2 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
4 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <lancerchao@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
5 * Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <fridolin.pokorny@gmail.com>. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>. All rights reserved.
7 * Copyright (c) 2018, Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
9 * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
10 * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
11 * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
12 * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
13 * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
16 * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
19 * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
20 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
23 * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
24 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
25 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
26 * provided with the distribution.
28 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
29 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
30 * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
31 * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
32 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
33 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
34 * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
38 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
39 #include <linux/module.h>
40 #include <crypto/aead.h>
42 #include <net/strparser.h>
45 static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len,
46 unsigned int recursion_level)
48 int start = skb_headlen(skb);
49 int i, chunk = start - offset;
50 struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
53 if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24))
66 for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
69 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
71 end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
85 if (unlikely(skb_has_frag_list(skb))) {
86 skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
89 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
91 end = start + frag_iter->len;
96 ret = __skb_nsg(frag_iter, offset - start, chunk,
98 if (unlikely(ret < 0))
113 /* Return the number of scatterlist elements required to completely map the
114 * skb, or -EMSGSIZE if the recursion depth is exceeded.
116 static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
118 return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0);
121 static int padding_length(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
122 struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb)
124 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
127 /* Determine zero-padding length */
128 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
129 char content_type = 0;
133 while (content_type == 0) {
134 if (back > rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size)
136 err = skb_copy_bits(skb,
137 rxm->offset + rxm->full_len - back,
146 ctx->control = content_type;
151 static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
153 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
154 struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst;
155 struct scatterlist *sgin = aead_req->src;
156 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
157 struct tls_context *tls_ctx;
158 struct tls_prot_info *prot;
159 struct scatterlist *sg;
164 skb = (struct sk_buff *)req->data;
165 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(skb->sk);
166 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
167 prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
169 /* Propagate if there was an err */
172 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(skb->sk),
173 LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
174 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
175 tls_err_abort(skb->sk, err);
177 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
180 pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
182 ctx->async_wait.err = pad;
183 tls_err_abort(skb->sk, pad);
185 rxm->full_len -= pad;
186 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
187 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
191 /* After using skb->sk to propagate sk through crypto async callback
192 * we need to NULL it again.
197 /* Free the destination pages if skb was not decrypted inplace */
199 /* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */
200 for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) {
203 put_page(sg_page(sg));
209 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
211 if (!pending && READ_ONCE(ctx->async_notify))
212 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
215 static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
217 struct scatterlist *sgin,
218 struct scatterlist *sgout,
221 struct aead_request *aead_req,
224 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
225 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
226 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
229 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv);
230 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
231 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout,
232 data_len + prot->tag_size,
236 /* Using skb->sk to push sk through to crypto async callback
237 * handler. This allows propagating errors up to the socket
238 * if needed. It _must_ be cleared in the async handler
239 * before consume_skb is called. We _know_ skb->sk is NULL
240 * because it is a clone from strparser.
243 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
244 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
245 tls_decrypt_done, skb);
246 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
248 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
249 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
250 crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
253 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
254 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
258 ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &ctx->async_wait);
259 } else if (ret == -EBADMSG) {
260 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
264 atomic_dec(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
269 static void tls_trim_both_msgs(struct sock *sk, int target_size)
271 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
272 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
273 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
274 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
276 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext, target_size);
278 target_size += prot->overhead_size;
279 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted, target_size);
282 static int tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(struct sock *sk, int len)
284 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
285 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
286 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
287 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
289 return sk_msg_alloc(sk, msg_en, len, 0);
292 static int tls_clone_plaintext_msg(struct sock *sk, int required)
294 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
295 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
296 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
297 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
298 struct sk_msg *msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
299 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
302 /* We add page references worth len bytes from encrypted sg
303 * at the end of plaintext sg. It is guaranteed that msg_en
304 * has enough required room (ensured by caller).
306 len = required - msg_pl->sg.size;
308 /* Skip initial bytes in msg_en's data to be able to use
309 * same offset of both plain and encrypted data.
311 skip = prot->prepend_size + msg_pl->sg.size;
313 return sk_msg_clone(sk, msg_pl, msg_en, skip, len);
316 static struct tls_rec *tls_get_rec(struct sock *sk)
318 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
319 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
320 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
321 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
325 mem_size = sizeof(struct tls_rec) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send);
327 rec = kzalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
331 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
332 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
337 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_in, 2);
338 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_in[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
339 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_in[1]);
341 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_out, 2);
342 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_out[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
343 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_out[1]);
348 static void tls_free_rec(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *rec)
350 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
351 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
355 static void tls_free_open_rec(struct sock *sk)
357 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
358 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
359 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
362 tls_free_rec(sk, rec);
363 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
367 int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags)
369 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
370 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
371 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
372 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
373 int tx_flags, rc = 0;
375 if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) {
376 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
377 struct tls_rec, list);
380 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
384 rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, tx_flags);
388 /* Full record has been transmitted.
389 * Remove the head of tx_list
391 list_del(&rec->list);
392 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
396 /* Tx all ready records */
397 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
398 if (READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready)) {
400 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
404 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
405 rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx,
406 &msg_en->sg.data[msg_en->sg.curr],
411 list_del(&rec->list);
412 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
420 if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
421 tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
426 static void tls_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
428 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
429 struct sock *sk = req->data;
430 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
431 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
432 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
433 struct scatterlist *sge;
434 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
439 rec = container_of(aead_req, struct tls_rec, aead_req);
440 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
442 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, msg_en->sg.curr);
443 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
444 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
446 /* Check if error is previously set on socket */
447 if (err || sk->sk_err) {
450 /* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
452 ctx->async_wait.err = sk->sk_err;
454 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
455 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
460 struct tls_rec *first_rec;
462 /* Mark the record as ready for transmission */
463 smp_store_mb(rec->tx_ready, true);
465 /* If received record is at head of tx_list, schedule tx */
466 first_rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
467 struct tls_rec, list);
468 if (rec == first_rec)
472 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
474 if (!pending && READ_ONCE(ctx->async_notify))
475 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
480 /* Schedule the transmission */
481 if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
482 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, 1);
485 static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk,
486 struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
487 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx,
488 struct aead_request *aead_req,
489 size_t data_len, u32 start)
491 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
492 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
493 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
494 struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, start);
495 int rc, iv_offset = 0;
497 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of IV is a constant */
498 if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
499 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
503 memcpy(&rec->iv_data[iv_offset], tls_ctx->tx.iv,
504 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
506 xor_iv_with_seq(prot->version, rec->iv_data, tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq);
508 sge->offset += prot->prepend_size;
509 sge->length -= prot->prepend_size;
511 msg_en->sg.curr = start;
513 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send);
514 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
515 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, rec->sg_aead_in,
517 data_len, rec->iv_data);
519 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
520 tls_encrypt_done, sk);
522 /* Add the record in tx_list */
523 list_add_tail((struct list_head *)&rec->list, &ctx->tx_list);
524 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
526 rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
527 if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
528 atomic_dec(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
529 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
530 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
534 WRITE_ONCE(rec->tx_ready, true);
535 } else if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
536 list_del(&rec->list);
540 /* Unhook the record from context if encryption is not failure */
541 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
542 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->tx);
546 static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from,
547 struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl,
548 struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point,
549 u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end)
551 u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes;
552 struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
553 u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
554 struct scatterlist tmp = { };
555 struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
559 new = tls_get_rec(sk);
562 ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size +
563 tx_overhead_size, 0);
565 tls_free_rec(sk, new);
569 *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end;
570 i = msg_opl->sg.start;
571 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
572 while (apply && sge->length) {
573 if (sge->length > apply) {
574 u32 len = sge->length - apply;
576 get_page(sg_page(sge));
577 sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
578 sge->offset + apply);
583 apply -= sge->length;
584 bytes += sge->length;
587 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
588 if (i == msg_opl->sg.end)
590 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
594 msg_opl->sg.curr = i;
595 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
596 msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0;
597 msg_opl->sg.size = bytes;
599 msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext;
600 msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply;
601 msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes;
603 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
604 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
606 memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
607 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
608 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
611 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
612 while (osge->length) {
613 memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
615 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
616 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
619 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
620 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
624 msg_npl->sg.curr = j;
625 msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0;
631 static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to,
632 struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end)
634 struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext;
635 struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext;
636 struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge;
640 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
641 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
643 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
644 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
646 if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) &&
647 osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) {
648 osge->length += nsge->length;
649 put_page(sg_page(nsge));
652 msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end;
653 msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end;
654 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
655 msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size;
656 msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size;
658 sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted);
659 sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted);
664 static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
665 unsigned char record_type)
667 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
668 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
669 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
670 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL;
671 u32 i, split_point, uninitialized_var(orig_end);
672 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
673 struct aead_request *req;
680 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
681 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
683 split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes;
684 split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size;
686 rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en,
687 split_point, prot->overhead_size,
691 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size +
692 prot->overhead_size);
695 rec->tx_flags = flags;
696 req = &rec->aead_req;
699 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
701 rec->content_type = record_type;
702 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
703 /* Add content type to end of message. No padding added */
704 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_content_type, &rec->content_type, 1);
705 sg_mark_end(&rec->sg_content_type);
706 sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, msg_pl->sg.end + 1,
707 &rec->sg_content_type);
709 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_pl, i));
712 i = msg_pl->sg.start;
713 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, &msg_pl->sg.data[i]);
716 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
717 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_en, i));
719 i = msg_en->sg.start;
720 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_out, 2, &msg_en->sg.data[i]);
722 tls_make_aad(rec->aad_space, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
723 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size,
724 record_type, prot->version);
726 tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx,
727 page_address(sg_page(&msg_en->sg.data[i])) +
728 msg_en->sg.data[i].offset,
729 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
730 record_type, prot->version);
732 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = false;
734 rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req,
735 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i);
737 if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
738 tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
740 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
741 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
744 ctx->async_capable = 1;
747 msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext;
748 msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted;
749 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
750 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
754 return tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
757 static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
758 bool full_record, u8 record_type,
759 size_t *copied, int flags)
761 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
762 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
763 struct sk_msg msg_redir = { };
764 struct sk_psock *psock;
765 struct sock *sk_redir;
771 policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY);
772 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
773 if (!psock || !policy) {
774 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
776 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
777 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
782 enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
783 if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) {
784 delta = msg->sg.size;
785 psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg);
786 if (delta < msg->sg.size)
787 delta -= msg->sg.size;
791 if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size &&
792 !enospc && !full_record) {
798 if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send)
799 send = msg->apply_bytes;
801 switch (psock->eval) {
803 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
805 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
806 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
811 sk_redir = psock->sk_redir;
812 memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg));
813 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
814 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
816 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
817 sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send);
818 msg->sg.size -= send;
820 err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, &msg_redir, send, flags);
823 *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir);
826 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
827 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
831 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send);
832 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
833 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
835 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
836 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
837 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
838 *copied -= (send + delta);
843 bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec;
847 msg = &rec->msg_plaintext;
848 if (!msg->apply_bytes)
852 psock->eval = __SK_NONE;
853 if (psock->sk_redir) {
854 sock_put(psock->sk_redir);
855 psock->sk_redir = NULL;
862 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
866 static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
868 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
869 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
870 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
871 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
877 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
878 copied = msg_pl->sg.size;
882 return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
886 int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
888 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
889 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
890 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
891 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
892 bool async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
893 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
894 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
895 bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
896 size_t try_to_copy, copied = 0;
897 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
907 if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL))
910 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
913 if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
914 ret = tls_proccess_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
916 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
918 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
923 while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
932 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
938 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
939 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
941 orig_size = msg_pl->sg.size;
943 try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg);
944 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
945 if (try_to_copy >= record_room) {
946 try_to_copy = record_room;
950 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy +
953 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
954 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
957 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
960 goto wait_for_memory;
962 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
963 * actually allocated. The difference is due
964 * to max sg elements limit
966 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_en->sg.size;
970 if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor) && !async_capable) {
971 u32 first = msg_pl->sg.end;
973 ret = sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
974 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
976 goto fallback_to_reg_send;
979 copied += try_to_copy;
981 sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first);
982 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
983 record_type, &copied,
986 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
988 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
989 goto wait_for_memory;
990 else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC)
992 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
997 copied -= try_to_copy;
998 sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first);
999 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter,
1000 msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
1001 fallback_to_reg_send:
1002 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size);
1005 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy;
1007 ret = tls_clone_plaintext_msg(sk, required_size);
1012 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
1013 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1014 * to max sg elements limit
1016 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1018 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en,
1019 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
1023 ret = sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
1024 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
1029 /* Open records defined only if successfully copied, otherwise
1030 * we would trim the sg but not reset the open record frags.
1032 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1033 copied += try_to_copy;
1034 if (full_record || eor) {
1035 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1036 record_type, &copied,
1039 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1041 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1042 goto wait_for_memory;
1043 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1054 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1056 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1060 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size);
1064 if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size)
1065 goto alloc_encrypted;
1070 } else if (num_zc) {
1071 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */
1072 smp_store_mb(ctx->async_notify, true);
1074 if (atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending))
1075 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1077 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1079 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1081 if (ctx->async_wait.err) {
1082 ret = ctx->async_wait.err;
1087 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1088 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1089 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1090 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags);
1094 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret);
1097 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1098 return copied ? copied : ret;
1101 static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1102 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1104 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1105 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1106 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
1107 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1108 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
1109 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
1110 struct tls_rec *rec;
1118 eor = !(flags & (MSG_MORE | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST));
1119 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
1121 /* Call the sk_stream functions to manage the sndbuf mem. */
1123 size_t copy, required_size;
1131 rec = ctx->open_rec;
1133 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
1139 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
1141 full_record = false;
1142 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
1144 if (copy >= record_room) {
1149 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + copy + prot->overhead_size;
1151 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
1152 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
1154 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
1157 goto wait_for_memory;
1159 /* Adjust copy according to the amount that was
1160 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1161 * to max sg elements limit
1163 copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1167 sk_msg_page_add(msg_pl, page, copy, offset);
1168 sk_mem_charge(sk, copy);
1174 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1175 if (full_record || eor || sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) {
1176 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1177 record_type, &copied, flags);
1179 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1181 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1182 goto wait_for_memory;
1183 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1192 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1194 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1197 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, msg_pl->sg.size);
1206 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1207 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1208 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1209 tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
1213 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret);
1214 return copied ? copied : ret;
1217 int tls_sw_sendpage_locked(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1218 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1220 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1221 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY |
1222 MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS))
1225 return tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1228 int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1229 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1231 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1234 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1235 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY))
1238 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1240 ret = tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1242 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1246 static struct sk_buff *tls_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
1247 int flags, long timeo, int *err)
1249 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1250 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1251 struct sk_buff *skb;
1252 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
1254 while (!(skb = ctx->recv_pkt) && sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) {
1256 *err = sock_error(sk);
1260 if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
1263 if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
1266 if ((flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) || !timeo) {
1271 add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1272 sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1273 sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo,
1274 ctx->recv_pkt != skb ||
1275 !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock),
1277 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1278 remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1280 /* Handle signals */
1281 if (signal_pending(current)) {
1282 *err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
1290 static int tls_setup_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
1291 int length, int *pages_used,
1292 unsigned int *size_used,
1293 struct scatterlist *to,
1296 int rc = 0, i = 0, num_elem = *pages_used, maxpages;
1297 struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
1298 unsigned int size = *size_used;
1299 ssize_t copied, use;
1302 while (length > 0) {
1304 maxpages = to_max_pages - num_elem;
1305 if (maxpages == 0) {
1309 copied = iov_iter_get_pages(from, pages,
1317 iov_iter_advance(from, copied);
1322 use = min_t(int, copied, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
1324 sg_set_page(&to[num_elem],
1325 pages[i], use, offset);
1326 sg_unmark_end(&to[num_elem]);
1327 /* We do not uncharge memory from this API */
1336 /* Mark the end in the last sg entry if newly added */
1337 if (num_elem > *pages_used)
1338 sg_mark_end(&to[num_elem - 1]);
1341 iov_iter_revert(from, size - *size_used);
1343 *pages_used = num_elem;
1348 /* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg
1349 * or in skb buffers itself. The input parameter 'zc' indicates if
1350 * zero-copy mode needs to be tried or not. With zero-copy mode, either
1351 * out_iov or out_sg must be non-NULL. In case both out_iov and out_sg are
1352 * NULL, then the decryption happens inside skb buffers itself, i.e.
1353 * zero-copy gets disabled and 'zc' is updated.
1356 static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1357 struct iov_iter *out_iov,
1358 struct scatterlist *out_sg,
1359 int *chunk, bool *zc, bool async)
1361 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1362 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1363 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1364 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1365 int n_sgin, n_sgout, nsg, mem_size, aead_size, err, pages = 0;
1366 struct aead_request *aead_req;
1367 struct sk_buff *unused;
1368 u8 *aad, *iv, *mem = NULL;
1369 struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL;
1370 struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL;
1371 const int data_len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1375 if (*zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) {
1377 n_sgout = iov_iter_npages(out_iov, INT_MAX) + 1;
1379 n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg);
1380 n_sgin = skb_nsg(skb, rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1381 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1385 n_sgin = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
1391 /* Increment to accommodate AAD */
1392 n_sgin = n_sgin + 1;
1394 nsg = n_sgin + n_sgout;
1396 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1397 mem_size = aead_size + (nsg * sizeof(struct scatterlist));
1398 mem_size = mem_size + prot->aad_size;
1399 mem_size = mem_size + crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1401 /* Allocate a single block of memory which contains
1402 * aead_req || sgin[] || sgout[] || aad || iv.
1403 * This order achieves correct alignment for aead_req, sgin, sgout.
1405 mem = kmalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
1409 /* Segment the allocated memory */
1410 aead_req = (struct aead_request *)mem;
1411 sgin = (struct scatterlist *)(mem + aead_size);
1412 sgout = sgin + n_sgin;
1413 aad = (u8 *)(sgout + n_sgout);
1414 iv = aad + prot->aad_size;
1416 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of nonce+iv is always '2' */
1417 if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
1423 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
1424 iv + iv_offset + prot->salt_size,
1430 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1431 memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv,
1432 crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_recv));
1434 memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size);
1436 xor_iv_with_seq(prot->version, iv, tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
1439 tls_make_aad(aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1441 tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size,
1442 ctx->control, prot->version);
1445 sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin);
1446 sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
1447 err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
1448 rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1449 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1457 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout);
1458 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
1461 err = tls_setup_from_iter(sk, out_iov, data_len,
1462 &pages, chunk, &sgout[1],
1465 goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
1466 } else if (out_sg) {
1467 memcpy(sgout, out_sg, n_sgout * sizeof(*sgout));
1469 goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
1472 fallback_to_reg_recv:
1479 /* Prepare and submit AEAD request */
1480 err = tls_do_decryption(sk, skb, sgin, sgout, iv,
1481 data_len, aead_req, async);
1482 if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
1485 /* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */
1486 for (; pages > 0; pages--)
1487 put_page(sg_page(&sgout[pages]));
1493 static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1494 struct iov_iter *dest, int *chunk, bool *zc,
1497 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1498 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1499 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1500 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1503 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1504 if (tls_ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW) {
1505 err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx, skb, rxm);
1510 /* Still not decrypted after tls_device */
1511 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1512 err = decrypt_internal(sk, skb, dest, NULL, chunk, zc,
1515 if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
1516 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot,
1525 pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
1529 rxm->full_len -= pad;
1530 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
1531 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
1532 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx);
1534 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
1542 int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1543 struct scatterlist *sgout)
1548 return decrypt_internal(sk, skb, NULL, sgout, &chunk, &zc, false);
1551 static bool tls_sw_advance_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1554 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1555 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1558 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1560 if (len < rxm->full_len) {
1562 rxm->full_len -= len;
1568 /* Finished with message */
1569 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
1570 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
1575 /* This function traverses the rx_list in tls receive context to copies the
1576 * decrypted records into the buffer provided by caller zero copy is not
1577 * true. Further, the records are removed from the rx_list if it is not a peek
1578 * case and the record has been consumed completely.
1580 static int process_rx_list(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
1589 struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&ctx->rx_list);
1592 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1595 /* Set the record type in 'control' if caller didn't pass it */
1598 ctrl = tlm->control;
1601 while (skip && skb) {
1602 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1605 /* Cannot process a record of different type */
1606 if (ctrl != tlm->control)
1609 if (skip < rxm->full_len)
1612 skip = skip - rxm->full_len;
1613 skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1616 while (len && skb) {
1617 struct sk_buff *next_skb;
1618 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1619 int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len - skip, len);
1623 /* Cannot process a record of different type */
1624 if (ctrl != tlm->control)
1627 /* Set record type if not already done. For a non-data record,
1628 * do not proceed if record type could not be copied.
1631 int cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1632 sizeof(ctrl), &ctrl);
1634 if (ctrl != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1635 if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
1642 if (!zc || (rxm->full_len - skip) > len) {
1643 int err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset + skip,
1650 copied = copied + chunk;
1652 /* Consume the data from record if it is non-peek case*/
1654 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1655 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1657 /* Return if there is unconsumed data in the record */
1658 if (rxm->full_len - skip)
1662 /* The remaining skip-bytes must lie in 1st record in rx_list.
1663 * So from the 2nd record, 'skip' should be 0.
1668 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1670 next_skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1673 skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1684 int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
1691 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1692 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1693 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1694 struct sk_psock *psock;
1695 unsigned char control = 0;
1696 ssize_t decrypted = 0;
1697 struct strp_msg *rxm;
1698 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1699 struct sk_buff *skb;
1702 int target, err = 0;
1704 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
1705 bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
1710 if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
1711 return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR);
1713 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
1716 /* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */
1717 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0, len, false,
1720 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1729 target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
1731 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1733 while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || ctx->recv_pkt)) {
1734 bool retain_skb = false;
1741 skb = tls_wait_data(sk, psock, flags, timeo, &err);
1744 int ret = __tcp_bpf_recvmsg(sk, psock,
1756 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1759 tlm->control = ctx->control;
1762 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1764 to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
1766 if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
1767 ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA &&
1768 prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1771 /* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
1772 if (ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
1773 async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
1775 async_capable = false;
1777 err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
1778 &chunk, &zc, async_capable);
1779 if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
1780 tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
1784 if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
1787 } else if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
1788 tlm->control = ctx->control;
1791 /* If the type of records being processed is not known yet,
1792 * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known,
1793 * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end.
1794 * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type
1795 * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser.
1796 * For tls1.3, we disable async.
1800 control = tlm->control;
1801 else if (control != tlm->control)
1807 cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1808 sizeof(control), &control);
1810 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1811 if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
1819 goto pick_next_record;
1822 if (rxm->full_len > len) {
1826 chunk = rxm->full_len;
1829 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
1835 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1836 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1847 /* For async or peek case, queue the current skb */
1848 if (async || is_peek || retain_skb) {
1849 skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, skb);
1853 if (tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, chunk)) {
1854 /* Return full control message to
1855 * userspace before trying to parse
1856 * another message type
1858 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1859 if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
1868 /* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */
1869 smp_store_mb(ctx->async_notify, true);
1870 if (atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending)) {
1871 err = crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1873 /* one of async decrypt failed */
1874 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1880 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1882 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1884 /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */
1885 if (is_peek || is_kvec)
1886 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, copied,
1887 decrypted, false, is_peek);
1889 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0,
1890 decrypted, true, is_peek);
1892 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1898 copied += decrypted;
1903 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
1904 return copied ? : err;
1907 ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
1908 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
1909 size_t len, unsigned int flags)
1911 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sock->sk);
1912 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1913 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;
1914 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
1915 struct sk_buff *skb;
1924 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1926 skb = tls_wait_data(sk, NULL, flags, timeo, &err);
1928 goto splice_read_end;
1930 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1931 err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false);
1933 /* splice does not support reading control messages */
1934 if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1936 goto splice_read_end;
1940 tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
1941 goto splice_read_end;
1945 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1947 chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
1948 copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
1950 goto splice_read_end;
1952 if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK)))
1953 tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, copied);
1957 return copied ? : err;
1960 bool tls_sw_stream_read(const struct sock *sk)
1962 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1963 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1964 bool ingress_empty = true;
1965 struct sk_psock *psock;
1968 psock = sk_psock(sk);
1970 ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg);
1973 return !ingress_empty || ctx->recv_pkt ||
1974 !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
1977 static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
1979 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
1980 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1981 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1982 char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
1983 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1984 size_t cipher_overhead;
1985 size_t data_len = 0;
1988 /* Verify that we have a full TLS header, or wait for more data */
1989 if (rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size > skb->len)
1992 /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */
1993 if (WARN_ON(prot->prepend_size > sizeof(header))) {
1998 /* Linearize header to local buffer */
1999 ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, header, prot->prepend_size);
2004 ctx->control = header[0];
2006 data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8));
2008 cipher_overhead = prot->tag_size;
2009 if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
2010 cipher_overhead += prot->iv_size;
2012 if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead +
2017 if (data_len < cipher_overhead) {
2022 /* Note that both TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 use TLS_1_2 version here */
2023 if (header[1] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR ||
2024 header[2] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
2029 tls_device_rx_resync_new_rec(strp->sk, data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
2030 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + rxm->offset);
2031 return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2034 tls_err_abort(strp->sk, ret);
2039 static void tls_queue(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
2041 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
2042 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2046 ctx->recv_pkt = skb;
2049 ctx->saved_data_ready(strp->sk);
2052 static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
2054 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2055 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2056 struct sk_psock *psock;
2058 strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp);
2060 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
2061 if (psock && !list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg)) {
2062 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
2063 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
2067 void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2069 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2071 set_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2072 set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2073 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ctx->tx_work.work);
2076 void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk)
2078 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2079 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2080 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
2082 /* Wait for any pending async encryptions to complete */
2083 smp_store_mb(ctx->async_notify, true);
2084 if (atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending))
2085 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
2087 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2089 /* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free
2090 * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list.
2092 if (tls_ctx->partially_sent_record) {
2093 tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx);
2094 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
2095 struct tls_rec, list);
2096 list_del(&rec->list);
2097 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2101 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
2102 list_del(&rec->list);
2103 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
2104 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2108 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send);
2109 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
2112 void tls_sw_free_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2114 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2119 void tls_sw_release_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2121 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2122 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2124 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
2125 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.iv);
2127 if (ctx->aead_recv) {
2128 kfree_skb(ctx->recv_pkt);
2129 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
2130 skb_queue_purge(&ctx->rx_list);
2131 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_recv);
2132 strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
2133 /* If tls_sw_strparser_arm() was not called (cleanup paths)
2134 * we still want to strp_stop(), but sk->sk_data_ready was
2137 if (ctx->saved_data_ready) {
2138 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2139 sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready;
2140 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2145 void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2147 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2149 strp_done(&ctx->strp);
2152 void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2154 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2159 void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2161 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2163 tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk);
2164 tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2167 /* The work handler to transmitt the encrypted records in tx_list */
2168 static void tx_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
2170 struct delayed_work *delayed_work = to_delayed_work(work);
2171 struct tx_work *tx_work = container_of(delayed_work,
2172 struct tx_work, work);
2173 struct sock *sk = tx_work->sk;
2174 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2175 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx;
2177 if (unlikely(!tls_ctx))
2180 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2181 if (test_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2184 if (!test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2186 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
2188 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2190 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
2193 void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
2195 struct tls_sw_context_tx *tx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
2197 /* Schedule the transmission if tx list is ready */
2198 if (is_tx_ready(tx_ctx) &&
2199 !test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &tx_ctx->tx_bitmask))
2200 schedule_delayed_work(&tx_ctx->tx_work.work, 0);
2203 void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2205 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2207 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2208 rx_ctx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready;
2209 sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready;
2210 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2212 strp_check_rcv(&rx_ctx->strp);
2215 int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx)
2217 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2218 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
2219 struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
2220 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *gcm_128_info;
2221 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
2222 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *ccm_128_info;
2223 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
2224 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
2225 struct cipher_context *cctx;
2226 struct crypto_aead **aead;
2227 struct strp_callbacks cb;
2228 u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size, salt_size;
2229 struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
2230 char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt, *cipher_name;
2240 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) {
2241 sw_ctx_tx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_tx), GFP_KERNEL);
2246 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = sw_ctx_tx;
2249 (struct tls_sw_context_tx *)ctx->priv_ctx_tx;
2252 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) {
2253 sw_ctx_rx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_rx), GFP_KERNEL);
2258 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = sw_ctx_rx;
2261 (struct tls_sw_context_rx *)ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
2266 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_tx->async_wait);
2267 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
2269 aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send;
2270 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_list);
2271 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.work, tx_work_handler);
2272 sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.sk = sk;
2274 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_rx->async_wait);
2275 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
2277 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list);
2278 aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
2281 switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
2282 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
2283 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2284 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2285 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2286 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2287 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2289 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2291 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info;
2292 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2293 key = gcm_128_info->key;
2294 salt = gcm_128_info->salt;
2295 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2296 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2299 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256: {
2300 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2301 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
2302 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2303 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2304 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2306 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2308 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info;
2309 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE;
2310 key = gcm_256_info->key;
2311 salt = gcm_256_info->salt;
2312 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE;
2313 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2316 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: {
2317 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2318 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2319 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2320 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2321 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2323 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2325 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info;
2326 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2327 key = ccm_128_info->key;
2328 salt = ccm_128_info->salt;
2329 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2330 cipher_name = "ccm(aes)";
2338 /* Sanity-check the sizes for stack allocations. */
2339 if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE ||
2340 rec_seq_size > TLS_MAX_REC_SEQ_SIZE) {
2345 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
2347 prot->aad_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2348 prot->tail_size = 1;
2350 prot->aad_size = TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
2351 prot->tail_size = 0;
2354 prot->version = crypto_info->version;
2355 prot->cipher_type = crypto_info->cipher_type;
2356 prot->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
2357 prot->tag_size = tag_size;
2358 prot->overhead_size = prot->prepend_size +
2359 prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size;
2360 prot->iv_size = iv_size;
2361 prot->salt_size = salt_size;
2362 cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2367 /* Note: 128 & 256 bit salt are the same size */
2368 prot->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
2369 memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, salt_size);
2370 memcpy(cctx->iv + salt_size, iv, iv_size);
2371 cctx->rec_seq = kmemdup(rec_seq, rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2372 if (!cctx->rec_seq) {
2378 *aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_name, 0, 0);
2379 if (IS_ERR(*aead)) {
2380 rc = PTR_ERR(*aead);
2386 ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
2388 rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, keysize);
2393 rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
2398 tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv);
2400 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
2401 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable = 0;
2403 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable =
2404 !!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags &
2407 /* Set up strparser */
2408 memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
2409 cb.rcv_msg = tls_queue;
2410 cb.parse_msg = tls_read_size;
2412 strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk, &cb);
2418 crypto_free_aead(*aead);
2421 kfree(cctx->rec_seq);
2422 cctx->rec_seq = NULL;
2428 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
2429 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
2431 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
2432 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;