2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/security.h>
16 #include <linux/magic.h>
17 #include <linux/parser.h>
18 #include <linux/slab.h>
19 #include <linux/genhd.h>
23 /* flags definitions */
24 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
25 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
26 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
27 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
28 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
29 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
32 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
33 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
34 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
35 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
40 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
41 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
42 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
45 struct ima_rule_entry {
46 struct list_head list;
51 unsigned long fsmagic;
56 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
57 void *args_p; /* audit value */
58 int type; /* audit type */
63 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
64 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
68 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
69 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
70 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
71 * and running executables.
73 static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
74 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
75 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
76 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
77 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
78 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
79 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
80 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
81 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
82 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
83 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
84 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
85 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
86 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
87 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
88 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
89 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
92 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
93 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
94 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
95 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
96 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
97 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
98 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
99 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
100 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
101 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
102 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
103 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
104 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
106 /* force signature */
107 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
108 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
112 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
113 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
114 static struct list_head *ima_rules;
116 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
118 static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
119 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
124 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
126 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
127 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
129 ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
132 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
135 * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
136 * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
139 * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
140 * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
142 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
144 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
148 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
149 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
150 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
151 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
153 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
155 entry->lsm[i].args_p,
156 &entry->lsm[i].rule);
157 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
160 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
164 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
165 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
166 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
167 * @func: LIM hook identifier
168 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
170 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
172 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
173 struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
175 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
176 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
179 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
180 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
182 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
183 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
185 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
186 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
188 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
189 memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
191 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
193 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
195 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
200 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
207 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
208 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
217 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
218 rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
226 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
228 ima_lsm_update_rules();
238 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
239 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
241 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
243 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
244 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
248 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
250 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
252 return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE;
254 return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE;
257 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
262 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
263 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
264 * @func: IMA hook identifier
265 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
267 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
270 * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
271 * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
274 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
277 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
278 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
280 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
282 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
285 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
288 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
290 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
291 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
292 action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
294 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
295 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
297 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
307 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
308 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
309 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
310 * can be made earlier.
312 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
314 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
317 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
318 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
319 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
323 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
327 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
329 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
330 * the new ima_policy_rules.
332 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
334 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
336 /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
337 measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
338 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
339 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
341 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
342 if (i < measure_entries)
343 list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
346 int j = i - measure_entries;
348 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
353 ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
357 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
359 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
360 * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
361 * added to the policy.
363 void ima_update_policy(void)
365 ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
366 ima_update_policy_flag();
371 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
372 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
374 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
375 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
376 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
377 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
380 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
381 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
382 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
383 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
384 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
385 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
386 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
387 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
388 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
389 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
390 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
391 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
392 {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
393 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
394 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
395 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
397 {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
398 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
399 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
403 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
404 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
408 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
411 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
412 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
415 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
416 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
418 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
419 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
420 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
421 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
428 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
430 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
431 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
432 audit_log_format(ab, " ");
435 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
437 struct audit_buffer *ab;
441 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
443 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
444 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
445 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
446 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
447 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
453 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
455 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
458 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
460 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
463 entry->action = MEASURE;
465 case Opt_dont_measure:
466 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
468 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
471 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
474 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
476 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
479 entry->action = APPRAISE;
481 case Opt_dont_appraise:
482 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
484 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
487 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
490 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
492 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
495 entry->action = AUDIT;
498 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
503 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
504 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
505 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
506 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
507 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
508 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
509 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
510 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
511 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
512 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
513 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
514 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
515 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
516 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
520 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
523 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
528 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
529 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
530 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
531 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
532 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
533 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
534 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
535 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
539 entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
542 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
544 if (entry->fsmagic) {
549 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
551 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
554 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
556 if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
557 sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
562 result = blk_part_pack_uuid(args[0].from,
565 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
568 ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
570 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
575 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
577 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
578 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
581 entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
585 ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
587 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
592 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
594 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
595 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
598 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
602 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
603 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
608 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
609 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
614 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
615 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
620 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
621 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
626 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
627 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
632 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
633 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
637 case Opt_appraise_type:
638 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
643 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
644 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
645 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
649 case Opt_permit_directio:
650 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
653 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
658 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
660 else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
661 ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
662 else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
663 ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
664 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
670 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
671 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
673 * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
674 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
676 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
678 static const char op[] = "update_policy";
680 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
684 p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
686 p += strspn(p, " \t");
688 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
691 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
693 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
694 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
698 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
700 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
703 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
704 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
709 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
710 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
711 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
716 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
717 void ima_delete_rules(void)
719 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
722 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
723 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
724 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
725 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
727 list_del(&entry->list);
730 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);