1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
24 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
31 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40 #include <linux/swap.h>
41 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
42 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
43 #include <linux/dcache.h>
44 #include <linux/file.h>
45 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
46 #include <linux/namei.h>
47 #include <linux/mount.h>
48 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
49 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52 #include <linux/tty.h>
54 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
64 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65 #include <net/netlink.h>
66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
67 #include <linux/udp.h>
68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
69 #include <linux/sctp.h>
70 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71 #include <linux/quota.h>
72 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <linux/parser.h>
75 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
77 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78 #include <linux/personality.h>
79 #include <linux/audit.h>
80 #include <linux/string.h>
81 #include <linux/mutex.h>
82 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83 #include <linux/syslog.h>
84 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85 #include <linux/export.h>
86 #include <linux/msg.h>
87 #include <linux/shm.h>
88 #include <linux/bpf.h>
89 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
90 #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
91 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
92 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
93 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
102 #include "netlabel.h"
106 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
108 /* SECMARK reference count */
109 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
111 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
112 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
114 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
116 unsigned long enforcing;
117 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
118 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
121 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
123 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
126 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
127 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
128 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
130 unsigned long enabled;
131 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
132 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
135 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
138 static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
139 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
141 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
146 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
148 pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
152 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
155 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
158 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
159 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
160 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
161 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
162 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
165 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
168 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
172 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
175 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
176 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
177 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
178 * is always considered enabled.
181 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
184 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
187 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
198 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
209 * initialise the security for the init task
211 static void cred_init_security(void)
213 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
216 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
217 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
221 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
223 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
225 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
227 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
232 * get the objective security ID of a task
234 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
239 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
244 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
247 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
248 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
249 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
250 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
252 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
253 struct dentry *dentry,
256 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
258 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
260 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
261 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
266 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
267 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
268 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
270 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
275 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
277 return selinux_inode(inode);
280 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
284 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
286 return ERR_PTR(error);
287 return selinux_inode(inode);
291 * Get the security label of an inode.
293 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
295 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
296 return selinux_inode(inode);
299 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
301 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
303 return selinux_inode(inode);
307 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
309 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
311 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
313 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
314 return selinux_inode(inode);
317 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
319 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
320 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
324 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
326 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
327 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
328 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
330 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
331 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
332 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
333 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
335 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
336 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
337 list_del_init(&isec->list);
338 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
342 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
344 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
345 sb->s_security = NULL;
349 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
350 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
353 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
355 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
356 kfree(opts->fscontext);
357 kfree(opts->context);
358 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
359 kfree(opts->defcontext);
372 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
382 A(rootcontext, true),
387 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
391 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
392 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
393 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
395 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
396 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
401 return tokens[i].opt;
406 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
408 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
409 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
410 const struct cred *cred)
412 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
415 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
416 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
417 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
421 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
422 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
423 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
427 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
428 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
429 const struct cred *cred)
431 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
433 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
434 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
435 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
439 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
440 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
441 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
445 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
447 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
448 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
449 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
450 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
451 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
452 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
453 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
454 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
455 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
458 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
460 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
463 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
464 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
466 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
468 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
469 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
472 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
475 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
476 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
478 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
479 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
480 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
486 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
488 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
489 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
490 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
493 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
494 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
495 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
496 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
497 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
498 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
499 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
500 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
501 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
506 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
507 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
508 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
509 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
510 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
511 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
513 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
514 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
515 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
520 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
523 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
524 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
525 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
527 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
528 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
530 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
532 /* Initialize the root inode. */
533 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
535 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
536 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
537 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
539 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
540 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
541 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
542 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
543 struct inode_security_struct, list);
544 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
545 list_del_init(&isec->list);
546 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
547 inode = igrab(inode);
549 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
550 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
553 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
555 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
560 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
561 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
563 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
565 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
566 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
567 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
568 (old_sid != new_sid))
571 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
572 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
574 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
575 if (mnt_flags & flag)
580 static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
582 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
585 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
586 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
587 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
592 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
593 * labeling information.
595 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
597 unsigned long kern_flags,
598 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
601 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
602 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
603 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
604 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
605 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
606 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
609 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
611 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
613 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
614 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
615 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
620 "before the security server is initialized\n");
623 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
624 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
625 * place the results is not allowed */
631 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
632 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
633 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
634 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
636 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
637 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
638 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
639 * will be used for both mounts)
641 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
645 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
648 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
649 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
650 * than once with different security options.
653 if (opts->fscontext) {
654 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
657 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
659 goto out_double_mount;
660 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
663 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
666 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
668 goto out_double_mount;
669 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
671 if (opts->rootcontext) {
672 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
675 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
677 goto out_double_mount;
678 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
680 if (opts->defcontext) {
681 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
684 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
686 goto out_double_mount;
687 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
691 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
692 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
693 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
694 goto out_double_mount;
699 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
700 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
702 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
703 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
704 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
705 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
706 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
707 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
709 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
710 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
711 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
712 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
714 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
716 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
719 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
721 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
722 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
729 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
730 * line and security labels must be ignored.
732 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
733 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
734 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
736 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
741 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
742 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
743 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
747 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
754 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
756 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
760 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
764 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
765 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
766 * the superblock context if not already set.
768 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
769 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
770 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
774 if (!fscontext_sid) {
775 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
779 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
786 if (!rootcontext_sid)
787 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
789 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
790 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
793 if (rootcontext_sid) {
794 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
799 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
800 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
803 if (defcontext_sid) {
804 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
805 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
807 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
808 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
812 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
813 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
819 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
823 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
825 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
829 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
830 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
835 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
836 const struct super_block *newsb)
838 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
839 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
840 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
841 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
843 if (oldflags != newflags)
845 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
847 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
849 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
851 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
852 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
853 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
854 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
859 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
860 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
861 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
865 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
866 struct super_block *newsb,
867 unsigned long kern_flags,
868 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
871 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
872 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
874 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
875 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
876 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
879 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
880 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
882 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
886 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
887 * place the results is not allowed.
889 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
892 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
893 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
895 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
896 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
897 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
898 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
899 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
902 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
904 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
906 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
907 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
908 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
910 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
911 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
912 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
917 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
918 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
919 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
923 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
927 if (!set_rootcontext) {
928 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
931 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
933 if (set_rootcontext) {
934 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
935 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
937 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
940 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
942 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
946 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
948 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
950 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
954 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
963 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
972 case Opt_rootcontext:
973 if (opts->rootcontext)
975 opts->rootcontext = s;
978 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
980 opts->defcontext = s;
985 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
989 static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
992 int token = Opt_error;
995 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
996 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
997 token = tokens[i].opt;
1002 if (token == Opt_error)
1005 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1006 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1012 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1021 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1027 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1029 char *context = NULL;
1033 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1036 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1041 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1049 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1051 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
1054 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1057 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1060 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1062 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1063 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1067 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1069 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1070 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1074 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1076 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1077 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1081 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1082 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
1083 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1085 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1086 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1090 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1092 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1097 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1099 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1101 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1103 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1105 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1107 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1109 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1111 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1113 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1117 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1120 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1122 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1125 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1127 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1130 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1132 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1138 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1139 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1142 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1149 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1150 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1151 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1152 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1153 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1155 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1157 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1158 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1159 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1160 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1161 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1163 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1165 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1173 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1174 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1175 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1177 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1179 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1180 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1181 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1183 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1185 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1186 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1187 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1188 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1189 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1190 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1191 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1192 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1193 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1194 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1195 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1196 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1197 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1198 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1199 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1201 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1202 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1203 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1205 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1208 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1210 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1212 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1218 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1220 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1222 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1224 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1226 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1228 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1230 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1232 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1234 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1236 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1238 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1240 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1242 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1244 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1246 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1248 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1250 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1252 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1254 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1256 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1258 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1260 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1262 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1264 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1266 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1268 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1270 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1272 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1274 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1279 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1282 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1288 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1289 char *buffer, *path;
1291 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1295 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1299 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1300 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1301 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1302 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1303 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1308 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1310 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1311 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1312 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1316 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1320 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1321 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1323 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1328 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1329 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1333 context[len] = '\0';
1334 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1335 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1338 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1339 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1344 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1348 context[len] = '\0';
1349 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1354 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1355 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1356 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1363 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1366 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1367 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1369 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1370 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1373 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1374 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1381 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1382 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1384 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1385 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1386 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1388 struct dentry *dentry;
1391 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1394 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1395 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1398 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1399 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1401 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1402 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1403 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1404 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1405 server is ready to handle calls. */
1406 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1407 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1408 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1409 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1413 sclass = isec->sclass;
1414 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1416 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1417 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1419 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1420 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1422 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1423 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1424 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1427 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1428 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1430 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1431 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1434 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1435 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1436 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1437 * two, depending upon that...
1439 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1441 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1445 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1446 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1447 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1448 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1449 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1450 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1451 * be used again by userspace.
1456 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1465 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1466 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1469 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1470 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1471 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1475 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1476 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1479 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1482 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1483 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1484 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1485 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1488 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1489 * d_splice_alias. */
1490 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1492 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1493 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1494 * a connected one, so try that first.
1496 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1498 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1501 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1502 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1503 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1504 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1505 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1506 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1507 * could be used again by userspace.
1511 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1512 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1518 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1519 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1520 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1533 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1534 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1536 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1540 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1545 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1549 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1550 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1556 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1557 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1560 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1561 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1564 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1565 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1568 /* All other signals. */
1569 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1576 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1577 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1580 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1581 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1582 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1584 struct common_audit_data ad;
1585 struct av_decision avd;
1587 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1588 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1591 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1594 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1596 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1599 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1602 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1607 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1608 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1609 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1610 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1611 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1618 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1619 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1620 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1621 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1622 struct inode *inode,
1624 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1626 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1629 validate_creds(cred);
1631 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1634 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1635 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1637 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1638 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1641 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1642 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1643 pathname if needed. */
1644 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1645 struct dentry *dentry,
1648 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1649 struct common_audit_data ad;
1651 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1652 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1653 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1654 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1657 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1658 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1659 pathname if needed. */
1660 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1661 const struct path *path,
1664 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1665 struct common_audit_data ad;
1667 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1669 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1670 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1673 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1674 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1678 struct common_audit_data ad;
1680 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1682 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1685 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1686 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1689 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1690 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1691 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1692 check a particular permission to the file.
1693 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1694 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1695 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1696 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1697 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1701 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1702 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1703 struct common_audit_data ad;
1704 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1707 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1710 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1711 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1720 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1721 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1726 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1729 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1736 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1739 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1741 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1744 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1746 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1747 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1748 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1749 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1751 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1753 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1754 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1762 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1763 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1764 struct dentry *dentry,
1767 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1768 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1769 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1771 struct common_audit_data ad;
1774 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1775 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1779 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1780 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1782 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1783 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1784 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1789 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1794 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1795 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1799 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1801 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1802 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1806 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1809 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1810 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1811 struct dentry *dentry,
1815 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1816 struct common_audit_data ad;
1817 u32 sid = current_sid();
1821 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1822 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1824 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1825 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1828 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1829 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1830 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1845 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1850 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1851 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1855 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1856 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1857 struct inode *new_dir,
1858 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1860 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1861 struct common_audit_data ad;
1862 u32 sid = current_sid();
1864 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1867 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1868 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1869 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1870 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1872 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1874 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1875 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1876 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1877 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1880 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1882 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1885 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1886 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1888 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1893 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1894 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1895 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1896 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1897 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1898 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1901 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1902 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1903 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1904 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1907 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1915 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1916 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1917 struct super_block *sb,
1919 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1921 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1922 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1924 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1925 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1926 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1929 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1930 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1934 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1935 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1936 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1937 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1940 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1942 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1946 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1948 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1950 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1957 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1958 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1962 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1964 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1965 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1972 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1981 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1984 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1986 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1987 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1989 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1990 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1996 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1998 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2000 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2001 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2003 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2004 mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2005 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2008 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2009 struct task_struct *to)
2011 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2012 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2013 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2016 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2017 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2018 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2019 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2024 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2025 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2029 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2030 struct task_struct *to)
2032 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2033 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2035 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2036 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2040 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2041 struct task_struct *to,
2044 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2045 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2046 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2047 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2048 struct common_audit_data ad;
2051 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2052 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2054 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2064 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2065 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2070 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2073 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2074 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2075 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2079 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2082 u32 sid = current_sid();
2083 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2085 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2086 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2087 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2089 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2090 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2093 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2095 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2096 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2097 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2100 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2101 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2104 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2105 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2108 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2109 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2110 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2111 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2113 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2114 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2115 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2119 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2120 * which was removed).
2122 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2123 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2124 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2125 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2128 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2129 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2131 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2134 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2136 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2151 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2159 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2160 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2163 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2169 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2171 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2173 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2176 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2179 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2180 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2181 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2182 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2183 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2184 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2185 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2186 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2187 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2188 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2189 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2190 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2193 /* All other syslog types */
2194 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2195 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2196 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2200 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2201 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2202 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2204 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2205 * processes that allocate mappings.
2207 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2209 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2211 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2212 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2216 return cap_sys_admin;
2219 /* binprm security operations */
2221 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2224 struct task_struct *tracer;
2227 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2229 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2235 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2236 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2237 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2239 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2240 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2244 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2245 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2247 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2248 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2251 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2252 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2253 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2254 * the old and new contexts.
2256 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2259 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2261 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2262 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2263 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2264 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2270 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2271 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2272 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2274 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2280 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2281 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2282 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2289 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2291 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2292 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2293 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2294 struct common_audit_data ad;
2295 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2298 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2299 * the script interpreter */
2301 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2302 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2303 isec = inode_security(inode);
2305 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2306 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2307 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2309 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2310 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2311 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2312 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2314 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2315 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2316 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2317 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2319 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2320 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2324 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2325 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2326 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2332 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2335 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2337 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2340 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2341 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2343 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2344 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2345 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2346 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2350 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2351 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2352 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2353 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2357 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2358 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2359 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2363 /* Check for shared state */
2364 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2365 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2366 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2367 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2373 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2374 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2375 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2376 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2378 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2379 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2381 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2387 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2388 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2390 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2391 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2392 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2393 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2394 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2395 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2397 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2403 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2405 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2408 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2409 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2410 struct files_struct *files)
2412 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2413 struct tty_struct *tty;
2417 tty = get_current_tty();
2419 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2420 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2421 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2423 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2424 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2425 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2426 open file may belong to another process and we are
2427 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2428 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2429 struct tty_file_private, list);
2430 file = file_priv->file;
2431 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2434 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2437 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2441 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2442 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2443 if (!n) /* none found? */
2446 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2447 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2449 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2451 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2452 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2458 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2460 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2462 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2463 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2466 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2467 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2470 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2471 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2473 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2474 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2476 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2477 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2478 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2480 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2481 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2482 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2483 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2484 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2486 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2487 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2488 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2490 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2492 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2493 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2494 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2495 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2497 task_unlock(current);
2498 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2499 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2504 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2507 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2509 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2519 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2520 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2521 * flush and unblock signals.
2523 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2524 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2526 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2527 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2531 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2532 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2533 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2534 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2535 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2536 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2537 recalc_sigpending();
2539 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2542 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2543 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2544 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2545 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2546 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2549 /* superblock security operations */
2551 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2553 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2555 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2559 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2560 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2561 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2563 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2564 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2565 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2566 sb->s_security = sbsec;
2571 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2573 superblock_free_security(sb);
2576 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2578 bool open_quote = false;
2582 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2584 open_quote = !open_quote;
2585 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2591 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2593 char *from = options;
2599 int len = opt_len(from);
2603 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2605 if (token != Opt_error) {
2610 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2615 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2621 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2627 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2632 memmove(to, from, len);
2645 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2651 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2653 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2654 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2658 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2664 if (opts->fscontext) {
2665 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2669 goto out_bad_option;
2671 if (opts->context) {
2672 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2675 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2676 goto out_bad_option;
2678 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2679 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2680 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2681 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2684 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2685 goto out_bad_option;
2687 if (opts->defcontext) {
2688 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2691 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2692 goto out_bad_option;
2697 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2698 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2703 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2705 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2706 struct common_audit_data ad;
2708 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2709 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2710 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2713 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2715 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2716 struct common_audit_data ad;
2718 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2719 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2720 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2723 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2724 const struct path *path,
2726 unsigned long flags,
2729 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2731 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2732 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2733 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2735 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2738 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2739 const struct path *to_path)
2741 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2743 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2746 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2748 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2750 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2751 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2754 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2755 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2757 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2758 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2763 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2767 opts = fc->security;
2769 if (src->fscontext) {
2770 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2771 if (!opts->fscontext)
2775 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2779 if (src->rootcontext) {
2780 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2781 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2784 if (src->defcontext) {
2785 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2786 if (!opts->defcontext)
2792 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2793 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2794 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2795 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2796 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2797 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2801 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2802 struct fs_parameter *param)
2804 struct fs_parse_result result;
2807 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2811 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2813 param->string = NULL;
2819 /* inode security operations */
2821 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2823 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2824 u32 sid = current_sid();
2826 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2827 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2828 isec->inode = inode;
2829 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2830 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2831 isec->task_sid = sid;
2832 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2837 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2839 inode_free_security(inode);
2842 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2843 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2849 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2850 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2851 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2856 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2860 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2862 const struct cred *old,
2867 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2869 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2870 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2871 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2876 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2877 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2881 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2882 const struct qstr *qstr,
2884 void **value, size_t *len)
2886 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2887 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2892 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2894 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2896 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2897 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2902 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2903 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2904 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2905 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2907 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2910 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
2911 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2915 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2918 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2929 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2931 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2934 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2936 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2939 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2941 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2944 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2946 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2949 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2951 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2954 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2956 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2959 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2961 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2964 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2965 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2967 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2970 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2972 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2974 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2977 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2980 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2981 struct common_audit_data ad;
2982 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2985 validate_creds(cred);
2987 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2988 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2989 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2990 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
2992 return PTR_ERR(isec);
2994 return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
2995 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
2996 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
2999 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3000 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3003 struct common_audit_data ad;
3004 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3007 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3010 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3011 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3012 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3018 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3020 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3023 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3024 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3026 struct av_decision avd;
3028 u32 audited, denied;
3030 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3031 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3033 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3037 validate_creds(cred);
3039 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3042 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3044 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3045 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3047 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3049 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3050 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3051 no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
3053 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3054 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3056 if (likely(!audited))
3059 /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */
3063 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3069 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3071 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3072 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3073 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3074 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3076 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3077 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3078 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3084 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3085 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3086 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3088 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3089 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3090 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3091 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3094 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3097 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3099 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3102 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3104 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3105 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3107 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3109 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3114 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3115 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3117 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3118 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3119 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3120 struct common_audit_data ad;
3121 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3124 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3125 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3129 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3130 ordinary setattr permission. */
3131 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3134 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3135 return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3137 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3138 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3141 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3144 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3145 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3147 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3148 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3149 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3150 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3154 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3156 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3157 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3158 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3161 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3162 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3164 const char *str = value;
3166 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3167 audit_size = size - 1;
3173 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3174 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3175 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3176 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3181 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3187 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3188 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3189 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3193 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3198 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3201 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3202 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3206 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3207 const void *value, size_t size,
3210 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3211 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3215 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3216 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3220 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3221 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3222 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3223 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3224 * we've since initialized.
3229 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3232 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3233 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3234 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3238 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3239 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3240 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3242 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3243 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3248 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3250 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3252 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3255 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3257 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3259 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3262 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3264 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3265 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3269 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3270 ordinary setattr permission. */
3271 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3274 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3275 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3279 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3280 unsigned int obj_type)
3285 struct common_audit_data ad;
3287 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3291 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3292 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3295 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3296 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3298 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3299 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3300 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3301 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3305 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3312 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3313 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3314 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3316 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3317 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3318 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3320 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3324 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3326 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3328 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3332 char *context = NULL;
3333 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3336 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3337 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3339 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3340 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3344 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3345 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3346 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3347 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3348 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3349 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3350 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3352 isec = inode_security(inode);
3353 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3354 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3355 isec->sid, &context,
3358 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3372 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3373 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3375 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3376 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3380 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3383 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3386 if (!value || !size)
3389 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3394 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3395 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3397 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3398 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3402 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3404 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3405 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3406 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3410 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3412 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3416 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3419 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3420 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3422 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3423 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3428 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3429 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3430 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3431 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3436 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3438 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3439 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3440 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3442 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3443 return 1; /* Discard */
3445 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3451 /* kernfs node operations */
3453 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3454 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3456 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3457 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3461 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3468 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3472 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3478 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3484 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3485 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3487 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3491 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3493 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3494 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3500 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3505 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3512 /* file security operations */
3514 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3516 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3517 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3519 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3520 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3523 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3524 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3527 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3529 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3530 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3531 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3532 u32 sid = current_sid();
3535 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3538 isec = inode_security(inode);
3539 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3540 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3541 /* No change since file_open check. */
3544 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3547 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3549 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3550 u32 sid = current_sid();
3553 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3559 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3560 * operation to an inode.
3562 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3563 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3565 struct common_audit_data ad;
3566 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3567 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3568 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3569 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3570 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3572 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3573 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3575 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3578 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3580 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3581 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3590 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3593 isec = inode_security(inode);
3594 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3595 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3596 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3601 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3604 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3611 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3612 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3613 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3616 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3617 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3618 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3621 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3624 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3629 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3630 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3633 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3634 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3637 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3642 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3644 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3646 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3647 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3650 if (default_noexec &&
3651 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3652 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3654 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3655 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3656 * This has an additional check.
3658 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3659 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3660 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3666 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3667 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3669 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3670 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3673 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3674 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3676 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3683 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3687 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3688 u32 sid = current_sid();
3689 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3690 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3691 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3697 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3698 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3700 struct common_audit_data ad;
3704 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3706 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3712 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3715 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3716 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3719 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3720 unsigned long reqprot,
3723 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3724 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3726 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3729 if (default_noexec &&
3730 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3732 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3733 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3734 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3735 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3736 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3737 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3738 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3739 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3740 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3741 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3742 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3743 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3744 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3746 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3747 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3748 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3749 * modified content. This typically should only
3750 * occur for text relocations.
3752 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3758 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3761 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3763 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3765 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3768 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3771 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3776 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3777 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3786 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3787 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3788 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3796 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3801 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3808 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3810 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3812 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3813 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3816 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3817 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3820 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3822 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3824 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3825 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3827 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3830 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3832 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3834 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3835 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3836 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3839 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3841 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3843 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3846 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3848 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3849 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3851 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3852 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3854 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3855 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3856 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3857 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3858 * struct as its SID.
3860 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3861 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3863 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3864 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3865 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3866 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3867 * new inode label or new policy.
3868 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3870 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3873 /* task security operations */
3875 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3876 unsigned long clone_flags)
3878 u32 sid = current_sid();
3880 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3881 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3885 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3887 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3890 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3891 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3898 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3900 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3902 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3903 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3908 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3910 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3914 * set the security data for a kernel service
3915 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3917 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3919 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3920 u32 sid = current_sid();
3923 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3925 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3926 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3930 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3931 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3932 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3938 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3939 * objective context of the specified inode
3941 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3943 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3944 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3945 u32 sid = current_sid();
3948 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3950 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3951 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3955 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3959 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3961 struct common_audit_data ad;
3963 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3964 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3966 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3967 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3968 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3971 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
3973 struct common_audit_data ad;
3974 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3975 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3976 u32 sid = current_sid();
3981 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3982 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3983 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
3987 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3990 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3991 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
3992 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3993 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
3998 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3999 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4000 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4001 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4004 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4005 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
4010 case READING_MODULE:
4011 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
4020 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
4025 case LOADING_MODULE:
4026 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4034 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4036 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4037 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4038 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4041 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4043 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4044 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4045 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4048 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4050 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4051 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4052 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4055 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4057 *secid = task_sid(p);
4060 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4062 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4063 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4064 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4067 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4069 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4070 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4071 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4074 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4076 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4077 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4078 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4081 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4088 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4089 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4090 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4091 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4092 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4093 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4094 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4097 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4098 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4100 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4102 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4103 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4104 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4105 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4106 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4107 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4108 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4109 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4114 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4117 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4118 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4121 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4123 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4124 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4125 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4128 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4130 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4131 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4132 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4135 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4136 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4142 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4144 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4146 secid = current_sid();
4148 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4149 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4150 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4153 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4154 struct inode *inode)
4156 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4157 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4159 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4160 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4162 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4163 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4166 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4167 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4168 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4170 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4171 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4173 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4174 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4178 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4179 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4182 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4183 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4187 *proto = ih->protocol;
4189 switch (ih->protocol) {
4191 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4193 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4197 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4201 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4202 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4207 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4209 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4213 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4217 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4218 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4222 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4223 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4225 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4229 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4233 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4234 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4238 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4239 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4240 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4242 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4246 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4250 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4251 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4262 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4264 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4265 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4266 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4269 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4270 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4273 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4274 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4278 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4279 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4282 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4283 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4284 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4293 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4295 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4299 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4300 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4305 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4307 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4311 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4312 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4316 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4317 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4319 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4323 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4324 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4328 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4329 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4330 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4332 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4336 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4337 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4341 /* includes fragments */
4351 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4352 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4357 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4359 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4362 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4363 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4366 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4368 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4371 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4372 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4382 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4383 " unable to parse packet\n");
4393 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4395 * @family: protocol family
4396 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4399 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4400 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4401 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4402 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4403 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4407 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4414 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4417 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4421 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4422 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4423 if (unlikely(err)) {
4425 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4426 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4434 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4435 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4436 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4437 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4439 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4440 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4441 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4442 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4445 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4449 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4450 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4458 /* socket security operations */
4460 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4461 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4463 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4464 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4468 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4469 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4472 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4474 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4475 struct common_audit_data ad;
4476 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4478 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4481 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4485 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4486 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4490 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4491 int protocol, int kern)
4493 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4501 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4502 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4506 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4507 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4510 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4511 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4513 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4514 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4515 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4516 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4517 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4521 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4526 isec->sclass = sclass;
4528 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4531 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4532 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4534 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4535 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4536 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4538 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4544 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4545 struct socket *sockb)
4547 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4548 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4550 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4551 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4556 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4557 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4558 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4560 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4562 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4563 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4567 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4571 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4572 family = sk->sk_family;
4573 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4575 struct common_audit_data ad;
4576 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4577 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4578 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4580 unsigned short snum;
4584 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4585 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4586 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4587 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4589 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4591 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4592 switch (family_sa) {
4595 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4597 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4598 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4599 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4600 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4602 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4604 family_sa = AF_INET;
4606 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4607 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4610 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4612 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4613 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4614 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4620 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4622 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4623 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4628 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4630 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4631 snum < low || snum > high) {
4632 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4636 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4639 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4645 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4646 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4647 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4650 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4651 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4654 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4655 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4658 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4659 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4663 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4667 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4671 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4672 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4674 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4676 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4678 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4685 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4686 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4688 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4691 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4692 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4694 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4695 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4697 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4698 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4701 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4704 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4707 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4708 * way to disconnect the socket
4710 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4714 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4717 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4718 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4719 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4720 struct common_audit_data ad;
4721 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4722 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4723 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4724 unsigned short snum;
4727 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4728 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4729 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4730 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4732 switch (address->sa_family) {
4734 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4735 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4737 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4740 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4741 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4743 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4746 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4747 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4749 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4752 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4755 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4759 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4760 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4761 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4763 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4764 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4766 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4767 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4771 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4773 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4774 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4775 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4776 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4784 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4785 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4786 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4789 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4791 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4795 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4798 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4800 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4803 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4806 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4807 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4811 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4815 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4816 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4817 sclass = isec->sclass;
4819 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4821 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4822 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4824 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4829 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4832 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4835 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4836 int size, int flags)
4838 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4841 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4843 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4846 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4848 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4851 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4855 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4859 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4862 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4865 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4868 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4870 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4873 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4877 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4878 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4879 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4880 struct common_audit_data ad;
4881 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4884 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4886 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4888 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4889 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4890 sksec_other->sclass,
4891 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4895 /* server child socket */
4896 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4897 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4898 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4902 /* connecting socket */
4903 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4908 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4909 struct socket *other)
4911 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4912 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4913 struct common_audit_data ad;
4914 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4916 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4918 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4920 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4921 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4925 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4926 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4927 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4933 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4936 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4938 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4942 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4945 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4947 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4950 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4954 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4955 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4956 struct common_audit_data ad;
4957 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4960 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4962 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4963 ad.u.net->family = family;
4964 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4968 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4969 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4970 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4976 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4979 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4984 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4987 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4988 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4989 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4990 struct common_audit_data ad;
4991 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4996 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4999 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5000 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5003 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5004 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5005 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5006 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5007 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5008 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5010 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5011 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5012 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5015 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5017 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5018 ad.u.net->family = family;
5019 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5023 if (peerlbl_active) {
5026 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5029 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5030 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5032 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5035 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5036 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5039 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5044 if (secmark_active) {
5045 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5046 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5055 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5056 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5061 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5062 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5064 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5065 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5066 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5067 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5068 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5069 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5071 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5076 if (scontext_len > len) {
5081 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5085 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5091 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5093 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5095 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5097 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5099 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5102 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5106 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5107 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5108 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5110 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5113 *secid = peer_secid;
5114 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5119 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5121 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5123 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5127 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5128 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5129 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5130 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5131 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5136 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5138 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5140 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5141 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5145 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5147 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5148 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5150 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5151 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5152 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5154 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5157 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5160 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5162 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5164 *secid = sksec->sid;
5168 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5170 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5171 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5172 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5174 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5175 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5176 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5177 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5180 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5181 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5184 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5185 struct sk_buff *skb)
5187 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5188 struct common_audit_data ad;
5189 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5191 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5195 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5198 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5200 if (peerlbl_active) {
5201 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5202 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5204 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5209 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5210 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5213 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5214 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5216 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5217 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5218 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5219 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5221 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5222 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5223 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5224 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5226 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5228 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5229 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5230 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5231 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5236 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5237 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5238 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5239 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5240 * plug this into the new socket.
5242 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5246 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5247 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5249 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5250 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5253 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5254 * based on their @optname.
5256 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5257 struct sockaddr *address,
5260 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5262 struct sockaddr *addr;
5263 struct socket *sock;
5265 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5268 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5269 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5272 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5273 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5277 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5280 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5283 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5289 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5295 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5296 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5297 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5298 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5300 /* Connect checks */
5301 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5302 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5303 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5304 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5305 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5309 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5310 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5311 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
5312 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5313 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5314 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5315 * primary address is selected.
5316 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5317 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5318 * selinux_socket_connect().
5320 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5334 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5335 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5338 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5339 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5341 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5342 * the non-sctp clone version.
5344 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5345 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5347 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5348 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5349 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5350 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5353 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5354 struct request_sock *req)
5356 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5358 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5362 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5365 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5368 req->secid = connsid;
5369 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5371 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5374 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5375 const struct request_sock *req)
5377 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5379 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5380 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5381 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5382 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5383 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5384 time it will have been created and available. */
5386 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5387 * thread with access to newsksec */
5388 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5391 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5393 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5394 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5396 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5397 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5400 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5403 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5405 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5408 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5411 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5412 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5416 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5418 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5421 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5423 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5426 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5429 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5432 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5434 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5436 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5439 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5445 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5450 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5452 u32 sid = current_sid();
5454 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5455 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5456 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5457 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5458 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5459 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5461 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5462 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5466 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5468 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5470 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5471 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5472 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5475 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5477 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5478 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5480 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5481 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5482 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5483 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5484 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5485 * protocols were being used */
5487 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5488 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5493 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5495 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5496 u32 sid = current_sid();
5499 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5500 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5501 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5504 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5505 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5506 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5514 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5516 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5517 const struct net_device *indev,
5523 struct common_audit_data ad;
5524 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5529 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5532 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5533 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5534 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5535 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5538 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5541 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5543 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5544 ad.u.net->family = family;
5545 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5548 if (peerlbl_active) {
5549 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5550 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5552 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5558 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5559 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5560 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5564 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5565 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5566 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5568 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5574 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5575 struct sk_buff *skb,
5576 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5578 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5581 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5582 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5583 struct sk_buff *skb,
5584 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5586 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5590 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5596 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5599 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5600 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5601 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5604 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5606 if (sk_listener(sk))
5607 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5608 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5609 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5610 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5611 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5612 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5613 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5614 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5615 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5616 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5617 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5618 * best we can do. */
5621 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5622 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5625 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5626 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5632 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5633 struct sk_buff *skb,
5634 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5636 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5639 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5640 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5641 struct sk_buff *skb,
5642 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5644 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5648 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5652 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5653 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5654 struct common_audit_data ad;
5655 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5661 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5663 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5665 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5666 ad.u.net->family = family;
5667 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5670 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5671 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5672 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5673 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5674 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5676 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5677 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5682 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5683 const struct net_device *outdev,
5688 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5690 struct common_audit_data ad;
5691 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5696 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5697 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5698 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5699 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5700 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5701 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5703 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5704 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5705 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5708 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5711 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5712 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5713 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5714 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5715 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5716 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5717 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5718 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5719 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5720 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5722 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5723 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5728 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5729 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5730 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5731 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5733 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5734 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5737 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5738 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5740 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5741 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5742 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5743 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5744 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5745 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5746 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5747 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5748 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5749 * for similar problems. */
5751 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5753 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5754 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5756 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5757 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5758 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5759 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5760 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5761 * pass the packet. */
5762 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5765 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5769 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5773 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5776 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5778 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5780 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5781 * associated socket. */
5782 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5783 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5784 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5787 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5789 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5790 ad.u.net->family = family;
5791 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5795 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5796 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5797 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5798 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5800 if (peerlbl_active) {
5804 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5806 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5808 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5809 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5811 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5813 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5815 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5816 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5822 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5823 struct sk_buff *skb,
5824 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5826 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5829 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5830 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5831 struct sk_buff *skb,
5832 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5834 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5838 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5840 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5843 unsigned int msg_len;
5844 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5845 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5846 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5847 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5848 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5851 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5852 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5854 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5855 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5856 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5857 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5858 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5860 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5863 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5865 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5868 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5869 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5870 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5871 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5872 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5873 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5874 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5875 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5876 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
5877 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5880 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5881 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5887 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5888 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5889 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5891 data_len -= msg_len;
5898 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5900 isec->sclass = sclass;
5901 isec->sid = current_sid();
5904 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5907 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5908 struct common_audit_data ad;
5909 u32 sid = current_sid();
5911 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5913 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5914 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5916 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5917 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5920 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5922 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5924 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5925 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5930 /* message queue security operations */
5931 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5933 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5934 struct common_audit_data ad;
5935 u32 sid = current_sid();
5938 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5939 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5941 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5942 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5944 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5945 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5950 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5952 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5953 struct common_audit_data ad;
5954 u32 sid = current_sid();
5956 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5958 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5959 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5961 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5962 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5963 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5966 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
5974 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5975 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5976 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5977 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5981 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5984 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5987 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5993 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
5997 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5999 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6000 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6001 struct common_audit_data ad;
6002 u32 sid = current_sid();
6005 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6006 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6009 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6011 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6013 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6014 * message queue this message will be stored in
6016 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6017 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6022 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6023 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6025 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6026 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6027 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6030 /* Can this process send the message */
6031 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6032 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6035 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6036 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6037 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6038 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6043 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6044 struct task_struct *target,
6045 long type, int mode)
6047 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6048 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6049 struct common_audit_data ad;
6050 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6053 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6054 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6056 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6057 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6059 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6061 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6063 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6065 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6069 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6070 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6072 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6073 struct common_audit_data ad;
6074 u32 sid = current_sid();
6077 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6078 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6080 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6081 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6083 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6084 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6089 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6091 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6092 struct common_audit_data ad;
6093 u32 sid = current_sid();
6095 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6097 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6098 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6100 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6101 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6102 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6105 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6106 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6114 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6115 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6116 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6117 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6121 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6124 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6131 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6137 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6141 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6142 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6146 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6149 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6151 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6154 /* Semaphore security operations */
6155 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6157 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6158 struct common_audit_data ad;
6159 u32 sid = current_sid();
6162 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6163 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6165 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6166 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6168 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6169 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6174 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6176 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6177 struct common_audit_data ad;
6178 u32 sid = current_sid();
6180 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6182 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6183 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6185 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6186 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6187 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6190 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6191 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6199 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6200 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6201 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6202 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6206 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6217 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6220 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6225 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6231 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6235 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6236 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6241 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6245 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6248 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6254 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6256 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6261 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6264 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6266 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6270 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6273 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6276 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6277 char *name, char **value)
6279 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6285 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6288 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6289 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6290 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6295 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6297 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6299 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6300 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6301 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6302 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6303 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6304 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6305 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6306 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6316 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6326 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6328 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6330 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6335 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6337 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6338 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6339 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6340 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6341 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6342 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6343 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6344 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6345 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6346 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6347 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6348 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6349 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6350 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6351 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6352 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6353 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6354 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6355 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6356 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6362 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6363 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6364 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6368 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6370 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6371 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6372 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6375 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6376 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6377 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6378 audit_size = size - 1;
6381 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6384 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6385 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6390 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6398 new = prepare_creds();
6402 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6403 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6404 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6405 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6406 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6407 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6408 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6409 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6410 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6411 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6412 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6413 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6415 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6416 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6420 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6421 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6422 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6423 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6428 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6430 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6431 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6437 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6438 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6439 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6440 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6444 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6445 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6446 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6448 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6449 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6450 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6469 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6471 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6474 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6476 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6480 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6482 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6486 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6491 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6493 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6495 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6496 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6497 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6501 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6503 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6505 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6507 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6508 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6512 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6514 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6516 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6519 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6522 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6531 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6532 unsigned long flags)
6534 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6535 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6537 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6541 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6542 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6543 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6545 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6551 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6553 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6559 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6560 const struct cred *cred,
6561 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6564 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6567 switch (need_perm) {
6574 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6577 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6583 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6584 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6586 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6587 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6588 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6589 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6597 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6598 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6599 ksec = key->security;
6601 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6602 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6605 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6607 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6608 char *context = NULL;
6612 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6620 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6621 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6623 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6624 u32 sid = current_sid();
6626 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6627 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6632 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6633 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6635 struct common_audit_data ad;
6638 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6639 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6641 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6645 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6646 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6647 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6648 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6649 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6651 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6652 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6655 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6658 struct common_audit_data ad;
6661 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6662 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6664 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6670 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6671 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6672 ibendport.port = port_num;
6673 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6674 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6676 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6677 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6680 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6682 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6684 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6687 sec->sid = current_sid();
6693 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6699 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6700 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6703 u32 sid = current_sid();
6707 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6708 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6709 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6713 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6714 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6725 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6729 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6730 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6731 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6732 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6736 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6737 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6738 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6739 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6740 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6741 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6742 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6744 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6746 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6747 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6748 struct bpf_map *map;
6751 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6752 map = file->private_data;
6753 bpfsec = map->security;
6754 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6755 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6756 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6759 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6760 prog = file->private_data;
6761 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6762 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6763 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6764 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6771 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6773 u32 sid = current_sid();
6774 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6776 bpfsec = map->security;
6777 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6778 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6779 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6782 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6784 u32 sid = current_sid();
6785 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6787 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6788 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6789 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6790 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6793 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6795 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6797 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6801 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6802 map->security = bpfsec;
6807 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6809 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6811 map->security = NULL;
6815 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6817 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6819 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6823 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6824 aux->security = bpfsec;
6829 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6831 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6833 aux->security = NULL;
6838 static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
6840 struct common_audit_data ad;
6841 u32 sid = current_sid();
6842 int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
6843 (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
6844 (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
6846 if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
6847 audit_log(audit_context(),
6848 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
6849 "lockdown_reason=invalid");
6853 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
6856 if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
6857 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6858 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
6859 LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
6861 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6862 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
6863 LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
6866 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6867 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6868 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6869 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6870 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6871 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6874 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6875 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6877 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6879 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6880 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6881 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6882 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6883 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6884 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6885 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6886 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6890 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6894 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6896 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6898 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6902 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6903 event->security = perfsec;
6908 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6910 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6912 event->security = NULL;
6916 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6918 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6919 u32 sid = current_sid();
6921 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6922 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6925 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6927 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6928 u32 sid = current_sid();
6930 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6931 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6936 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
6937 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
6938 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
6939 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
6941 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
6942 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
6944 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
6946 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
6947 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
6948 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
6950 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
6974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7084 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7103 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7124 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7127 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7130 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7137 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7145 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7156 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7164 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
7174 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
7180 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7185 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7189 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7198 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7201 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7205 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7213 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7217 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7222 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7224 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7226 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7227 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7228 selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
7229 selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
7230 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7231 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7233 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7234 cred_init_security();
7236 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7242 ebitmap_cache_init();
7244 hashtab_cache_init();
7246 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7248 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7249 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7251 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7252 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7254 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7255 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7257 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7259 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7264 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7266 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7269 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7271 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7273 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7274 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7275 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7278 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7279 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7280 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7282 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7283 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7284 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7285 .init = selinux_init,
7288 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7290 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7292 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7294 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7295 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7298 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7300 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7301 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7304 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7306 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7307 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7309 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7311 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7313 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7314 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7317 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7319 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7320 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7323 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7325 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7326 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7331 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7333 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7334 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7337 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7339 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7340 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7343 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7344 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7345 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7348 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7352 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7355 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7357 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7359 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7363 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7365 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7366 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7368 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7370 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7374 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7376 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7377 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7380 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7382 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7383 int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7385 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7386 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7390 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7391 /* Only do this once. */
7395 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7397 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7400 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7401 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7404 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7406 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7408 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7411 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */