1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
24 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
31 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
50 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53 #include <linux/tty.h>
55 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
59 #include <net/netlabel.h>
60 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
61 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
62 #include <linux/atomic.h>
63 #include <linux/bitops.h>
64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
65 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66 #include <net/netlink.h>
67 #include <linux/tcp.h>
68 #include <linux/udp.h>
69 #include <linux/dccp.h>
70 #include <linux/sctp.h>
71 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72 #include <linux/quota.h>
73 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75 #include <linux/parser.h>
76 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
78 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79 #include <linux/personality.h>
80 #include <linux/audit.h>
81 #include <linux/string.h>
82 #include <linux/mutex.h>
83 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
84 #include <linux/syslog.h>
85 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
86 #include <linux/export.h>
87 #include <linux/msg.h>
88 #include <linux/shm.h>
89 #include <linux/bpf.h>
90 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
91 #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
103 #include "netlabel.h"
107 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
109 /* SECMARK reference count */
110 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
112 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
115 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
122 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
124 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
127 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
136 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
139 static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
142 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
149 pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
153 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
166 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
182 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
188 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
199 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
210 * initialise the security for the init task
212 static void cred_init_security(void)
214 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
217 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
222 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
224 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
226 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
228 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
233 * get the objective security ID of a task
235 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
240 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
245 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
248 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
249 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
250 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
251 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
253 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
254 struct dentry *dentry,
257 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
259 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
261 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
262 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
267 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
268 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
269 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
271 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
276 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
278 return selinux_inode(inode);
281 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
285 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
287 return ERR_PTR(error);
288 return selinux_inode(inode);
292 * Get the security label of an inode.
294 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
296 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
297 return selinux_inode(inode);
300 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
302 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
304 return selinux_inode(inode);
308 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
310 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
312 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
314 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
315 return selinux_inode(inode);
318 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
320 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
321 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
325 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
327 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
328 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
329 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
331 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
332 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
333 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
334 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
336 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
337 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
338 list_del_init(&isec->list);
339 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
343 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
345 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
346 sb->s_security = NULL;
350 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
351 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
354 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
356 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
357 kfree(opts->fscontext);
358 kfree(opts->context);
359 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
360 kfree(opts->defcontext);
373 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
383 A(rootcontext, true),
388 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
392 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
393 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
394 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
396 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
397 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
402 return tokens[i].opt;
407 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
409 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
410 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
411 const struct cred *cred)
413 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
416 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
417 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
418 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
422 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
423 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
424 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
428 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
429 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
430 const struct cred *cred)
432 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
434 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
435 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
436 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
440 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
441 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
442 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
446 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
448 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
449 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
450 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
451 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
452 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
453 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
454 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
455 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
456 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
459 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
461 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
464 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
465 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
467 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
469 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
472 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
473 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
476 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
477 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
479 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
480 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
481 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
487 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
489 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
490 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
491 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
494 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
495 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
496 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
497 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
498 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
499 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
500 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
501 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
502 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
507 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
508 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
509 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
510 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
511 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
512 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
514 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
515 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
516 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
521 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
524 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
525 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
526 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
528 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
529 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
531 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
533 /* Initialize the root inode. */
534 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
536 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
537 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
538 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
540 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
541 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
542 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
543 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
544 struct inode_security_struct, list);
545 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
546 list_del_init(&isec->list);
547 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
548 inode = igrab(inode);
550 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
551 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
554 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
556 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
561 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
562 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
564 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
566 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
567 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
568 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
569 (old_sid != new_sid))
572 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
573 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
575 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
576 if (mnt_flags & flag)
581 static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
583 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
586 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
587 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
588 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 unsigned long kern_flags,
599 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
601 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
604 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
610 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
612 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
614 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
615 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
616 server is ready to handle calls. */
620 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
621 "before the security server is initialized\n");
624 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
625 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
626 * place the results is not allowed */
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
646 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
649 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
650 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
651 * than once with different security options.
654 if (opts->fscontext) {
655 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
658 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
660 goto out_double_mount;
661 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
664 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
667 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
669 goto out_double_mount;
670 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
672 if (opts->rootcontext) {
673 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
678 goto out_double_mount;
679 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
681 if (opts->defcontext) {
682 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
685 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
687 goto out_double_mount;
688 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
692 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
693 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
694 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
695 goto out_double_mount;
700 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
701 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
703 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
704 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
705 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
706 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
707 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
708 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
710 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
711 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
712 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
713 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
715 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
717 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
720 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
722 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
729 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
730 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
731 * line and security labels must be ignored.
733 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
734 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
736 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
737 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
742 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
744 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
748 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
755 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
757 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
761 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
765 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
766 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
767 * the superblock context if not already set.
769 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
770 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
771 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
775 if (!fscontext_sid) {
776 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
780 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
787 if (!rootcontext_sid)
788 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
790 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
794 if (rootcontext_sid) {
795 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
800 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
801 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
804 if (defcontext_sid) {
805 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
806 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
808 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
809 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
813 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
820 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
830 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
836 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
837 const struct super_block *newsb)
839 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
840 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
841 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
842 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
844 if (oldflags != newflags)
846 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
848 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
850 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
852 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
853 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
854 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
855 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
860 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
861 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
862 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
866 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
867 struct super_block *newsb,
868 unsigned long kern_flags,
869 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
872 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
873 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
875 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
876 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
877 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
880 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
881 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
883 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
887 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
888 * place the results is not allowed.
890 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
893 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
894 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
896 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
897 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
898 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
899 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
900 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
903 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
905 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
907 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
908 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
909 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
911 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
912 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
913 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
918 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
919 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
920 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
924 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
928 if (!set_rootcontext) {
929 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
932 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
934 if (set_rootcontext) {
935 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
936 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
938 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
941 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
943 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
947 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
949 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
951 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
955 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
964 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
973 case Opt_rootcontext:
974 if (opts->rootcontext)
976 opts->rootcontext = s;
979 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
981 opts->defcontext = s;
986 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
990 static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
993 int token = Opt_error;
996 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
997 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
998 token = tokens[i].opt;
1003 if (token == Opt_error)
1006 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1007 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1013 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1022 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1028 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1030 char *context = NULL;
1034 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1037 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1042 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1050 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1052 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
1055 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1058 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1061 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1063 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1064 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1068 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1070 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1071 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1075 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1077 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1078 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1082 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1083 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
1084 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1086 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1087 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1091 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1093 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1098 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1100 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1102 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1104 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1106 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1108 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1110 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1112 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1114 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1118 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1121 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1123 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1126 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1128 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1131 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1133 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1139 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1140 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1150 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1151 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1152 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1153 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1154 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1158 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1159 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1160 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1161 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1162 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1168 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1175 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1176 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1178 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1180 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1181 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1182 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1184 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1186 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1187 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1188 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1189 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1191 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1192 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1193 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1194 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1195 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1197 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1199 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1203 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1209 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1211 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1213 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1219 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1221 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1223 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1225 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1227 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1229 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1231 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1233 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1235 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1237 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1239 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1241 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1243 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1245 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1247 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1249 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1251 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1253 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1255 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1257 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1259 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1261 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1263 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1265 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1267 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1269 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1271 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1273 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1275 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1280 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1283 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1289 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1290 char *buffer, *path;
1292 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1296 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1300 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1301 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1302 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1303 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1304 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1309 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1311 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1312 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1313 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1317 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1321 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1322 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1324 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1329 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1330 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1334 context[len] = '\0';
1335 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1336 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1339 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1340 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1345 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1349 context[len] = '\0';
1350 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1355 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1356 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1357 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1364 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1367 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1368 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1370 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1371 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1374 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1375 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1382 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1383 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1385 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1386 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1387 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1389 struct dentry *dentry;
1392 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1395 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1396 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1399 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1400 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1402 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1403 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1404 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1405 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1406 server is ready to handle calls. */
1407 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1408 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1409 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1410 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1414 sclass = isec->sclass;
1415 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1417 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1418 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1420 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1421 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1423 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1424 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1425 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1428 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1429 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1431 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1432 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1435 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1436 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1437 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1438 * two, depending upon that...
1440 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1442 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1446 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1447 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1448 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1449 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1450 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1451 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1452 * be used again by userspace.
1457 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1463 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1466 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1467 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1470 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1471 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1472 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1476 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1477 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1480 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1483 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1484 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1485 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1486 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1489 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1490 * d_splice_alias. */
1491 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1493 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1494 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1495 * a connected one, so try that first.
1497 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1499 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1502 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1503 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1504 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1505 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1506 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1507 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1508 * could be used again by userspace.
1512 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1513 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1519 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1520 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1521 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1534 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1535 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1537 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1541 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1546 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1550 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1551 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1557 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1558 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1561 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1562 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1565 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1566 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1569 /* All other signals. */
1570 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1577 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1578 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1581 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1582 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1583 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1585 struct common_audit_data ad;
1586 struct av_decision avd;
1588 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1589 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1592 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1595 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1597 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1600 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1603 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1608 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1609 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1610 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1611 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1612 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1619 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1620 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1621 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1622 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1623 struct inode *inode,
1625 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1627 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1630 validate_creds(cred);
1632 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1635 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1636 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1638 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1639 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1642 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1643 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1644 pathname if needed. */
1645 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1649 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1650 struct common_audit_data ad;
1652 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1653 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1654 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1655 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1658 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1659 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1660 pathname if needed. */
1661 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1662 const struct path *path,
1665 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1666 struct common_audit_data ad;
1668 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1670 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1671 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1674 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1675 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1679 struct common_audit_data ad;
1681 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1683 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1686 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1687 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1690 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1691 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1692 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1693 check a particular permission to the file.
1694 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1695 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1696 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1697 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1698 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1702 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1703 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1704 struct common_audit_data ad;
1705 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1708 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1711 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1721 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1722 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1727 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1730 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1737 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1740 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1742 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1745 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1747 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1748 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1749 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1750 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1752 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1754 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1755 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1763 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1764 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1765 struct dentry *dentry,
1768 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1769 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1770 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1772 struct common_audit_data ad;
1775 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1776 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1780 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1781 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1783 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1784 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1785 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1790 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1795 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1796 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1800 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1802 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1803 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1807 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1810 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1811 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1812 struct dentry *dentry,
1816 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1817 struct common_audit_data ad;
1818 u32 sid = current_sid();
1822 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1823 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1825 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1826 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1829 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1830 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1831 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1846 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1851 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1852 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1856 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1857 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1858 struct inode *new_dir,
1859 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1861 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1862 struct common_audit_data ad;
1863 u32 sid = current_sid();
1865 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1868 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1869 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1870 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1871 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1873 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1875 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1876 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1877 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1878 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1881 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1883 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1886 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1887 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1889 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1894 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1895 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1896 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1897 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1898 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1899 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1902 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1903 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1904 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1905 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1908 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1916 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1917 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1918 struct super_block *sb,
1920 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1922 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1923 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1925 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1926 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1927 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1930 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1931 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1935 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1936 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1937 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1938 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1941 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1943 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1947 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1949 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1951 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1958 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1959 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1963 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1965 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1966 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1973 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1982 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
1985 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1987 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1988 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1990 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1991 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1997 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1999 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2001 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2002 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2004 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2005 mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2006 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2009 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2010 struct task_struct *to)
2012 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2013 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2014 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2017 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2018 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2019 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2020 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2025 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2026 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2030 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2031 struct task_struct *to)
2033 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2034 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2036 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2037 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2041 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2042 struct task_struct *to,
2045 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2046 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2047 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2048 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2049 struct common_audit_data ad;
2052 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2053 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2055 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2056 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2065 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2066 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2071 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2074 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2075 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2076 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2080 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2083 u32 sid = current_sid();
2084 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2086 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2087 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2088 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2090 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2091 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2094 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2096 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2097 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2098 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2101 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2102 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2104 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2105 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2106 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2109 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2110 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2111 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2112 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2114 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2115 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2116 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2120 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2121 * which was removed).
2123 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2124 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2125 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2126 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2129 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2130 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2132 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2135 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2137 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2152 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2160 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2161 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2164 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2170 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2172 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2174 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2177 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2180 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2181 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2182 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2183 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2184 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2185 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2186 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2187 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2188 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2189 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2190 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2191 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2194 /* All other syslog types */
2195 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2196 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2197 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2201 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2202 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2203 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2205 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2206 * processes that allocate mappings.
2208 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2210 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2212 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2213 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2217 return cap_sys_admin;
2220 /* binprm security operations */
2222 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2225 struct task_struct *tracer;
2228 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2230 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2236 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2237 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2238 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2240 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2241 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2245 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2246 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2248 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2249 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2252 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2253 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2254 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2255 * the old and new contexts.
2257 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2260 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2262 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2263 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2264 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2265 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2271 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2272 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2273 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2275 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2281 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2282 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2283 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2290 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2292 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2293 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2294 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2295 struct common_audit_data ad;
2296 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2299 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2300 * the script interpreter */
2302 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2303 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2304 isec = inode_security(inode);
2306 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2307 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2308 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2310 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2311 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2312 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2313 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2315 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2316 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2317 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2318 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2320 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2321 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2325 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2326 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2327 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2333 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2336 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2338 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2341 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2342 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2344 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2345 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2346 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2347 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2351 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2352 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2353 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2354 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2358 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2359 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2360 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2364 /* Check for shared state */
2365 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2366 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2367 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2368 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2374 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2375 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2376 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2377 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2379 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2380 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2382 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2388 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2389 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2391 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2392 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2393 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2394 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2395 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2396 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2398 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2404 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2406 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2409 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2410 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2411 struct files_struct *files)
2413 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2414 struct tty_struct *tty;
2418 tty = get_current_tty();
2420 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2421 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2422 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2424 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2425 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2426 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2427 open file may belong to another process and we are
2428 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2429 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2430 struct tty_file_private, list);
2431 file = file_priv->file;
2432 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2435 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2438 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2442 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2443 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2444 if (!n) /* none found? */
2447 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2448 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2450 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2452 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2453 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2459 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2461 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2463 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2464 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2467 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2468 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2471 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2472 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2474 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2475 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2477 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2478 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2479 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2481 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2482 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2483 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2484 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2485 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2487 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2488 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2489 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2491 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2493 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2494 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2495 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2496 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2498 task_unlock(current);
2499 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2500 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2505 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2508 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2510 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2520 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2521 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2522 * flush and unblock signals.
2524 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2525 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2527 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2528 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2532 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2533 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2534 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2535 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2536 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2537 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2538 recalc_sigpending();
2540 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2543 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2544 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2545 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2546 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2547 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2550 /* superblock security operations */
2552 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2554 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2556 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2560 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2561 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2562 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2564 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2565 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2566 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2567 sb->s_security = sbsec;
2572 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2574 superblock_free_security(sb);
2577 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2579 bool open_quote = false;
2583 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2585 open_quote = !open_quote;
2586 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2592 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2594 char *from = options;
2600 int len = opt_len(from);
2604 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2606 if (token != Opt_error) {
2611 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2616 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2622 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2628 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2633 memmove(to, from, len);
2646 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2652 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2654 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2655 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2659 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2665 if (opts->fscontext) {
2666 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2669 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2670 goto out_bad_option;
2672 if (opts->context) {
2673 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2676 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2677 goto out_bad_option;
2679 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2680 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2681 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2682 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2685 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2686 goto out_bad_option;
2688 if (opts->defcontext) {
2689 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2692 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2693 goto out_bad_option;
2698 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2699 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2704 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2706 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2707 struct common_audit_data ad;
2709 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2710 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2711 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2714 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2716 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2717 struct common_audit_data ad;
2719 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2720 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2721 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2724 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2725 const struct path *path,
2727 unsigned long flags,
2730 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2732 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2733 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2734 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2736 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2739 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2740 const struct path *to_path)
2742 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2744 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2747 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2749 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2751 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2752 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2755 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2756 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2758 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2759 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2764 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2768 opts = fc->security;
2770 if (src->fscontext) {
2771 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2772 if (!opts->fscontext)
2776 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2780 if (src->rootcontext) {
2781 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2782 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2785 if (src->defcontext) {
2786 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2787 if (!opts->defcontext)
2793 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2794 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2795 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2796 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2797 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2798 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2802 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2803 struct fs_parameter *param)
2805 struct fs_parse_result result;
2808 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2812 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2814 param->string = NULL;
2820 /* inode security operations */
2822 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2824 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2825 u32 sid = current_sid();
2827 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2828 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2829 isec->inode = inode;
2830 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2831 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2832 isec->task_sid = sid;
2833 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2838 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2840 inode_free_security(inode);
2843 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2844 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2850 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2851 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2852 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2857 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2861 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2863 const struct cred *old,
2868 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2870 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2871 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2872 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2877 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2878 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2882 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2883 const struct qstr *qstr,
2885 void **value, size_t *len)
2887 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2888 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2893 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2895 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2897 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2898 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2903 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2904 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2905 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2906 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2908 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2911 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
2912 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2916 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2919 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2930 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2932 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2935 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2937 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2940 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2942 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2945 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2947 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2950 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2952 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2955 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2957 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2960 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2962 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2965 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2966 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2968 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2971 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2973 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2975 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2978 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2981 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2982 struct common_audit_data ad;
2983 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2986 validate_creds(cred);
2988 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2989 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2990 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2991 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
2993 return PTR_ERR(isec);
2995 return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
2996 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
2997 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
3000 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3001 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3004 struct common_audit_data ad;
3005 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3008 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3011 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3012 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3013 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3019 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3021 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3024 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3025 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3027 struct av_decision avd;
3029 u32 audited, denied;
3031 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3032 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3034 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3038 validate_creds(cred);
3040 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3043 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3045 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3046 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3048 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3050 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3051 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3052 no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
3054 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3055 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3057 if (likely(!audited))
3060 /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */
3064 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3070 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3072 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3073 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3074 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3075 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3077 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3078 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3079 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3085 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3086 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3087 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3089 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3090 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3091 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3092 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3095 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3098 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3100 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3103 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3105 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3106 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3108 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3110 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3115 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3116 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3118 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3119 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3120 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3121 struct common_audit_data ad;
3122 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3125 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3126 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3130 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3131 ordinary setattr permission. */
3132 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3135 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3136 return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3138 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3139 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3142 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3145 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3146 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3148 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3149 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3150 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3151 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3155 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3157 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3158 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3159 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3162 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3163 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3165 const char *str = value;
3167 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3168 audit_size = size - 1;
3174 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3175 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3176 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3177 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3182 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3188 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3189 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3190 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3194 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3199 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3202 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3203 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3207 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3208 const void *value, size_t size,
3211 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3216 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3217 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3221 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3222 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3223 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3224 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3225 * we've since initialized.
3230 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3233 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3234 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3239 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3240 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3241 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3243 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3244 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3249 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3251 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3253 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3256 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3258 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3260 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3263 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3265 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3266 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3270 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3271 ordinary setattr permission. */
3272 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3275 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3278 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3279 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3283 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3284 unsigned int obj_type)
3289 struct common_audit_data ad;
3291 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3295 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3296 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3299 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3300 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3302 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3303 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3304 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3305 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3309 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3316 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3317 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3318 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3320 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3321 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3322 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3324 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3328 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3330 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3332 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3336 char *context = NULL;
3337 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3340 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3341 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3343 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3344 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3348 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3349 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3350 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3351 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3352 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3353 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3354 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3356 isec = inode_security(inode);
3357 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3358 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3359 isec->sid, &context,
3362 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3376 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3377 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3379 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3380 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3384 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3387 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3390 if (!value || !size)
3393 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3398 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3399 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3401 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3402 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3406 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3408 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3409 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3410 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3414 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3416 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3420 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3423 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3424 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3426 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3427 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3432 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3433 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3434 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3435 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3440 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3442 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3443 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3444 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3446 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3447 return 1; /* Discard */
3449 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3455 /* kernfs node operations */
3457 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3458 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3460 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3461 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3465 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3472 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3476 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3482 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3488 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3489 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3491 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3495 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3497 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3498 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3504 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3509 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3516 /* file security operations */
3518 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3520 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3521 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3523 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3524 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3527 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3528 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3531 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3533 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3534 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3535 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3536 u32 sid = current_sid();
3539 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3542 isec = inode_security(inode);
3543 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3544 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3545 /* No change since file_open check. */
3548 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3551 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3553 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3554 u32 sid = current_sid();
3557 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3563 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3564 * operation to an inode.
3566 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3567 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3569 struct common_audit_data ad;
3570 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3571 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3572 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3573 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3574 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3576 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3577 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3579 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3582 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3584 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3585 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3594 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3597 isec = inode_security(inode);
3598 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3599 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3600 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3605 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3608 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3615 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3616 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3617 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3620 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3621 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3622 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3625 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3628 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3633 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3634 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3637 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3638 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3641 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3646 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3648 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3650 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3651 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3654 if (default_noexec &&
3655 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3656 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3658 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3659 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3660 * This has an additional check.
3662 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3663 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3664 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3670 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3671 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3673 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3674 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3677 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3678 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3680 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3687 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3691 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3692 u32 sid = current_sid();
3693 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3694 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3695 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3701 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3702 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3704 struct common_audit_data ad;
3708 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3710 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3716 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3719 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3720 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3723 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3724 unsigned long reqprot,
3727 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3728 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3730 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3733 if (default_noexec &&
3734 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3736 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3737 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3738 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3739 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3740 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3741 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3742 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3743 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3744 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3745 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3746 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3747 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3748 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3750 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3751 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3752 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3753 * modified content. This typically should only
3754 * occur for text relocations.
3756 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3762 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3765 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3767 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3769 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3772 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3775 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3780 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3781 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3790 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3791 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3792 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3800 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3805 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3812 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3814 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3816 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3817 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3820 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3821 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3824 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3826 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3828 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3829 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3831 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3834 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3836 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3838 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3839 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3840 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3843 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3845 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3847 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3850 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3852 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3853 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3855 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3856 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3858 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3859 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3860 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3861 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3862 * struct as its SID.
3864 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3865 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3867 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3868 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3869 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3870 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3871 * new inode label or new policy.
3872 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3874 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3877 /* task security operations */
3879 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3880 unsigned long clone_flags)
3882 u32 sid = current_sid();
3884 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3885 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3889 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3891 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3894 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3895 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3902 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3904 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3906 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3907 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3912 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3914 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3918 * set the security data for a kernel service
3919 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3921 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3923 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3924 u32 sid = current_sid();
3927 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3929 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3930 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3934 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3935 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3936 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3942 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3943 * objective context of the specified inode
3945 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3947 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3948 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3949 u32 sid = current_sid();
3952 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3954 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3955 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3959 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3963 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3965 struct common_audit_data ad;
3967 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3968 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3970 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3971 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3972 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3975 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
3977 struct common_audit_data ad;
3978 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3979 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3980 u32 sid = current_sid();
3985 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3986 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3987 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
3991 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3994 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3995 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
3996 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3997 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4002 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4003 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4004 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4005 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4008 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4009 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4015 case READING_MODULE:
4016 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4025 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4030 case LOADING_MODULE:
4031 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4039 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4041 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4042 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4043 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4046 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4048 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4049 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4050 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4053 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4055 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4056 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4057 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4060 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4062 *secid = task_sid(p);
4065 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4067 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4068 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4069 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4072 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4074 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4075 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4076 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4079 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4081 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4082 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4083 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4086 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4093 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4094 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4095 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4096 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4097 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4098 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4099 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4102 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4103 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4105 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4107 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4108 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4109 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4110 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4111 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4112 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4113 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4114 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4119 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4121 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4122 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4123 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4126 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4128 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4129 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4130 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4133 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4135 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4136 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4137 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4140 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4141 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4147 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4149 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4151 secid = current_sid();
4153 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4154 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4155 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4158 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4159 struct inode *inode)
4161 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4162 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4164 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4165 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4167 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4168 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4171 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4172 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4173 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4175 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4176 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4178 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4179 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4183 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4184 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4187 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4188 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4192 *proto = ih->protocol;
4194 switch (ih->protocol) {
4196 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4198 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4202 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4206 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4207 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4212 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4214 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4218 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4222 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4223 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4227 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4228 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4230 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4234 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4238 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4239 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4243 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4244 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4245 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4247 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4251 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4255 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4256 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4267 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4269 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4270 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4271 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4274 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4275 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4278 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4279 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4283 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4284 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4287 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4288 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4289 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4298 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4300 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4304 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4305 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4310 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4312 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4316 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4317 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4321 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4322 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4324 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4328 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4329 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4333 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4334 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4335 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4337 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4341 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4342 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4346 /* includes fragments */
4356 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4357 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4362 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4364 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4367 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4368 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4371 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4373 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4376 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4377 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4387 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4388 " unable to parse packet\n");
4398 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4400 * @family: protocol family
4401 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4404 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4405 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4406 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4407 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4408 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4412 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4419 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4422 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4426 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4427 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4428 if (unlikely(err)) {
4430 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4431 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4439 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4440 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4441 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4442 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4444 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4445 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4446 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4447 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4450 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4454 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4455 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4463 /* socket security operations */
4465 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4466 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4468 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4469 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4473 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4474 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4477 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4479 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4480 struct common_audit_data ad;
4481 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4483 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4486 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4490 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4491 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4495 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4496 int protocol, int kern)
4498 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4506 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4507 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4511 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4512 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4515 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4516 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4518 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4519 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4521 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4522 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4526 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4531 isec->sclass = sclass;
4533 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4536 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4537 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4539 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4540 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4541 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4543 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4549 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4550 struct socket *sockb)
4552 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4553 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4555 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4556 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4561 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4562 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4563 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4565 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4567 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4568 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4572 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4576 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4577 family = sk->sk_family;
4578 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4580 struct common_audit_data ad;
4581 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4582 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4583 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4585 unsigned short snum;
4589 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4590 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4591 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4592 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4594 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4596 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4597 switch (family_sa) {
4600 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4602 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4603 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4604 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4605 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4607 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4609 family_sa = AF_INET;
4611 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4612 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4615 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4617 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4618 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4619 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4625 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4627 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4628 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4633 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4635 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4636 snum < low || snum > high) {
4637 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4641 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4644 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4650 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4651 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4652 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4655 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4656 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4659 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4660 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4663 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4664 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4668 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4672 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4676 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4677 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4679 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4681 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4683 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4690 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4691 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4693 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4696 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4697 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4699 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4700 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4702 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4703 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4706 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4709 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4712 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4713 * way to disconnect the socket
4715 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4719 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4722 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4723 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4724 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4725 struct common_audit_data ad;
4726 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4727 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4728 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4729 unsigned short snum;
4732 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4733 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4734 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4735 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4737 switch (address->sa_family) {
4739 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4740 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4742 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4745 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4746 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4748 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4751 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4752 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4754 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4757 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4760 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4764 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4765 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4766 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4768 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4769 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4771 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4772 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4776 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4778 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4779 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4780 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4781 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4789 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4790 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4791 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4794 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4796 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4800 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4803 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4805 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4808 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4811 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4812 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4816 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4820 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4821 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4822 sclass = isec->sclass;
4824 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4826 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4827 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4829 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4834 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4837 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4840 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4841 int size, int flags)
4843 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4846 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4848 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4851 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4853 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4856 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4860 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4864 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4867 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4870 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4873 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4875 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4878 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4882 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4883 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4884 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4885 struct common_audit_data ad;
4886 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4889 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4891 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4893 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4894 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4895 sksec_other->sclass,
4896 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4900 /* server child socket */
4901 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4902 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4903 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4907 /* connecting socket */
4908 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4913 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4914 struct socket *other)
4916 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4917 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4918 struct common_audit_data ad;
4919 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4921 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4923 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4925 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4926 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4930 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4931 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4932 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4938 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4941 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4943 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4947 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4950 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4952 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4955 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4959 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4960 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4961 struct common_audit_data ad;
4962 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4965 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4967 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4968 ad.u.net->family = family;
4969 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4973 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4974 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4975 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4981 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4984 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4989 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4992 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4993 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4994 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4995 struct common_audit_data ad;
4996 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5001 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5004 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5005 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5008 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5009 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5010 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5011 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5012 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5013 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5015 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5016 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5017 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5020 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5022 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5023 ad.u.net->family = family;
5024 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5028 if (peerlbl_active) {
5031 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5034 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5035 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5037 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5040 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5041 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5044 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5049 if (secmark_active) {
5050 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5051 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5060 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5061 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5066 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5067 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5069 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5070 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5071 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5072 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5073 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5074 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5076 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5081 if (scontext_len > len) {
5086 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5090 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5096 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5098 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5100 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5102 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5104 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5107 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5111 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5112 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5113 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5115 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5118 *secid = peer_secid;
5119 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5124 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5126 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5128 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5132 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5133 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5134 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5135 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5136 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5141 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5143 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5145 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5146 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5150 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5152 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5153 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5155 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5156 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5157 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5159 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5162 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5165 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5167 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5169 *secid = sksec->sid;
5173 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5175 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5176 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5177 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5179 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5180 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5181 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5182 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5185 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5186 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5189 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5190 struct sk_buff *skb)
5192 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5193 struct common_audit_data ad;
5194 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5196 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5200 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5203 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5205 if (peerlbl_active) {
5206 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5207 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5209 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5214 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5215 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5218 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5219 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5221 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5222 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5223 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5224 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5226 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5227 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5228 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5229 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5231 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5233 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5234 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5235 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5236 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5241 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5242 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5243 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5244 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5245 * plug this into the new socket.
5247 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5251 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5252 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5254 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5255 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5258 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5259 * based on their @optname.
5261 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5262 struct sockaddr *address,
5265 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5267 struct sockaddr *addr;
5268 struct socket *sock;
5270 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5273 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5274 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5277 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5278 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5282 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5285 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5288 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5294 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5300 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5301 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5302 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5303 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5305 /* Connect checks */
5306 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5307 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5308 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5309 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5310 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5314 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5315 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5316 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5317 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5318 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5319 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5320 * primary address is selected.
5321 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5322 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5323 * selinux_socket_connect().
5325 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5339 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5340 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5343 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5344 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5346 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5347 * the non-sctp clone version.
5349 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5350 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5352 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5353 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5354 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5355 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5358 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5359 struct request_sock *req)
5361 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5363 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5367 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5370 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5373 req->secid = connsid;
5374 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5376 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5379 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5380 const struct request_sock *req)
5382 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5384 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5385 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5386 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5387 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5388 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5389 time it will have been created and available. */
5391 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5392 * thread with access to newsksec */
5393 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5396 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5398 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5399 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5401 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5402 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5405 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5408 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5410 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5413 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5416 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5417 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5421 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5423 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5426 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5428 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5431 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5434 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5437 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5439 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5441 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5444 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5450 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5455 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5457 u32 sid = current_sid();
5459 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5460 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5461 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5462 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5463 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5464 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5466 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5467 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5471 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5473 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5475 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5476 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5477 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5480 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5482 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5483 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5485 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5486 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5487 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5488 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5489 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5490 * protocols were being used */
5492 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5493 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5498 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5500 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5501 u32 sid = current_sid();
5504 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5505 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5506 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5509 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5510 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5511 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5519 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5521 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5522 const struct net_device *indev,
5528 struct common_audit_data ad;
5529 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5534 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5537 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5538 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5539 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5540 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5543 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5546 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5548 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5549 ad.u.net->family = family;
5550 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5553 if (peerlbl_active) {
5554 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5555 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5557 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5563 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5564 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5565 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5569 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5570 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5571 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5573 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5579 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5580 struct sk_buff *skb,
5581 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5583 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5586 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5587 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5588 struct sk_buff *skb,
5589 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5591 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5595 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5601 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5604 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5605 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5606 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5609 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5611 if (sk_listener(sk))
5612 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5613 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5614 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5615 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5616 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5617 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5618 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5619 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5620 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5621 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5622 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5623 * best we can do. */
5626 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5627 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5630 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5631 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5637 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5638 struct sk_buff *skb,
5639 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5641 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5644 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5645 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5646 struct sk_buff *skb,
5647 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5649 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5653 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5657 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5658 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5659 struct common_audit_data ad;
5660 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5666 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5668 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5670 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5671 ad.u.net->family = family;
5672 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5675 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5676 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5677 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5678 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5679 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5681 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5682 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5687 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5688 const struct net_device *outdev,
5693 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5695 struct common_audit_data ad;
5696 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5701 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5702 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5703 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5704 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5705 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5706 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5708 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5709 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5710 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5713 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5716 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5717 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5718 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5719 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5720 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5721 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5722 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5723 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5724 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5725 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5727 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5728 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5733 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5734 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5735 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5736 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5738 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5739 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5742 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5743 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5745 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5746 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5747 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5748 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5749 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5750 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5751 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5752 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5753 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5754 * for similar problems. */
5756 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5758 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5759 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5761 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5762 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5763 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5764 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5765 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5766 * pass the packet. */
5767 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5770 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5774 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5778 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5781 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5783 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5785 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5786 * associated socket. */
5787 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5788 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5789 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5792 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5794 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5795 ad.u.net->family = family;
5796 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5800 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5801 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5802 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5803 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5805 if (peerlbl_active) {
5809 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5811 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5813 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5814 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5816 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5818 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5820 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5821 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5827 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5828 struct sk_buff *skb,
5829 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5831 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5834 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5835 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5836 struct sk_buff *skb,
5837 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5839 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5843 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5845 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5848 unsigned int msg_len;
5849 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5850 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5851 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5852 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5853 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5856 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5857 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5859 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5860 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5861 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5862 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5863 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5865 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5868 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5870 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5873 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5874 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5875 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5876 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5877 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5878 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5879 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5880 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5881 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
5882 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5885 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5886 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5892 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5893 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5894 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5896 data_len -= msg_len;
5903 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5905 isec->sclass = sclass;
5906 isec->sid = current_sid();
5909 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5912 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5913 struct common_audit_data ad;
5914 u32 sid = current_sid();
5916 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5918 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5919 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5921 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5922 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5925 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5927 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5929 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5930 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5935 /* message queue security operations */
5936 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5938 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5939 struct common_audit_data ad;
5940 u32 sid = current_sid();
5943 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5944 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5946 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5947 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5949 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5950 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5955 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5957 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5958 struct common_audit_data ad;
5959 u32 sid = current_sid();
5961 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5963 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5964 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5966 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5967 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5968 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5971 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
5979 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5980 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5981 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5982 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5986 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5989 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5992 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5998 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6002 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6004 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6005 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6006 struct common_audit_data ad;
6007 u32 sid = current_sid();
6010 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6011 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6014 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6016 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6018 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6019 * message queue this message will be stored in
6021 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6022 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6027 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6028 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6030 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6031 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6032 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6035 /* Can this process send the message */
6036 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6037 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6040 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6041 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6042 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6043 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6048 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6049 struct task_struct *target,
6050 long type, int mode)
6052 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6053 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6054 struct common_audit_data ad;
6055 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6058 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6059 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6061 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6062 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6064 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6066 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6068 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6070 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6074 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6075 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6077 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6078 struct common_audit_data ad;
6079 u32 sid = current_sid();
6082 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6083 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6085 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6086 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6088 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6089 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6094 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6096 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6097 struct common_audit_data ad;
6098 u32 sid = current_sid();
6100 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6102 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6103 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6105 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6106 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6107 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6110 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6111 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6119 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6120 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6121 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6122 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6126 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6129 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6136 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6142 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6146 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6147 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6151 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6154 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6156 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6159 /* Semaphore security operations */
6160 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6162 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6163 struct common_audit_data ad;
6164 u32 sid = current_sid();
6167 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6168 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6170 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6171 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6173 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6174 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6179 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6181 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6182 struct common_audit_data ad;
6183 u32 sid = current_sid();
6185 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6187 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6188 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6190 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6191 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6192 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6195 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6196 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6204 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6205 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6206 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6207 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6211 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6222 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6225 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6230 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6236 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6240 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6241 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6246 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6250 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6253 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6259 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6261 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6266 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6269 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6271 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6275 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6278 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6281 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6282 char *name, char **value)
6284 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6290 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6293 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6294 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6295 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6300 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6302 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6304 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6305 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6306 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6307 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6308 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6309 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6310 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6311 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6321 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6331 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6333 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6335 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6340 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6342 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6343 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6344 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6345 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6346 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6347 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6348 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6349 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6350 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6351 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6352 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6353 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6354 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6355 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6356 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6357 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6358 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6359 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6360 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6361 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6367 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6368 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6369 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6373 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6375 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6376 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6377 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6380 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6381 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6382 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6383 audit_size = size - 1;
6386 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6389 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6390 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6395 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6403 new = prepare_creds();
6407 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6408 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6409 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6410 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6411 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6412 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6413 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6414 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6415 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6416 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6417 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6418 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6420 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6421 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6425 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6426 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6427 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6428 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6433 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6435 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6436 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6442 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6443 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6444 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6445 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6449 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6450 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6451 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6453 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6454 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6455 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6474 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6476 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6479 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6481 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6485 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6487 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6491 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6496 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6498 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6500 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6501 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6502 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6506 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6508 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6510 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6512 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6513 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6517 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6519 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6521 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6524 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6527 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6536 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6537 unsigned long flags)
6539 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6540 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6542 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6546 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6547 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6548 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6550 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6556 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6558 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6564 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6565 const struct cred *cred,
6566 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6569 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6572 switch (need_perm) {
6579 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6582 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6588 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6589 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6591 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6592 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6593 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6594 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6602 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6603 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6604 ksec = key->security;
6606 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6607 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6610 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6612 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6613 char *context = NULL;
6617 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6625 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6626 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6628 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6629 u32 sid = current_sid();
6631 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6632 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6637 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6638 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6640 struct common_audit_data ad;
6643 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6644 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6646 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6650 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6651 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6652 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6653 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6654 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6656 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6657 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6660 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6663 struct common_audit_data ad;
6666 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6667 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6669 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6675 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6676 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6677 ibendport.port = port_num;
6678 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6679 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6681 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6682 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6685 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6687 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6689 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6692 sec->sid = current_sid();
6698 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6704 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6705 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6708 u32 sid = current_sid();
6712 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6713 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6714 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6718 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6719 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6730 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6734 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6735 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6736 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6737 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6741 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6742 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6743 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6744 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6745 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6746 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6747 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6749 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6751 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6752 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6753 struct bpf_map *map;
6756 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6757 map = file->private_data;
6758 bpfsec = map->security;
6759 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6760 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6761 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6764 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6765 prog = file->private_data;
6766 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6767 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6768 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6769 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6776 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6778 u32 sid = current_sid();
6779 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6781 bpfsec = map->security;
6782 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6783 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6784 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6787 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6789 u32 sid = current_sid();
6790 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6792 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6793 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6794 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6795 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6798 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6800 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6802 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6806 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6807 map->security = bpfsec;
6812 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6814 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6816 map->security = NULL;
6820 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6822 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6824 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6828 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6829 aux->security = bpfsec;
6834 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6836 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6838 aux->security = NULL;
6843 static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
6845 struct common_audit_data ad;
6846 u32 sid = current_sid();
6847 int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
6848 (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
6849 (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
6851 if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
6852 audit_log(audit_context(),
6853 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
6854 "lockdown_reason=invalid");
6858 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
6861 if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
6862 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6863 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
6864 LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
6866 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6867 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
6868 LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
6871 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6872 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6873 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6874 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6875 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6876 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6879 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6880 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6882 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6884 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6885 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6886 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6887 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6888 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6889 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6890 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6891 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6895 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6899 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6901 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6903 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6907 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6908 event->security = perfsec;
6913 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6915 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6917 event->security = NULL;
6921 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6923 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6924 u32 sid = current_sid();
6926 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6927 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6930 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6932 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6933 u32 sid = current_sid();
6935 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6936 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6941 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
6942 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
6943 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
6944 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
6946 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
6947 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
6949 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
6951 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
6952 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
6953 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
6955 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
6974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
6990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7084 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7108 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7129 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7132 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7135 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7142 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7150 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7161 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7169 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
7179 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
7185 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7190 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7194 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7203 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7206 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7210 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7218 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7222 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7227 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7229 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7231 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7232 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7233 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7234 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7235 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7236 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7238 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7239 cred_init_security();
7241 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7247 ebitmap_cache_init();
7249 hashtab_cache_init();
7251 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7253 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7254 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7256 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7257 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7259 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7260 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7262 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7264 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7269 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7271 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7274 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7276 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7278 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7279 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7280 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7283 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7284 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7285 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7287 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7288 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7289 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7290 .init = selinux_init,
7293 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7295 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7297 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7299 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7300 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7303 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7305 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7306 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7309 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7311 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7312 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7314 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7316 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7318 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7319 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7322 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7324 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7325 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7328 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7330 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7331 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7336 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7338 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7339 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7342 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7344 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7345 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7348 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7349 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7350 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7353 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7357 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7360 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7362 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7364 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7368 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7370 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7371 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7373 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7375 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7379 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7381 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7382 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7385 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7387 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7388 int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7390 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7391 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7395 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7396 /* Only do this once. */
7400 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7402 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7405 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7406 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7409 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7411 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7413 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7416 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */