1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
24 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
31 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
50 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53 #include <linux/tty.h>
55 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
59 #include <net/netlabel.h>
60 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
61 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
62 #include <linux/atomic.h>
63 #include <linux/bitops.h>
64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
65 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66 #include <net/netlink.h>
67 #include <linux/tcp.h>
68 #include <linux/udp.h>
69 #include <linux/dccp.h>
70 #include <linux/sctp.h>
71 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72 #include <linux/quota.h>
73 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75 #include <linux/parser.h>
76 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
78 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79 #include <linux/personality.h>
80 #include <linux/audit.h>
81 #include <linux/string.h>
82 #include <linux/mutex.h>
83 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
84 #include <linux/syslog.h>
85 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
86 #include <linux/export.h>
87 #include <linux/msg.h>
88 #include <linux/shm.h>
89 #include <linux/bpf.h>
90 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
91 #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
103 #include "netlabel.h"
107 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
109 /* SECMARK reference count */
110 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
112 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
115 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
122 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
124 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
127 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
136 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
139 static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
142 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
149 pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
153 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
166 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
182 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
188 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
199 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
210 * initialise the security for the init task
212 static void cred_init_security(void)
214 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
217 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
222 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
224 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
226 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
228 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
233 * get the objective security ID of a task
235 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
240 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
245 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
248 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
249 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
250 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
251 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
253 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
254 struct dentry *dentry,
257 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
259 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
261 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
262 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
267 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
268 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
269 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
271 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
276 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
278 return selinux_inode(inode);
281 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
285 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
287 return ERR_PTR(error);
288 return selinux_inode(inode);
292 * Get the security label of an inode.
294 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
296 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
297 return selinux_inode(inode);
300 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
302 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
304 return selinux_inode(inode);
308 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
310 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
312 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
314 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
315 return selinux_inode(inode);
318 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
320 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
321 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
325 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
327 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
328 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
329 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
331 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
332 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
333 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
334 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
336 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
337 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
338 list_del_init(&isec->list);
339 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
343 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
345 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
346 sb->s_security = NULL;
350 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
351 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
354 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
356 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
357 kfree(opts->fscontext);
358 kfree(opts->context);
359 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
360 kfree(opts->defcontext);
373 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
383 A(rootcontext, true),
388 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
392 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
393 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
394 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
396 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
397 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
402 return tokens[i].opt;
407 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
409 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
410 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
411 const struct cred *cred)
413 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
416 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
417 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
418 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
422 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
423 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
424 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
428 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
429 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
430 const struct cred *cred)
432 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
434 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
435 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
436 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
440 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
441 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
442 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
446 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
448 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
449 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
450 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
451 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
452 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
453 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
454 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
455 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
456 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
459 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
461 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
464 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
465 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
467 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
469 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
472 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
473 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
476 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
477 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
479 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
480 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
481 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
487 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
489 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
490 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
491 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
494 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
495 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
496 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
497 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
498 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
499 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
500 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
501 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
502 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
507 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
508 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
509 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
510 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
511 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
512 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
514 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
515 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
516 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
521 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
524 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
525 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
526 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
528 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
529 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
531 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
533 /* Initialize the root inode. */
534 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
536 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
537 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
538 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
540 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
541 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
542 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
543 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
544 struct inode_security_struct, list);
545 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
546 list_del_init(&isec->list);
547 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
548 inode = igrab(inode);
550 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
551 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
554 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
556 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
561 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
562 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
564 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
566 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
567 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
568 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
569 (old_sid != new_sid))
572 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
573 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
575 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
576 if (mnt_flags & flag)
581 static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
583 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
586 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
587 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
588 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 unsigned long kern_flags,
599 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
601 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
604 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
610 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
612 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
614 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
615 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
616 server is ready to handle calls. */
620 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
621 "before the security server is initialized\n");
624 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
625 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
626 * place the results is not allowed */
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
646 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
649 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
650 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
651 * than once with different security options.
654 if (opts->fscontext) {
655 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
658 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
660 goto out_double_mount;
661 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
664 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
667 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
669 goto out_double_mount;
670 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
672 if (opts->rootcontext) {
673 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
678 goto out_double_mount;
679 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
681 if (opts->defcontext) {
682 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
685 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
687 goto out_double_mount;
688 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
692 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
693 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
694 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
695 goto out_double_mount;
700 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
701 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
703 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
704 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
705 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
706 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
707 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
708 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
710 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
711 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
712 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
713 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
715 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
717 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
720 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
722 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
729 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
730 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
731 * line and security labels must be ignored.
733 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
734 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
736 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
737 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
742 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
744 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
748 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
755 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
757 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
761 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
765 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
766 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
767 * the superblock context if not already set.
769 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
770 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
771 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
775 if (!fscontext_sid) {
776 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
780 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
787 if (!rootcontext_sid)
788 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
790 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
794 if (rootcontext_sid) {
795 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
800 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
801 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
804 if (defcontext_sid) {
805 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
806 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
808 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
809 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
813 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
820 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
830 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
836 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
837 const struct super_block *newsb)
839 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
840 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
841 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
842 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
844 if (oldflags != newflags)
846 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
848 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
850 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
852 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
853 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
854 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
855 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
860 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
861 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
862 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
866 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
867 struct super_block *newsb,
868 unsigned long kern_flags,
869 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
872 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
873 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
875 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
876 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
877 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
880 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
881 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
883 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
887 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
888 * place the results is not allowed.
890 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
893 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
894 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
896 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
897 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
898 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
899 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
900 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
903 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
905 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
907 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
908 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
909 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
911 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
912 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
913 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
918 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
919 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
920 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
924 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
928 if (!set_rootcontext) {
929 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
932 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
934 if (set_rootcontext) {
935 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
936 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
938 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
941 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
943 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
947 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
949 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
951 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
955 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
964 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
973 case Opt_rootcontext:
974 if (opts->rootcontext)
976 opts->rootcontext = s;
979 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
981 opts->defcontext = s;
986 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
990 static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
993 int token = Opt_error;
996 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
997 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
998 token = tokens[i].opt;
1003 if (token == Opt_error)
1006 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1007 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1013 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1022 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1028 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1030 char *context = NULL;
1034 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1037 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1042 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1050 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1052 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
1055 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1058 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1061 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1063 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1064 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1068 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1070 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1071 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1075 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1077 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1078 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1082 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1083 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
1084 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1086 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1087 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1091 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1093 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1098 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1100 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1102 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1104 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1106 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1108 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1110 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1112 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1114 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1118 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1121 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1123 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1126 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1128 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1131 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1133 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1139 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1140 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1150 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1151 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1152 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1153 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1154 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1158 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1159 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1160 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1161 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1162 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1168 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1175 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1176 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1178 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1180 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1181 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1182 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1184 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1186 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1187 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1188 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1189 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1191 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1192 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1193 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1194 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1195 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1197 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1199 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1203 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1209 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1211 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1213 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1219 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1221 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1223 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1225 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1227 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1229 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1231 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1233 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1235 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1237 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1239 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1241 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1243 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1245 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1247 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1249 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1251 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1253 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1255 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1257 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1259 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1261 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1263 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1265 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1267 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1269 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1271 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1273 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1275 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1280 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1283 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1289 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1290 char *buffer, *path;
1292 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1296 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1300 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1301 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1302 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1303 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1304 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1309 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1311 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1312 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1313 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1317 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1321 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1322 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1324 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1329 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1330 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1334 context[len] = '\0';
1335 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1336 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1339 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1340 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1345 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1349 context[len] = '\0';
1350 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1355 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1356 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1357 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1364 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1367 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1368 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1370 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1371 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1374 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1375 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1382 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1383 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1385 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1386 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1387 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1389 struct dentry *dentry;
1392 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1395 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1396 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1399 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1400 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1402 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1403 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1404 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1405 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1406 server is ready to handle calls. */
1407 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1408 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1409 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1410 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1414 sclass = isec->sclass;
1415 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1417 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1418 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1420 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1421 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1423 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1424 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1425 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1428 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1429 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1431 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1432 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1435 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1436 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1437 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1438 * two, depending upon that...
1440 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1442 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1446 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1447 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1448 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1449 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1450 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1451 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1452 * be used again by userspace.
1457 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1463 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1466 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1467 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1470 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1471 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1472 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1476 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1477 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1480 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1483 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1484 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1485 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1486 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1489 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1490 * d_splice_alias. */
1491 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1493 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1494 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1495 * a connected one, so try that first.
1497 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1499 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1502 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1503 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1504 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1505 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1506 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1507 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1508 * could be used again by userspace.
1512 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1513 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1519 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1520 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1521 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1534 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1535 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1537 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1541 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1546 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1550 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1551 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1557 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1558 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1561 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1562 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1565 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1566 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1569 /* All other signals. */
1570 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1577 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1578 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1581 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1582 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1583 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1585 struct common_audit_data ad;
1586 struct av_decision avd;
1588 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1589 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1592 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1595 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1597 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1600 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1603 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1608 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1609 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1610 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1611 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1612 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1619 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1620 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1621 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1622 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1623 struct inode *inode,
1625 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1627 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1630 validate_creds(cred);
1632 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1635 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1636 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1638 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1639 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1642 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1643 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1644 pathname if needed. */
1645 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1649 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1650 struct common_audit_data ad;
1652 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1653 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1654 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1655 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1658 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1659 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1660 pathname if needed. */
1661 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1662 const struct path *path,
1665 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1666 struct common_audit_data ad;
1668 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1670 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1671 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1674 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1675 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1679 struct common_audit_data ad;
1681 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1683 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1686 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1687 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1690 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1691 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1692 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1693 check a particular permission to the file.
1694 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1695 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1696 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1697 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1698 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1702 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1703 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1704 struct common_audit_data ad;
1705 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1708 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1711 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1721 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1722 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1727 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1730 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1737 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1740 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1742 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1745 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1747 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1748 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1749 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1750 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1752 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1754 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1755 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1763 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1764 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1765 struct dentry *dentry,
1768 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1769 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1770 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1772 struct common_audit_data ad;
1775 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1776 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1780 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1781 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1783 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1784 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1785 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1790 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1795 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1796 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1800 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1802 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1803 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1807 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1810 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1811 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1812 struct dentry *dentry,
1816 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1817 struct common_audit_data ad;
1818 u32 sid = current_sid();
1822 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1823 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1825 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1826 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1829 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1830 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1831 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1846 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1851 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1852 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1856 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1857 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1858 struct inode *new_dir,
1859 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1861 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1862 struct common_audit_data ad;
1863 u32 sid = current_sid();
1865 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1868 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1869 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1870 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1871 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1873 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1875 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1876 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1877 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1878 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1881 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1883 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1886 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1887 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1889 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1894 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1895 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1896 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1897 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1898 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1899 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1902 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1903 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1904 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1905 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1908 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1916 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1917 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1918 struct super_block *sb,
1920 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1922 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1923 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1925 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1926 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1927 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1930 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1931 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1935 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1936 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1937 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1938 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1941 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1943 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1947 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1949 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1951 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1958 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1959 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1963 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1965 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1966 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1973 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1982 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1985 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1987 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1988 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1990 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1991 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1997 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1999 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2001 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2002 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2004 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2005 mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2006 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2009 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2010 struct task_struct *to)
2012 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2013 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2014 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2017 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2018 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2019 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2020 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2025 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2026 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2030 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2031 struct task_struct *to)
2033 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2034 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2036 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2037 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2041 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2042 struct task_struct *to,
2045 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2046 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2047 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2048 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2049 struct common_audit_data ad;
2052 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2053 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2055 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2056 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2065 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2066 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2071 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2074 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2075 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2076 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2080 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2083 u32 sid = current_sid();
2084 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2086 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2087 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2088 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2090 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2091 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2094 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2096 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2097 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2098 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2101 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2102 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2104 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2105 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2106 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2109 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2110 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2111 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2112 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2114 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2115 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2116 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2120 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2121 * which was removed).
2123 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2124 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2125 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2126 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2129 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2130 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2132 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2135 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2137 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2152 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2160 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2161 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2164 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2170 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2172 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2174 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2177 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2180 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2181 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2182 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2183 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2184 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2185 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2186 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2187 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2188 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2189 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2190 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2191 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2194 /* All other syslog types */
2195 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2196 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2197 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2201 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2202 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2203 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2205 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2206 * processes that allocate mappings.
2208 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2210 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2212 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2213 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2217 return cap_sys_admin;
2220 /* binprm security operations */
2222 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2225 struct task_struct *tracer;
2228 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2230 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2236 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2237 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2238 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2240 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2241 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2245 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2246 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2248 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2249 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2252 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2253 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2254 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2255 * the old and new contexts.
2257 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2260 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2262 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2263 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2264 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2265 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2271 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2272 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2273 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2275 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2281 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2282 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2283 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2290 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2292 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2293 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2294 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2295 struct common_audit_data ad;
2296 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2299 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2300 * the script interpreter */
2302 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2303 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2304 isec = inode_security(inode);
2306 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2307 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2308 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2310 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2311 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2312 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2313 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2315 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2316 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2317 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2318 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2320 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2321 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2325 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2326 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2327 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2333 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2336 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2338 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2341 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2342 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2344 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2345 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2346 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2347 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2351 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2352 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2353 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2354 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2358 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2359 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2360 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2364 /* Check for shared state */
2365 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2366 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2367 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2368 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2374 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2375 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2376 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2377 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2379 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2380 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2382 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2388 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2389 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2391 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2392 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2393 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2394 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2395 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2396 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2398 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2404 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2406 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2409 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2410 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2411 struct files_struct *files)
2413 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2414 struct tty_struct *tty;
2418 tty = get_current_tty();
2420 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2421 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2422 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2424 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2425 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2426 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2427 open file may belong to another process and we are
2428 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2429 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2430 struct tty_file_private, list);
2431 file = file_priv->file;
2432 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2435 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2438 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2442 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2443 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2444 if (!n) /* none found? */
2447 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2448 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2450 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2452 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2453 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2459 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2461 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2463 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2464 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2467 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2468 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2471 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2472 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2474 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2475 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2477 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2478 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2479 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2481 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2482 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2483 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2484 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2485 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2487 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2488 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2489 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2491 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2493 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2494 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2495 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2496 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2498 task_unlock(current);
2499 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2500 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2505 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2508 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2510 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2520 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2521 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2522 * flush and unblock signals.
2524 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2525 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2527 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2528 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2532 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2533 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2534 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2535 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2536 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2537 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2538 recalc_sigpending();
2540 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2543 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2544 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2545 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2546 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2547 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2550 /* superblock security operations */
2552 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2554 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2556 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2560 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2561 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2562 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2564 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2565 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2566 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2567 sb->s_security = sbsec;
2572 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2574 superblock_free_security(sb);
2577 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2579 bool open_quote = false;
2583 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2585 open_quote = !open_quote;
2586 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2592 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2594 char *from = options;
2600 int len = opt_len(from);
2604 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2606 if (token != Opt_error) {
2611 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2616 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2622 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2628 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2633 memmove(to, from, len);
2646 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2652 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2654 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2655 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2659 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2665 if (opts->fscontext) {
2666 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2669 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2670 goto out_bad_option;
2672 if (opts->context) {
2673 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2676 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2677 goto out_bad_option;
2679 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2680 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2681 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2682 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2685 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2686 goto out_bad_option;
2688 if (opts->defcontext) {
2689 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2692 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2693 goto out_bad_option;
2698 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2699 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2704 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2706 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2707 struct common_audit_data ad;
2709 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2710 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2711 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2714 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2716 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2717 struct common_audit_data ad;
2719 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2720 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2721 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2724 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2725 const struct path *path,
2727 unsigned long flags,
2730 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2732 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2733 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2734 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2736 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2739 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2740 const struct path *to_path)
2742 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2744 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2747 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2749 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2751 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2752 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2755 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2756 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2758 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2759 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2764 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2768 opts = fc->security;
2770 if (src->fscontext) {
2771 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2772 if (!opts->fscontext)
2776 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2780 if (src->rootcontext) {
2781 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2782 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2785 if (src->defcontext) {
2786 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2787 if (!opts->defcontext)
2793 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2794 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2795 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2796 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2797 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2798 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2802 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2803 struct fs_parameter *param)
2805 struct fs_parse_result result;
2808 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2812 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2814 param->string = NULL;
2820 /* inode security operations */
2822 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2824 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2825 u32 sid = current_sid();
2827 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2828 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2829 isec->inode = inode;
2830 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2831 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2832 isec->task_sid = sid;
2833 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2838 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2840 inode_free_security(inode);
2843 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2844 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2850 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2851 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2852 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2857 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2861 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2863 const struct cred *old,
2868 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2870 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2871 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2872 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2877 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2878 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2882 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2883 const struct qstr *qstr,
2885 void **value, size_t *len)
2887 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2888 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2893 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2895 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2897 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2898 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2903 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2904 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2905 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2906 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2908 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2911 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
2912 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2916 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2919 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2930 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2932 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2935 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2937 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2940 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2942 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2945 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2947 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2950 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2952 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2955 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2957 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2960 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2962 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2965 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2966 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2968 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2971 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2973 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2975 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2978 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2981 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2982 struct common_audit_data ad;
2983 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2986 validate_creds(cred);
2988 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2989 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2990 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2991 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
2993 return PTR_ERR(isec);
2995 return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
2996 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
2997 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
3000 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3001 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3004 struct common_audit_data ad;
3005 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3008 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3011 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3012 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3013 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3019 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3021 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3024 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3025 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3027 struct av_decision avd;
3029 u32 audited, denied;
3031 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3032 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3034 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3038 validate_creds(cred);
3040 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3043 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3045 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3046 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3048 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3050 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3051 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3052 no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
3054 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3055 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3057 if (likely(!audited))
3060 /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */
3064 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3070 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3072 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3073 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3074 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3075 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3077 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3078 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3079 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3085 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3086 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3087 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3089 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3090 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3091 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3092 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3095 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3098 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3100 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3103 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3105 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3106 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3108 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3110 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3115 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3116 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3118 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3119 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3120 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3121 struct common_audit_data ad;
3122 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3125 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3126 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3130 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3131 ordinary setattr permission. */
3132 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3135 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3136 return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3138 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3139 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3142 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3145 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3146 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3148 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3149 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3150 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3151 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3155 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3157 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3158 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3159 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3162 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3163 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3165 const char *str = value;
3167 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3168 audit_size = size - 1;
3174 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3175 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3176 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3177 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3182 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3188 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3189 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3190 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3194 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3199 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3202 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3203 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3207 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3208 const void *value, size_t size,
3211 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3216 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3217 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3221 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3222 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3223 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3224 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3225 * we've since initialized.
3230 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3233 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3234 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3239 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3240 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3241 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3243 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3244 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3249 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3251 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3253 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3256 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3258 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3260 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3263 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3265 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3266 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3270 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3271 ordinary setattr permission. */
3272 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3275 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3276 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3280 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3281 unsigned int obj_type)
3286 struct common_audit_data ad;
3288 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3292 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3293 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3296 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3297 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3299 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3300 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3301 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3302 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3306 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3313 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3314 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3315 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3317 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3318 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3319 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3321 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3325 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3327 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3329 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3333 char *context = NULL;
3334 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3337 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3338 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3340 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3341 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3345 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3346 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3347 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3348 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3349 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3350 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3351 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3353 isec = inode_security(inode);
3354 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3355 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3356 isec->sid, &context,
3359 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3373 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3374 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3376 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3377 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3381 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3384 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3387 if (!value || !size)
3390 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3395 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3396 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3398 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3399 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3403 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3405 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3406 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3407 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3411 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3413 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3417 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3420 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3421 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3423 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3424 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3429 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3430 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3431 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3432 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3437 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3439 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3440 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3441 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3443 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3444 return 1; /* Discard */
3446 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3452 /* kernfs node operations */
3454 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3455 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3457 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3458 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3462 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3469 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3473 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3479 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3485 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3486 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3488 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3492 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3494 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3495 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3501 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3506 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3513 /* file security operations */
3515 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3517 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3518 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3520 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3521 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3524 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3525 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3528 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3530 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3531 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3532 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3533 u32 sid = current_sid();
3536 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3539 isec = inode_security(inode);
3540 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3541 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3542 /* No change since file_open check. */
3545 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3548 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3550 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3551 u32 sid = current_sid();
3554 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3560 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3561 * operation to an inode.
3563 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3564 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3566 struct common_audit_data ad;
3567 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3568 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3569 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3570 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3571 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3573 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3574 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3576 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3579 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3581 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3582 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3591 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3594 isec = inode_security(inode);
3595 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3596 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3597 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3602 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3605 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3612 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3613 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3614 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3617 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3618 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3619 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3622 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3625 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3630 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3631 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3634 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3635 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3638 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3643 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3645 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3647 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3648 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3651 if (default_noexec &&
3652 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3653 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3655 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3656 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3657 * This has an additional check.
3659 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3660 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3661 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3667 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3668 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3670 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3671 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3674 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3675 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3677 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3684 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3688 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3689 u32 sid = current_sid();
3690 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3691 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3692 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3698 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3699 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3701 struct common_audit_data ad;
3705 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3707 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3713 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3716 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3717 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3720 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3721 unsigned long reqprot,
3724 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3725 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3727 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3730 if (default_noexec &&
3731 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3733 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3734 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3735 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3736 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3737 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3738 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3739 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3740 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3741 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3742 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3743 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3744 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3745 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3747 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3748 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3749 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3750 * modified content. This typically should only
3751 * occur for text relocations.
3753 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3759 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3762 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3764 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3766 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3769 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3772 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3777 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3778 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3787 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3788 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3789 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3797 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3802 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3809 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3811 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3813 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3814 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3817 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3818 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3821 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3823 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3825 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3826 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3828 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3831 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3833 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3835 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3836 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3837 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3840 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3844 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3847 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3849 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3850 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3852 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3853 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3855 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3856 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3857 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3858 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3859 * struct as its SID.
3861 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3862 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3864 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3865 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3866 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3867 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3868 * new inode label or new policy.
3869 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3871 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3874 /* task security operations */
3876 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3877 unsigned long clone_flags)
3879 u32 sid = current_sid();
3881 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3882 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3886 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3888 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3891 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3892 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3899 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3901 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3903 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3904 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3909 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3911 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3915 * set the security data for a kernel service
3916 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3918 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3920 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3921 u32 sid = current_sid();
3924 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3926 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3927 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3931 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3932 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3933 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3939 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3940 * objective context of the specified inode
3942 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3944 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3945 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3946 u32 sid = current_sid();
3949 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3951 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3952 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3956 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3960 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3962 struct common_audit_data ad;
3964 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3965 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3967 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3968 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3969 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3972 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
3974 struct common_audit_data ad;
3975 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3976 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3977 u32 sid = current_sid();
3982 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3983 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3984 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
3988 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3991 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3992 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
3993 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3994 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
3999 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4000 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4001 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4002 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4005 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4006 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
4011 case READING_MODULE:
4012 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
4021 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4026 case LOADING_MODULE:
4027 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4035 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4037 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4038 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4039 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4042 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4044 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4045 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4046 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4049 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4051 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4052 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4053 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4056 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4058 *secid = task_sid(p);
4061 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4063 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4064 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4065 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4068 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4070 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4071 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4072 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4075 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4077 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4078 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4079 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4082 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4089 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4090 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4091 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4092 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4093 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4094 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4095 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4098 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4099 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4101 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4103 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4104 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4105 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4106 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4107 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4108 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4109 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4110 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4115 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4117 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4118 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4119 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4122 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4124 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4125 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4126 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4129 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4131 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4132 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4133 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4136 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4137 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4143 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4145 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4147 secid = current_sid();
4149 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4150 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4151 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4154 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4155 struct inode *inode)
4157 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4158 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4160 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4161 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4163 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4164 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4167 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4168 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4169 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4171 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4172 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4174 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4175 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4179 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4180 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4183 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4184 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4188 *proto = ih->protocol;
4190 switch (ih->protocol) {
4192 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4194 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4198 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4202 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4203 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4208 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4210 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4214 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4218 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4219 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4223 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4224 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4226 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4230 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4234 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4235 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4239 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4240 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4241 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4243 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4247 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4251 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4252 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4263 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4265 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4266 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4267 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4270 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4271 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4274 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4275 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4279 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4280 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4283 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4284 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4285 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4294 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4296 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4300 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4301 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4306 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4308 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4312 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4313 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4317 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4318 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4320 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4324 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4325 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4329 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4330 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4331 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4333 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4337 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4338 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4342 /* includes fragments */
4352 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4353 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4358 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4360 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4363 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4364 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4367 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4369 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4372 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4373 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4383 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4384 " unable to parse packet\n");
4394 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4396 * @family: protocol family
4397 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4400 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4401 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4402 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4403 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4404 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4408 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4415 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4418 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4422 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4423 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4424 if (unlikely(err)) {
4426 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4427 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4435 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4436 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4437 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4438 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4440 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4441 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4442 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4443 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4446 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4450 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4451 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4459 /* socket security operations */
4461 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4462 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4464 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4465 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4469 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4470 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4473 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4475 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4476 struct common_audit_data ad;
4477 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4479 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4482 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4486 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4487 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4491 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4492 int protocol, int kern)
4494 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4502 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4503 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4507 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4508 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4511 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4512 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4514 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4515 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4516 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4517 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4518 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4522 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4527 isec->sclass = sclass;
4529 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4532 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4533 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4535 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4536 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4537 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4539 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4545 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4546 struct socket *sockb)
4548 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4549 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4551 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4552 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4557 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4558 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4559 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4561 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4563 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4564 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4568 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4572 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4573 family = sk->sk_family;
4574 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4576 struct common_audit_data ad;
4577 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4578 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4579 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4581 unsigned short snum;
4585 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4586 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4587 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4588 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4590 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4592 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4593 switch (family_sa) {
4596 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4598 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4599 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4600 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4601 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4603 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4605 family_sa = AF_INET;
4607 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4608 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4611 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4613 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4614 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4615 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4621 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4623 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4624 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4629 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4631 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4632 snum < low || snum > high) {
4633 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4637 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4640 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4646 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4647 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4648 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4651 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4652 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4655 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4656 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4659 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4660 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4664 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4668 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4672 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4673 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4675 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4677 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4679 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4686 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4687 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4689 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4692 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4693 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4695 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4696 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4698 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4699 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4702 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4705 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4708 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4709 * way to disconnect the socket
4711 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4715 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4718 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4719 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4720 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4721 struct common_audit_data ad;
4722 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4723 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4724 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4725 unsigned short snum;
4728 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4729 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4730 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4731 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4733 switch (address->sa_family) {
4735 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4736 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4738 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4741 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4742 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4744 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4747 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4748 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4750 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4753 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4756 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4760 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4761 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4762 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4764 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4765 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4767 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4768 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4772 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4774 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4775 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4776 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4777 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4785 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4786 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4787 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4790 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4792 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4796 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4799 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4801 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4804 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4807 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4808 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4812 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4816 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4817 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4818 sclass = isec->sclass;
4820 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4822 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4823 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4825 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4830 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4833 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4836 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4837 int size, int flags)
4839 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4842 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4844 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4847 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4849 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4852 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4856 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4860 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4863 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4866 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4869 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4871 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4874 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4878 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4879 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4880 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4881 struct common_audit_data ad;
4882 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4885 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4887 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4889 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4890 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4891 sksec_other->sclass,
4892 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4896 /* server child socket */
4897 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4898 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4899 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4903 /* connecting socket */
4904 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4909 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4910 struct socket *other)
4912 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4913 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4914 struct common_audit_data ad;
4915 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4917 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4919 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4921 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4922 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4926 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4927 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4928 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4934 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4937 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4939 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4943 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4946 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4948 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4951 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4955 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4956 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4957 struct common_audit_data ad;
4958 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4961 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4963 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4964 ad.u.net->family = family;
4965 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4969 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4970 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4971 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4977 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4980 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4985 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4988 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4989 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4990 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4991 struct common_audit_data ad;
4992 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4997 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5000 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5001 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5004 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5005 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5006 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5007 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5008 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5009 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5011 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5012 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5013 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5016 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5018 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5019 ad.u.net->family = family;
5020 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5024 if (peerlbl_active) {
5027 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5030 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5031 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5033 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5036 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5037 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5040 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5045 if (secmark_active) {
5046 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5047 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5056 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5057 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5062 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5063 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5065 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5066 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5067 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5068 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5069 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5070 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5072 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5077 if (scontext_len > len) {
5082 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5086 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5092 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5094 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5096 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5098 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5100 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5103 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5107 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5108 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5109 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5111 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5114 *secid = peer_secid;
5115 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5120 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5122 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5124 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5128 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5129 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5130 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5131 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5132 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5137 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5139 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5141 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5142 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5146 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5148 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5149 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5151 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5152 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5153 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5155 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5158 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5161 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5163 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5165 *secid = sksec->sid;
5169 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5171 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5172 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5173 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5175 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5176 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5177 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5178 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5181 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5182 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5185 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5186 struct sk_buff *skb)
5188 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5189 struct common_audit_data ad;
5190 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5192 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5196 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5199 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5201 if (peerlbl_active) {
5202 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5203 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5205 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5210 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5211 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5214 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5215 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5217 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5218 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5219 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5220 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5222 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5223 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5224 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5225 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5227 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5229 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5230 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5231 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5232 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5237 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5238 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5239 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5240 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5241 * plug this into the new socket.
5243 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5247 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5248 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5250 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5251 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5254 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5255 * based on their @optname.
5257 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5258 struct sockaddr *address,
5261 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5263 struct sockaddr *addr;
5264 struct socket *sock;
5266 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5269 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5270 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5273 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5274 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5278 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5281 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5284 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5290 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5296 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5297 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5298 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5299 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5301 /* Connect checks */
5302 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5303 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5304 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5305 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5306 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5310 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5311 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5312 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
5313 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5314 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5315 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5316 * primary address is selected.
5317 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5318 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5319 * selinux_socket_connect().
5321 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5335 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5336 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5339 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5340 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5342 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5343 * the non-sctp clone version.
5345 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5346 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5348 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5349 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5350 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5351 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5354 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5355 struct request_sock *req)
5357 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5359 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5363 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5366 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5369 req->secid = connsid;
5370 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5372 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5375 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5376 const struct request_sock *req)
5378 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5380 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5381 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5382 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5383 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5384 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5385 time it will have been created and available. */
5387 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5388 * thread with access to newsksec */
5389 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5392 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5394 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5395 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5397 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5398 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5401 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5404 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5406 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5409 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5412 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5413 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5417 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5419 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5422 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5424 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5427 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5430 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5433 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5435 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5437 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5440 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5446 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5451 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5453 u32 sid = current_sid();
5455 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5456 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5457 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5458 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5459 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5460 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5462 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5463 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5467 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5469 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5471 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5472 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5473 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5476 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5478 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5479 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5481 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5482 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5483 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5484 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5485 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5486 * protocols were being used */
5488 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5489 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5494 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5496 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5497 u32 sid = current_sid();
5500 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5501 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5502 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5505 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5506 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5507 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5515 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5517 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5518 const struct net_device *indev,
5524 struct common_audit_data ad;
5525 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5530 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5533 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5534 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5535 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5536 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5539 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5542 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5544 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5545 ad.u.net->family = family;
5546 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5549 if (peerlbl_active) {
5550 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5551 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5553 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5559 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5560 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5561 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5565 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5566 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5567 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5569 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5575 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5576 struct sk_buff *skb,
5577 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5579 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5582 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5583 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5584 struct sk_buff *skb,
5585 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5587 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5591 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5597 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5600 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5601 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5602 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5605 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5607 if (sk_listener(sk))
5608 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5609 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5610 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5611 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5612 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5613 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5614 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5615 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5616 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5617 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5618 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5619 * best we can do. */
5622 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5623 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5626 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5627 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5633 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5634 struct sk_buff *skb,
5635 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5637 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5640 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5641 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5642 struct sk_buff *skb,
5643 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5645 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5649 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5653 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5654 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5655 struct common_audit_data ad;
5656 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5662 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5664 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5666 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5667 ad.u.net->family = family;
5668 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5671 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5672 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5673 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5674 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5675 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5677 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5678 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5683 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5684 const struct net_device *outdev,
5689 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5691 struct common_audit_data ad;
5692 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5697 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5698 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5699 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5700 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5701 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5702 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5704 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5705 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5706 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5709 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5712 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5713 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5714 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5715 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5716 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5717 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5718 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5719 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5720 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5721 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5723 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5724 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5729 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5730 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5731 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5732 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5734 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5735 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5738 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5739 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5741 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5742 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5743 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5744 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5745 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5746 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5747 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5748 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5749 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5750 * for similar problems. */
5752 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5754 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5755 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5757 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5758 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5759 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5760 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5761 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5762 * pass the packet. */
5763 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5766 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5770 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5774 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5777 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5779 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5781 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5782 * associated socket. */
5783 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5784 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5785 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5788 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5790 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5791 ad.u.net->family = family;
5792 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5796 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5797 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5798 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5799 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5801 if (peerlbl_active) {
5805 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5807 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5809 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5810 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5812 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5814 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5816 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5817 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5823 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5824 struct sk_buff *skb,
5825 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5827 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5830 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5831 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5832 struct sk_buff *skb,
5833 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5835 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5839 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5841 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5844 unsigned int msg_len;
5845 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5846 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5847 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5848 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5849 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5852 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5853 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5855 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5856 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5857 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5858 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5859 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5861 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5864 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5866 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5869 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5870 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5871 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5872 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5873 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5874 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5875 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5876 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5877 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
5878 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5881 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5882 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5888 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5889 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5890 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5892 data_len -= msg_len;
5899 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5901 isec->sclass = sclass;
5902 isec->sid = current_sid();
5905 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5908 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5909 struct common_audit_data ad;
5910 u32 sid = current_sid();
5912 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5914 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5915 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5917 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5918 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5921 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5923 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5925 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5926 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5931 /* message queue security operations */
5932 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5934 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5935 struct common_audit_data ad;
5936 u32 sid = current_sid();
5939 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5940 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5942 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5943 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5945 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5946 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5951 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5953 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5954 struct common_audit_data ad;
5955 u32 sid = current_sid();
5957 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5959 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5960 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5962 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5963 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5964 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5967 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
5975 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5976 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5977 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5978 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5982 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5985 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5988 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5994 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
5998 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6000 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6001 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6002 struct common_audit_data ad;
6003 u32 sid = current_sid();
6006 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6007 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6010 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6012 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6014 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6015 * message queue this message will be stored in
6017 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6018 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6023 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6024 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6026 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6027 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6028 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6031 /* Can this process send the message */
6032 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6033 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6036 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6037 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6038 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6039 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6044 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6045 struct task_struct *target,
6046 long type, int mode)
6048 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6049 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6050 struct common_audit_data ad;
6051 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6054 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6055 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6057 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6058 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6060 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6062 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6064 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6066 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6070 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6071 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6073 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6074 struct common_audit_data ad;
6075 u32 sid = current_sid();
6078 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6079 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6081 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6082 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6084 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6085 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6090 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6092 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6093 struct common_audit_data ad;
6094 u32 sid = current_sid();
6096 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6098 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6099 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6101 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6102 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6103 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6106 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6107 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6115 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6117 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6118 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6122 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6125 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6132 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6138 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6142 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6143 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6147 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6150 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6152 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6155 /* Semaphore security operations */
6156 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6158 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6159 struct common_audit_data ad;
6160 u32 sid = current_sid();
6163 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6164 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6166 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6167 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6169 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6170 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6175 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6177 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6178 struct common_audit_data ad;
6179 u32 sid = current_sid();
6181 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6183 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6184 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6186 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6187 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6188 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6191 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6192 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6200 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6201 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6202 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6203 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6207 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6218 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6221 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6226 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6232 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6236 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6237 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6242 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6246 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6249 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6255 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6257 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6262 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6265 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6267 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6271 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6274 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6277 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6278 char *name, char **value)
6280 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6286 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6289 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6290 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6291 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6296 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6298 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6300 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6301 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6302 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6303 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6304 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6305 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6306 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6307 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6317 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6327 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6329 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6331 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6336 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6338 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6339 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6340 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6341 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6342 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6343 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6344 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6345 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6346 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6347 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6348 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6349 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6350 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6351 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6352 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6353 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6354 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6355 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6356 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6357 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6363 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6364 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6365 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6369 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6371 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6372 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6373 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6376 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6377 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6378 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6379 audit_size = size - 1;
6382 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6385 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6386 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6391 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6399 new = prepare_creds();
6403 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6404 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6405 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6406 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6407 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6408 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6409 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6410 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6411 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6412 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6413 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6414 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6416 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6417 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6421 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6422 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6423 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6424 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6429 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6431 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6432 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6438 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6439 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6440 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6441 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6445 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6446 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6447 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6449 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6450 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6451 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6470 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6472 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6475 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6477 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6481 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6483 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6487 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6492 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6494 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6496 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6497 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6498 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6502 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6504 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6506 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6508 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6509 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6513 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6515 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6517 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6520 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6523 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6532 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6533 unsigned long flags)
6535 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6536 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6538 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6542 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6543 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6544 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6546 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6552 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6554 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6560 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6561 const struct cred *cred,
6562 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6565 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6568 switch (need_perm) {
6575 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6578 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6584 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6585 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6587 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6588 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6589 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6590 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6598 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6599 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6600 ksec = key->security;
6602 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6603 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6606 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6608 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6609 char *context = NULL;
6613 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6621 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6622 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6624 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6625 u32 sid = current_sid();
6627 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6628 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6633 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6634 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6636 struct common_audit_data ad;
6639 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6640 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6642 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6646 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6647 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6648 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6649 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6650 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6652 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6653 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6656 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6659 struct common_audit_data ad;
6662 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6663 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6665 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6671 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6672 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6673 ibendport.port = port_num;
6674 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6675 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6677 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6678 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6681 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6683 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6685 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6688 sec->sid = current_sid();
6694 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6700 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6701 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6704 u32 sid = current_sid();
6708 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6709 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6710 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6714 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6715 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6726 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6730 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6731 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6732 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6733 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6737 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6738 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6739 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6740 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6741 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6742 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6743 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6745 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6747 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6748 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6749 struct bpf_map *map;
6752 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6753 map = file->private_data;
6754 bpfsec = map->security;
6755 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6756 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6757 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6760 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6761 prog = file->private_data;
6762 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6763 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6764 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6765 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6772 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6774 u32 sid = current_sid();
6775 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6777 bpfsec = map->security;
6778 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6779 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6780 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6783 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6785 u32 sid = current_sid();
6786 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6788 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6789 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6790 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6791 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6794 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6796 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6798 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6802 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6803 map->security = bpfsec;
6808 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6810 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6812 map->security = NULL;
6816 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6818 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6820 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6824 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6825 aux->security = bpfsec;
6830 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6832 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6834 aux->security = NULL;
6839 static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
6841 struct common_audit_data ad;
6842 u32 sid = current_sid();
6843 int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
6844 (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
6845 (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
6847 if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
6848 audit_log(audit_context(),
6849 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
6850 "lockdown_reason=invalid");
6854 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
6857 if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
6858 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6859 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
6860 LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
6862 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6863 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
6864 LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
6867 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6868 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6869 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6870 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6871 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6872 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6875 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6876 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6878 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6880 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6881 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6882 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6883 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6884 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6885 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6886 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6887 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6891 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6895 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6897 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6899 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6903 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6904 event->security = perfsec;
6909 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6911 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6913 event->security = NULL;
6917 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6919 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6920 u32 sid = current_sid();
6922 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6923 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6926 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6928 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6929 u32 sid = current_sid();
6931 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6932 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6937 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
6938 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
6939 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
6940 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
6942 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
6943 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
6945 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
6947 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
6948 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
6949 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
6951 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7104 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7125 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7128 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7131 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7138 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7146 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7157 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7165 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
7175 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
7181 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7186 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7190 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7199 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7202 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7206 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7214 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7218 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7223 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7225 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7227 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7228 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7229 selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
7230 selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
7231 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7232 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7234 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7235 cred_init_security();
7237 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7243 ebitmap_cache_init();
7245 hashtab_cache_init();
7247 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7249 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7250 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7252 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7253 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7255 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7256 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7258 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7260 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7265 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7267 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7270 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7272 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7274 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7275 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7276 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7279 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7280 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7281 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7283 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7284 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7285 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7286 .init = selinux_init,
7289 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7291 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7293 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7295 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7296 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7299 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7301 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7302 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7305 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7307 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7308 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7310 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7312 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7314 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7315 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7318 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7320 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7321 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7324 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7326 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7327 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7332 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7334 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7335 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7338 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7340 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7341 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7344 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7345 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7346 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7349 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7353 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7356 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7358 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7360 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7364 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7366 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7367 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7369 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7371 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7375 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7377 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7378 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7381 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7383 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7384 int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7386 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7387 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7391 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7392 /* Only do this once. */
7396 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7398 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7401 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7402 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7405 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7407 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7409 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7412 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */