at the memory model/language level. Deeper analysis, to find high-level race conditions only, requires conveying the intended kernel logic to a tool. This requires (1) the developer writing a specification or model of their code, and then (2) the tool verifying that the implementation matches. This has been done for small bits of code using model checkers and other formal methods, but does not scale to the level of what can be covered with a dynamic analysis based data race detector such as KCSAN. For reasons outlined in this `article `_, data races can be much more subtle, but can cause no less harm than high-level race conditions. Implementation Details ---------------------- The general approach is inspired by `DataCollider `_. Unlike DataCollider, KCSAN does not use hardware watchpoints, but instead relies on compiler instrumentation. Watchpoints are implemented using an efficient encoding that stores access type, size, and address in a long; the benefits of using "soft watchpoints" are portability and greater flexibility in limiting which accesses trigger a watchpoint. More specifically, KCSAN requires instrumenting plain (unmarked, non-atomic) memory operations; for each instrumented plain access: 1. Check if a matching watchpoint exists; if yes, and at least one access is a write, then we encountered a racing access. 2. Periodically, if no matching watchpoint exists, set up a watchpoint and stall for a small delay. 3. Also check the data value before the delay, and re-check the data value after delay; if the values mismatch, we infer a race of unknown origin. To detect data races between plain and atomic memory operations, KCSAN also annotates atomic accesses, but only to check if a watchpoint exists (``kcsan_check_atomic_*``); i.e. KCSAN never sets up a watchpoint on atomic accesses. Key Properties ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. **Memory Overhead:** The current implementation uses a small array of longs to encode watchpoint information, which is negligible. 2. **Performance Overhead:** KCSAN's runtime aims to be minimal, using an efficient watchpoint encoding that does not require acquiring any shared locks in the fast-path. For kernel boot on a system with 8 CPUs: - 5.0x slow-down with the default KCSAN config; - 2.8x slow-down from runtime fast-path overhead only (set very large ``KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH`` and unset ``KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH_RANDOMIZE``). 3. **Annotation Overheads:** Minimal annotations are required outside the KCSAN runtime. As a result, maintenance overheads are minimal as the kernel evolves. 4. **Detects Racy Writes from Devices:** Due to checking data values upon setting up watchpoints, racy writes from devices can also be detected. 5. **Memory Ordering:** KCSAN is *not* explicitly aware of the LKMM's ordering rules; this may result in missed data races (false negatives). 6. **Analysis Accuracy:** For observed executions, due to using a sampling strategy, the analysis is *unsound* (false negatives possible), but aims to be complete (no false positives). Alternatives Considered ----------------------- An alternative data race detection approach for the kernel can be found in `Kernel Thread Sanitizer (KTSAN) `_. KTSAN is a happens-before data race detector, which explicitly establishes the happens-before order between memory operations, which can then be used to determine data races as defined in `Data Races`_. To build a correct happens-before relation, KTSAN must be aware of all ordering rules of the LKMM and synchronization primitives. Unfortunately, any omission leads to false positives, which is especially important in the context of the kernel which includes numerous custom synchronization mechanisms. Furthermore, KTSAN's implementation requires metadata for each memory location (shadow memory); currently, for each page, KTSAN requires 4 pages of shadow memory.