1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
4 * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
5 * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz>
6 * Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
7 * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
8 * Copyright 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
9 * Copyright 2018-2020, 2022 Intel Corporation
12 #include <linux/if_ether.h>
13 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
16 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
17 #include <linux/slab.h>
18 #include <linux/export.h>
19 #include <net/mac80211.h>
20 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
21 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
22 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
23 #include "driver-ops.h"
24 #include "debugfs_key.h"
32 * DOC: Key handling basics
34 * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data)
35 * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface,
36 * each station key also belongs to that interface.
38 * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms
39 * that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked
40 * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is
41 * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm
42 * that isn't implemented in software).
43 * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW
44 * or HW except by looking into debugfs.
46 * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all
47 * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure
48 * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are
49 * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware
50 * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must
51 * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period.
54 static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
56 static void assert_key_lock(struct ieee80211_local *local)
58 lockdep_assert_held(&local->key_mtx);
62 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta)
64 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
66 if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP)
69 /* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is protected by this */
70 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
74 list_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
75 vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt += delta;
80 static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
83 * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom
84 * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race
85 * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one:
87 * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before
88 * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off.
90 * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but
91 * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks
94 * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for
95 * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c)
97 * Solution has been explained at
98 * http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net
101 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
103 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
105 if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) {
107 * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no
108 * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1.
114 static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
117 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
119 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt < delta);
121 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, -delta);
122 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt -= delta;
125 static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
127 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata;
128 struct sta_info *sta;
129 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
133 if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED) {
134 /* If we get here, it's during resume and the key is
135 * tainted so shouldn't be used/programmed any more.
136 * However, its flags may still indicate that it was
137 * programmed into the device (since we're in resume)
138 * so clear that flag now to avoid trying to remove
141 if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE &&
142 !(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
143 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
144 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
145 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
147 key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
151 if (!key->local->ops->set_key)
152 goto out_unsupported;
154 assert_key_lock(key->local);
159 * If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it
160 * is supported; if not, return.
162 if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) &&
163 !ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK))
164 goto out_unsupported;
166 if (sta && !sta->uploaded)
167 goto out_unsupported;
169 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
171 * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces.
172 * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver.
174 if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) {
176 goto out_unsupported;
180 ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata,
181 sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf);
184 key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
186 if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
187 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
188 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
189 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
191 WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
192 (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV));
194 WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) &&
195 (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC));
200 if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP && ret != 1)
202 "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n",
204 sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
207 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
208 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
209 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
210 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
211 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
212 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
213 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
214 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
215 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
216 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
217 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
218 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
219 /* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */
222 if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL))
230 static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
232 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
233 struct sta_info *sta;
238 if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key)
241 assert_key_lock(key->local);
243 if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
249 if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
250 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
251 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
252 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
254 key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
255 ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata,
256 sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf);
260 "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n",
262 sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
265 static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool force)
267 struct sta_info *sta = key->sta;
268 struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local;
270 assert_key_lock(local);
272 set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION);
274 sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx;
276 if (force || !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT))
277 clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
278 ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta);
283 int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key)
285 return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key, false);
288 static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key *old,
289 struct ieee80211_key *new)
291 struct ieee80211_local *local = new->local;
292 struct sta_info *sta = new->sta;
295 assert_key_lock(local);
297 if (new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) {
298 /* Extended Key ID key install, initial one or rekey */
300 if (sta->ptk_idx != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX &&
301 !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) {
302 /* Aggregation Sessions with Extended Key ID must not
303 * mix MPDUs with different keyIDs within one A-MPDU.
304 * Tear down running Tx aggregation sessions and block
305 * new Rx/Tx aggregation requests during rekey to
306 * ensure there are no A-MPDUs when the driver is not
307 * supporting A-MPDU key borders. (Blocking Tx only
308 * would be sufficient but WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA gets the
309 * job done for the few ms we need it.)
311 set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
312 mutex_lock(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
313 for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
314 ___ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session(sta, i,
315 AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST);
316 mutex_unlock(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
319 /* Rekey without Extended Key ID.
320 * Aggregation sessions are OK when running on SW crypto.
321 * A broken remote STA may cause issues not observed with HW
324 if (!(old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
327 /* Stop Tx till we are on the new key */
328 old->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED;
329 ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta);
330 if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_AGGREGATION)) {
331 set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
332 ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta,
333 AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST);
335 if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local->hw.wiphy,
336 NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0)) {
337 pr_warn_ratelimited("Rekeying PTK for STA %pM but driver can't safely do that.",
339 /* Flushing the driver queues *may* help prevent
340 * the clear text leaks and freezes.
342 ieee80211_flush_queues(local, old->sdata, false);
347 static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
348 int idx, bool uni, bool multi)
350 struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
352 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
354 if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS)
355 key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
358 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key);
359 ieee80211_check_fast_xmit_iface(sdata);
360 if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN)
361 drv_set_default_unicast_key(sdata->local, sdata, idx);
365 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_multicast_key, key);
367 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
370 void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx,
371 bool uni, bool multi)
373 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
374 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, idx, uni, multi);
375 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
379 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx)
381 struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
383 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
385 if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS &&
386 idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
387 key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
389 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_mgmt_key, key);
391 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
394 void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
397 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
398 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, idx);
399 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
403 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx)
405 struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
407 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
409 if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS &&
410 idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS +
411 NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS)
412 key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
414 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_beacon_key, key);
416 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
419 void ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
422 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
423 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, idx);
424 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
427 static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
428 struct sta_info *sta,
430 struct ieee80211_key *old,
431 struct ieee80211_key *new)
435 bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey, defbeaconkey;
437 /* caller must provide at least one old/new */
438 if (WARN_ON(!new && !old))
442 list_add_tail_rcu(&new->list, &sdata->key_list);
444 WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx);
446 if (new && sta && pairwise) {
447 /* Unicast rekey needs special handling. With Extended Key ID
448 * old is still NULL for the first rekey.
450 ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(old, new);
454 idx = old->conf.keyidx;
456 if (old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) {
457 ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(old);
460 ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new);
463 /* new must be provided in case old is not */
464 idx = new->conf.keyidx;
465 if (!new->local->wowlan)
466 ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new);
474 rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk[idx], new);
476 !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX))
477 _ieee80211_set_tx_key(new, true);
479 rcu_assign_pointer(sta->deflink.gtk[idx], new);
481 /* Only needed for transition from no key -> key.
482 * Still triggers unnecessary when using Extended Key ID
483 * and installing the second key ID the first time.
486 ieee80211_check_fast_rx(sta);
489 old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
490 sdata->default_unicast_key);
492 old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
493 sdata->default_multicast_key);
495 old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
496 sdata->default_mgmt_key);
497 defbeaconkey = old &&
498 old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
499 sdata->default_beacon_key);
501 if (defunikey && !new)
502 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, true, false);
503 if (defmultikey && !new)
504 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, false, true);
505 if (defmgmtkey && !new)
506 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, -1);
507 if (defbeaconkey && !new)
508 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, -1);
510 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->keys[idx], new);
511 if (defunikey && new)
512 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
514 if (defmultikey && new)
515 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
517 if (defmgmtkey && new)
518 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata,
520 if (defbeaconkey && new)
521 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata,
526 list_del_rcu(&old->list);
531 struct ieee80211_key *
532 ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len,
534 size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq)
536 struct ieee80211_key *key;
539 if (WARN_ON(idx < 0 ||
540 idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS +
541 NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS))
542 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
544 key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key) + key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
546 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
549 * Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the
550 * key to the hardware if possible.
555 key->conf.cipher = cipher;
556 key->conf.keyidx = idx;
557 key->conf.keylen = key_len;
559 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
560 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
561 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN;
562 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN;
564 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
565 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN;
566 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
568 for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
569 key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv32 =
570 get_unaligned_le32(&seq[2]);
571 key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv16 =
572 get_unaligned_le16(seq);
575 spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
577 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
578 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
579 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
581 for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
582 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN; j++)
583 key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
584 seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1];
587 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
588 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
590 key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
591 key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN);
592 if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) {
593 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
598 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
599 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_HDR_LEN;
600 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN;
601 for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
602 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN; j++)
603 key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
604 seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN - j - 1];
605 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
606 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
608 key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
609 key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN);
610 if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) {
611 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
616 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
617 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
618 key->conf.iv_len = 0;
619 if (cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC)
620 key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie);
622 key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16);
624 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN; j++)
625 key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn[j] =
626 seq[IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1];
628 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
629 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
631 key->u.aes_cmac.tfm =
632 ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len);
633 if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm)) {
634 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
639 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
640 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
641 key->conf.iv_len = 0;
642 key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16);
644 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN; j++)
645 key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn[j] =
646 seq[IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1];
647 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
648 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
650 key->u.aes_gmac.tfm =
651 ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len);
652 if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm)) {
653 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm);
658 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
659 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
660 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
661 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
662 for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
663 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN; j++)
664 key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
665 seq[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1];
666 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
667 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
669 key->u.gcmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(key_data,
671 if (IS_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm)) {
672 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm);
678 memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len);
679 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key->list);
684 static void ieee80211_key_free_common(struct ieee80211_key *key)
686 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
687 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
688 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
689 ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
691 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
692 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
693 ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
695 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
696 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
697 ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm);
699 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
700 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
701 ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(key->u.gcmp.tfm);
704 kfree_sensitive(key);
707 static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key,
711 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata;
713 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key);
715 if (delay_tailroom) {
716 /* see ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec */
717 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec++;
718 schedule_delayed_work(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk,
721 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
725 ieee80211_key_free_common(key);
728 static void ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key,
735 * Synchronize so the TX path and rcu key iterators
736 * can no longer be using this key before we free/remove it.
740 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom);
743 void ieee80211_key_free_unused(struct ieee80211_key *key)
745 WARN_ON(key->sdata || key->local);
746 ieee80211_key_free_common(key);
749 static bool ieee80211_key_identical(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
750 struct ieee80211_key *old,
751 struct ieee80211_key *new)
753 u8 tkip_old[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP], tkip_new[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP];
756 if (!old || new->conf.keylen != old->conf.keylen)
759 tk_old = old->conf.key;
760 tk_new = new->conf.key;
763 * In station mode, don't compare the TX MIC key, as it's never used
764 * and offloaded rekeying may not care to send it to the host. This
765 * is the case in iwlwifi, for example.
767 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
768 new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP &&
769 new->conf.keylen == WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP &&
770 !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) {
771 memcpy(tkip_old, tk_old, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP);
772 memcpy(tkip_new, tk_new, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP);
773 memset(tkip_old + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8);
774 memset(tkip_new + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8);
779 return !crypto_memneq(tk_old, tk_new, new->conf.keylen);
782 int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
783 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
784 struct sta_info *sta)
786 static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
787 struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
788 int idx = key->conf.keyidx;
789 bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
791 * We want to delay tailroom updates only for station - in that
792 * case it helps roaming speed, but in other cases it hurts and
793 * can cause warnings to appear.
795 bool delay_tailroom = sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION;
796 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
798 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
800 if (sta && pairwise) {
801 struct ieee80211_key *alt_key;
803 old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx]);
804 alt_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx ^ 1]);
806 /* The rekey code assumes that the old and new key are using
807 * the same cipher. Enforce the assumption for pairwise keys.
809 if ((alt_key && alt_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) ||
810 (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher))
813 old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
814 sta->deflink.gtk[idx]);
816 old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
819 /* Non-pairwise keys must also not switch the cipher on rekey */
821 if (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher)
826 * Silently accept key re-installation without really installing the
827 * new version of the key to avoid nonce reuse or replay issues.
829 if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata, old_key, key)) {
830 ieee80211_key_free_unused(key);
835 key->local = sdata->local;
840 * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed
841 * key and fragment cache attacks.
843 key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);
845 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
847 ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
850 ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key);
851 ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key, delay_tailroom);
853 ieee80211_key_free(key, delay_tailroom);
857 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
862 void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom)
868 * Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used.
871 ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
872 key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
874 ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom);
877 void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
879 struct ieee80211_key *key;
880 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
882 lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy);
884 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
886 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
887 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
889 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
890 list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) {
891 vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
892 vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
896 if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) {
897 list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
898 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
899 ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
903 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
906 void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
907 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
908 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
909 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
910 struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
911 struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
915 struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
916 struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
917 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
919 lockdep_assert_wiphy(hw->wiphy);
921 mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
923 sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
924 list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list)
925 iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
926 key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
927 &key->conf, iter_data);
929 list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
930 list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp,
931 &sdata->key_list, list)
932 iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
933 key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
934 &key->conf, iter_data);
936 mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
938 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys);
941 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
942 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
943 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
944 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
945 struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
946 struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
950 struct ieee80211_key *key;
952 list_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
953 /* skip keys of station in removal process */
954 if (key->sta && key->sta->removed)
956 if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
959 iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
960 key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
961 &key->conf, iter_data);
965 void ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
966 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
967 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
968 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
969 struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
970 struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
974 struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
975 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
978 sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
979 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data);
981 list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
982 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data);
985 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu);
987 static void ieee80211_free_keys_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
988 struct list_head *keys)
990 struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
992 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata,
993 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
994 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
996 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata);
997 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_beacon_default(sdata);
999 list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) {
1000 ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
1001 key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
1003 list_add_tail(&key->list, keys);
1006 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
1009 void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
1010 bool force_synchronize)
1012 struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
1013 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
1014 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *master;
1015 struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
1018 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk);
1020 mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
1022 ieee80211_free_keys_iface(sdata, &keys);
1024 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
1025 list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
1026 ieee80211_free_keys_iface(vlan, &keys);
1029 if (!list_empty(&keys) || force_synchronize)
1031 list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &keys, list)
1032 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key, false);
1034 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
1036 master = container_of(sdata->bss,
1037 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data,
1040 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt !=
1041 master->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt);
1044 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
1045 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
1048 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
1049 list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
1050 WARN_ON_ONCE(vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
1051 vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
1054 mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
1057 void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local,
1058 struct sta_info *sta)
1060 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1063 mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
1064 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->deflink.gtk); i++) {
1065 key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->deflink.gtk[i]);
1068 ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
1069 key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
1071 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type ==
1072 NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION);
1075 for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
1076 key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[i]);
1079 ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
1080 key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
1082 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type ==
1083 NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION);
1086 mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
1089 void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct work_struct *wk)
1091 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
1093 sdata = container_of(wk, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data,
1094 dec_tailroom_needed_wk.work);
1097 * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
1098 * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
1099 * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
1100 * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
1101 * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
1102 * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
1103 * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
1104 * zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
1106 * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
1107 * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
1108 * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
1109 * within an ESS this usually won't happen.
1112 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
1113 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata,
1114 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
1115 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
1116 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
1119 void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid,
1120 const u8 *replay_ctr, gfp_t gfp)
1122 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
1124 trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata, bssid, replay_ctr);
1126 cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp);
1128 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify);
1130 void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
1131 int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
1133 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1136 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1138 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
1139 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
1140 if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1142 seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32;
1143 seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16;
1145 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
1146 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
1147 if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1150 pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
1152 pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
1153 memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
1155 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
1156 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
1157 if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
1159 pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
1160 memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN);
1162 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
1163 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
1164 if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
1166 pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn;
1167 memcpy(seq->aes_gmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN);
1169 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
1170 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
1171 if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1174 pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
1176 pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid];
1177 memcpy(seq->gcmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
1181 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq);
1183 void ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
1184 int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
1186 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1189 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1191 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
1192 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
1193 if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1195 key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32 = seq->tkip.iv32;
1196 key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16 = seq->tkip.iv16;
1198 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
1199 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
1200 if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1203 pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
1205 pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
1206 memcpy(pn, seq->ccmp.pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
1208 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
1209 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
1210 if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
1212 pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
1213 memcpy(pn, seq->aes_cmac.pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN);
1215 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
1216 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
1217 if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
1219 pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn;
1220 memcpy(pn, seq->aes_gmac.pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN);
1222 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
1223 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
1224 if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1227 pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
1229 pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid];
1230 memcpy(pn, seq->gcmp.pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
1237 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq);
1239 void ieee80211_remove_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
1241 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1243 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1245 assert_key_lock(key->local);
1248 * if key was uploaded, we assume the driver will/has remove(d)
1249 * it, so adjust bookkeeping accordingly
1251 if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) {
1252 key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
1254 if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
1255 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
1256 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
1257 increment_tailroom_need_count(key->sdata);
1260 ieee80211_key_free(key, false);
1262 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_remove_key);
1264 struct ieee80211_key_conf *
1265 ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
1266 struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
1268 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
1269 struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
1270 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1273 if (WARN_ON(!local->wowlan))
1274 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1276 if (WARN_ON(vif->type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION))
1277 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1279 key = ieee80211_key_alloc(keyconf->cipher, keyconf->keyidx,
1280 keyconf->keylen, keyconf->key,
1283 return ERR_CAST(key);
1285 if (sdata->u.mgd.mfp != IEEE80211_MFP_DISABLED)
1286 key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT;
1288 err = ieee80211_key_link(key, sdata, NULL);
1290 return ERR_PTR(err);
1294 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add);
1296 void ieee80211_key_mic_failure(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
1298 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1300 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1302 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
1303 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
1304 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
1305 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
1307 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
1308 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
1309 key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
1312 /* ignore the others for now, we don't keep counters now */
1316 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_mic_failure);
1318 void ieee80211_key_replay(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
1320 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1322 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1324 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
1325 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
1326 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
1327 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
1329 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
1330 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
1331 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
1333 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
1334 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
1335 key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
1337 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
1338 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
1339 key->u.gcmp.replays++;
1343 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_replay);