2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
23 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <linux/crypto.h>
26 #include <crypto/aes.h>
27 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
28 #include <crypto/hash.h>
29 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
31 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
32 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
33 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
34 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
36 #include "ecdh_helper.h"
39 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
40 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
42 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
43 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
44 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
47 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
50 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
54 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
56 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
57 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)
59 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
61 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
63 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
65 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
66 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
78 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
85 /* Secure Connections OOB data */
91 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
92 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
96 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
97 struct delayed_work security_timer;
98 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
100 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
101 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
102 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
103 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
104 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
105 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
106 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
107 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
113 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
114 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
116 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
117 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
123 /* Secure Connections variables */
129 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
130 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
133 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
134 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
137 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
138 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
139 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
140 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
141 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
143 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
144 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
145 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
146 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
149 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
150 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
151 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
152 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
153 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
156 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
160 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
161 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
164 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
165 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
168 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
169 size_t len, u8 mac[16])
171 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
174 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
178 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
182 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
183 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
184 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
186 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
187 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
189 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
191 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
195 err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
197 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
201 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
203 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
208 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
209 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
214 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
215 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
216 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
219 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
220 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
222 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
226 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
231 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
232 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
233 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
235 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
236 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
237 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
238 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
241 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
242 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
243 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
244 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
248 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
249 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
250 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
252 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
256 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
258 memcpy(m, length, 2);
259 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
260 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
261 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
262 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
263 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
265 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
267 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
271 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
273 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
275 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
279 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
284 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
285 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
286 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
292 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
293 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
294 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
297 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
298 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
299 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
300 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
301 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
303 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
307 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
312 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
313 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
318 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
319 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
320 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
323 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
324 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
326 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
330 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
333 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
338 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
339 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
343 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
345 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
349 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
354 static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
355 const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
359 SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
361 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
365 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
370 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
374 static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r)
376 struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
377 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
380 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
382 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
383 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
385 err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16);
387 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
391 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
392 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
394 aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data);
396 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
397 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
399 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
401 memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
405 static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16],
406 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
407 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
412 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
413 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
414 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
418 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
421 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
422 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
424 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
427 crypto_xor_cpy(res, r, p1, sizeof(p1));
429 /* res = e(k, res) */
432 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
436 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
438 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
439 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
441 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
443 /* res = res XOR p2 */
444 crypto_xor(res, p2, sizeof(p2));
446 /* res = e(k, res) */
449 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
454 static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16],
455 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
459 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
461 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
465 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
470 static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
475 /* r' = padding || r */
477 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
479 err = smp_e(irk, _res);
481 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
485 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
486 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
487 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
488 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
491 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
496 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
497 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
499 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
503 if (!chan || !chan->data)
506 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
508 err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
512 return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
515 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
517 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
520 if (!chan || !chan->data)
523 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
525 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
526 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
528 err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
532 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa);
537 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
539 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
543 if (!chan || !chan->data)
548 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
549 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
550 err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
553 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
554 smp->debug_key = true;
557 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
558 err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
562 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
563 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
565 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
568 smp->debug_key = false;
571 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
572 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
574 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
576 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
577 smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
581 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
583 smp->local_oob = true;
588 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
590 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
591 struct smp_chan *smp;
598 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "code 0x%2.2x", code);
600 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
603 iv[1].iov_base = data;
606 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
608 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iv, 2, 1 + len);
610 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
617 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
618 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
621 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
623 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
624 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
625 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
627 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
629 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
633 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
636 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
637 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
638 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
639 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
640 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
642 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
646 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
647 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
648 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
650 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
651 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
652 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
653 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
654 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
656 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
657 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
658 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
659 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
661 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
664 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
665 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
667 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
668 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
670 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
671 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
672 struct oob_data *oob_data;
675 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
676 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
677 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
680 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
681 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
683 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
685 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
687 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
688 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
689 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
690 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
691 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
692 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
693 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
697 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
701 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
702 req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
703 req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
704 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
705 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
706 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
708 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
712 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
713 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
714 rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
715 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
716 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
717 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
719 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
722 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
724 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
725 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
726 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
728 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
729 max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
730 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
732 if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
733 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
734 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
736 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
741 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
743 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
744 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
745 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
750 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
752 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
753 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
755 kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
756 kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk);
757 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
759 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
760 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
762 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
763 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
765 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
766 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
767 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
768 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
772 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
775 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
776 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
779 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
780 list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
781 kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
784 if (smp->remote_irk) {
785 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
786 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
791 kfree_sensitive(smp);
795 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
797 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
798 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
801 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
804 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
807 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
810 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
811 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
812 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
813 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
815 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
818 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
819 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
820 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
821 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
822 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
823 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
826 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
827 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
828 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
829 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
830 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
831 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
834 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
836 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
837 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
839 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
840 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
843 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
844 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
846 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
849 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
850 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
852 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
853 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
854 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
858 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
859 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
860 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
862 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io,
865 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
866 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
867 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
868 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
871 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
872 smp->method = JUST_CFM;
874 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
876 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
877 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
879 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
881 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
882 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
883 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
884 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
886 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for
888 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
889 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
895 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
899 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
900 * can only recover the just-works case.
902 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
905 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
906 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
907 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
908 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
909 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
912 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
913 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
915 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
916 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
917 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
919 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
922 /* Generate random passkey. */
923 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
924 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
925 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
927 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
928 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", passkey);
929 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
932 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
933 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
934 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
935 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
936 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
937 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
940 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
941 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
947 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
949 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
950 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
953 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
955 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
956 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
957 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
960 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
962 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
964 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
967 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
969 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
974 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
976 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
977 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
981 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
982 conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
984 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
985 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
986 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
988 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
990 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
991 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
992 "(confirmation values mismatch)");
993 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1001 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
1003 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1004 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1006 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
1007 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
1008 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1014 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1017 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1019 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1024 /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
1025 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
1026 * STK never needs to be stored).
1028 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1029 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1035 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1037 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1038 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1039 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1040 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1041 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1042 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1045 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1046 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1049 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1052 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1053 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1054 * authentication requests.
1056 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1060 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1061 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1063 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1064 * identity address track the connection based on it
1065 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1067 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1068 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1069 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1070 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
1075 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1076 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1077 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1080 if (smp->slave_csrk) {
1081 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1082 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1083 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
1087 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1088 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1089 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1092 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
1093 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1094 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1095 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
1098 if (smp->link_key) {
1099 struct link_key *key;
1102 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1103 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1104 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1105 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1107 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1109 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1110 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1112 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1114 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1117 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1118 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1119 list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1120 kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1126 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1128 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1131 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1132 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1134 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1136 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1141 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1142 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1146 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1148 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
1149 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1151 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1155 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1156 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
1157 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1159 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
1160 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1161 smp->link_key = NULL;
1165 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
1166 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1168 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1169 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1170 smp->link_key = NULL;
1175 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1176 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1177 smp->link_key = NULL;
1182 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1184 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1185 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1186 * them in the correct order.
1188 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1189 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1190 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1191 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1192 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1193 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1196 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1198 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
1199 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1200 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1201 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1202 struct link_key *key;
1204 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1206 bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
1210 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1211 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1213 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1214 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
1215 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1217 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
1220 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
1221 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1223 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1227 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1233 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1235 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1236 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1237 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1238 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1241 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1243 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1245 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1246 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1247 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1251 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1254 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1255 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1257 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1258 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1261 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1262 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1263 sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1264 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1265 sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1267 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1268 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1271 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1273 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1274 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1275 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
1276 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1281 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1282 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1283 * of the value to zeroes.
1285 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1286 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1287 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1289 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1290 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1292 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1294 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1295 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1296 SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1297 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1298 smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
1303 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
1305 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1308 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1309 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1310 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1312 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1314 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1316 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1317 * after the connection has been established.
1319 * This is true even when the connection has been
1320 * established using a resolvable random address.
1322 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1323 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1325 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1328 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1331 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1332 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1333 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1335 /* Generate a new random key */
1336 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1338 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1340 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1341 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1343 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1344 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1346 smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
1348 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1350 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1353 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1354 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1355 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1359 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1360 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1362 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1365 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1367 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1368 security_timer.work);
1369 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1371 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1373 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1376 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1378 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1379 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1380 struct smp_chan *smp;
1382 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1386 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1387 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1388 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1392 smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0);
1393 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
1394 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
1401 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1403 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1405 hci_conn_hold(hcon);
1410 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
1412 kfree_sensitive(smp);
1416 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1418 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1419 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1429 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1430 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1431 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1432 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1434 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1437 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1439 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1440 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1441 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1442 u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1444 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1445 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1446 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1447 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1452 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1456 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1459 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1461 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1462 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1464 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1465 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1467 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1468 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1470 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1473 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1475 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1476 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1477 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1480 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1483 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1485 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1487 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1489 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1494 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1496 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1497 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1498 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1501 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1502 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1506 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1507 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1510 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1512 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1514 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1515 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1517 smp->passkey_round++;
1519 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1520 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1521 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1522 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1525 /* The round is only complete when the initiator
1526 * receives pairing random.
1529 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1530 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1531 if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1532 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1534 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1538 /* Start the next round */
1539 if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1540 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1542 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1543 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1544 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1548 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1549 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1550 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1554 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1557 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1558 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1562 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1564 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1566 /* Initiating device starts the round */
1570 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u",
1571 smp->passkey_round + 1);
1573 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1575 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1581 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1583 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1584 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1587 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1590 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1591 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1593 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1594 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1596 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1597 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1598 smp->passkey_round = 0;
1600 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1601 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1605 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1611 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1613 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1614 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1615 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1616 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1623 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1625 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1626 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1627 struct smp_chan *smp;
1634 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
1640 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1648 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1649 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1654 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1655 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1656 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1657 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", value);
1658 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1660 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1661 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1663 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1664 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1665 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1669 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1676 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1677 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1678 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1680 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1684 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1688 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1689 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1690 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1692 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1693 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1694 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1696 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1697 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1698 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1701 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1702 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1704 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1705 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1708 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1710 req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1711 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
1712 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
1713 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1715 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1720 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1722 rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1723 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1724 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1725 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1727 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1730 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1732 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1733 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1734 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1735 struct smp_chan *smp;
1736 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1739 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1741 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1742 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1744 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1745 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1748 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1753 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1755 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1756 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1758 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1759 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1760 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1762 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1763 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1765 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1766 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1767 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1769 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1770 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1771 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1773 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1774 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1776 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1777 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1778 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1779 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1780 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1781 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1783 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1785 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1787 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1788 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1790 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1791 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1792 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1794 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1795 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1797 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1798 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1799 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1801 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1805 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1807 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
1808 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1810 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1811 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1814 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1815 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1817 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1819 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1820 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1822 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1823 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1826 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1827 req->io_capability);
1828 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1829 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1832 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1833 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1834 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1836 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1838 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1839 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1841 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1843 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1845 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1846 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1847 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1848 * positive SC enablement.
1850 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1852 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1853 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1854 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1855 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1856 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1860 /* Request setup of TK */
1861 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1863 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1868 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1870 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1872 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
1874 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1875 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1876 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1878 if (!chan || !chan->data)
1879 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1881 smp_dev = chan->data;
1883 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1884 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1886 if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1887 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1892 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1893 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
1894 if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
1895 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1896 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1897 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1900 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
1901 if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
1902 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1904 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1905 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
1907 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
1913 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1914 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1916 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1921 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1923 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1924 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1925 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1926 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1930 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
1932 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1933 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1935 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1936 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1938 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1940 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1942 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1943 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1944 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1946 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1948 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1949 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1951 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1952 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1953 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1955 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1956 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1958 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1959 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1961 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1962 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1964 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1966 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
1967 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1969 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1970 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1971 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1972 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1973 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1977 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1978 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1979 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1980 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1982 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1983 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1986 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
1987 rsp->io_capability);
1988 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1989 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1992 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1994 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1995 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1997 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1999 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2000 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
2001 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
2002 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2003 return sc_send_public_key(smp);
2006 auth |= req->auth_req;
2008 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
2010 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2012 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2014 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
2015 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2016 return smp_confirm(smp);
2021 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
2023 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2025 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
2027 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2028 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2030 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2031 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2033 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2039 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
2040 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
2041 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
2043 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
2045 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2046 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2047 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2048 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2051 /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
2053 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2055 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2056 bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2057 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2060 bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2062 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2063 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2065 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2066 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2068 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2070 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2071 bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2072 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2075 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2080 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2082 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2083 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2084 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2085 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2087 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
2089 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2090 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2092 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2093 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2095 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2098 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2099 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2100 return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2102 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2104 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2109 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2110 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2112 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2116 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2117 return smp_confirm(smp);
2119 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2124 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2126 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2127 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2128 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2129 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint;
2133 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2135 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2136 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2138 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2139 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2141 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2142 return smp_random(smp);
2145 pkax = smp->local_pk;
2146 pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2150 pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2151 pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2156 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2158 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2159 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2160 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2161 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2164 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2165 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2166 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2171 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2174 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2176 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2177 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2179 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2181 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2183 /* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
2184 if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
2185 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2187 /* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave
2188 * the decision to user space since the remote device could
2189 * be legitimate or malicious.
2191 if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
2193 /* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since
2194 * it'll be ignored anyway.
2203 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2204 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2206 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2208 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2210 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2211 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2216 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2218 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2223 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS)
2226 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2227 hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint);
2229 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2231 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2236 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2238 struct smp_ltk *key;
2239 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2241 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2245 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2248 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2251 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2252 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2254 /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
2255 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2260 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2261 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2263 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2266 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2267 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2268 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2269 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2270 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2272 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2273 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2274 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2277 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2283 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2285 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2286 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2287 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2288 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2289 struct smp_chan *smp;
2292 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2294 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2295 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2297 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2298 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2300 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2302 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2303 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2305 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2306 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2308 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2310 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
2311 /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
2312 * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
2315 smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
2319 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2320 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2322 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2325 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2327 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2329 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2330 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2331 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2333 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2335 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2336 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2338 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2339 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2341 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2342 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2347 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2349 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2350 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2351 struct smp_chan *smp;
2355 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon,
2358 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2362 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2365 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2368 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2369 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2371 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2372 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2377 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
2381 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2383 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2389 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2395 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2397 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
2398 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
2399 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
2400 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
2403 /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs
2404 * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C
2406 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) {
2407 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2410 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2411 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2412 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
2415 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2416 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2418 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2419 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2420 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2422 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2423 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2425 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2426 cp.auth_req = authreq;
2427 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2428 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2431 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2435 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2439 int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
2442 struct hci_conn *hcon;
2443 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
2444 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2445 struct smp_chan *smp;
2448 err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2449 hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2451 hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2455 conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2463 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2467 /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
2468 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
2470 smp->slave_ltk = NULL;
2471 smp->remote_irk = NULL;
2473 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2474 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2476 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
2480 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2486 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2488 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2489 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2490 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2492 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2494 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2495 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2497 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
2498 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK,
2500 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
2501 "LTK blocked for %pMR",
2503 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2506 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
2508 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2510 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2515 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2517 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2518 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2519 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2520 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2521 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2522 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2525 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2527 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2528 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2530 /* Mark the information as received */
2531 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2533 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2534 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2535 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2536 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2538 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2540 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2541 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2542 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2543 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2545 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2546 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2551 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2553 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2554 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2555 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2557 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
2559 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2560 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2562 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
2563 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK,
2565 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
2566 "Identity key blocked for %pMR",
2568 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2571 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2573 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2575 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2580 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2581 struct sk_buff *skb)
2583 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2584 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2585 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2586 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2589 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "");
2591 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2592 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2594 /* Mark the information as received */
2595 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2597 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2598 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2600 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2602 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2603 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2604 * as "identity information". However, since such
2605 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2606 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2607 * received an IRK for such a device.
2609 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2610 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2612 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2613 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2614 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
2618 /* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is
2619 * providing different address as identity information.
2621 * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug.
2623 if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) &&
2624 (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) ||
2625 info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) {
2626 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev,
2627 "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address");
2631 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2632 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2634 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2635 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2637 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2639 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2640 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2643 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2644 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2649 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2651 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2652 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2653 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2654 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2656 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2658 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2659 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2661 /* Mark the information as received */
2662 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2664 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2666 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2668 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2669 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2671 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2672 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2675 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2680 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2682 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2683 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2684 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2685 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2687 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2688 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2691 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2692 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2693 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2694 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2697 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2698 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2700 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2701 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2704 local_io = local->io_capability;
2705 remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2707 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2708 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2710 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2711 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2713 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2714 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2716 method = JUST_WORKS;
2718 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2719 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2720 method = JUST_WORKS;
2725 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2727 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2728 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2729 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2730 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2731 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2732 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
2733 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2736 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2738 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2739 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2741 /* Check if remote and local public keys are the same and debug key is
2744 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags) &&
2745 !crypto_memneq(key, smp->local_pk, 64)) {
2746 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Remote and local public keys are identical");
2747 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2750 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2752 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2753 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2754 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2756 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2758 if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2759 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2762 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2763 * the key from the initiating device.
2766 err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2771 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2772 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2774 /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
2775 * key was set/generated.
2777 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2778 struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data;
2779 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
2781 if (!hchan || !hchan->data)
2782 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2784 smp_dev = hchan->data;
2786 tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
2788 tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
2791 if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
2792 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2794 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2796 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2798 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2800 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "selected method 0x%02x", smp->method);
2802 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2803 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2804 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2806 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2808 if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2809 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2811 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2812 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2813 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2814 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2815 hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2816 smp->passkey_round = 0;
2817 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2819 hcon->passkey_notify,
2820 hcon->passkey_entered))
2821 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2822 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2823 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2826 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2828 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2829 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2831 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2837 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2839 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2840 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2842 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2843 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2844 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2848 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2849 * send the confirm value.
2851 if (conn->hcon->out)
2854 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2855 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2857 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2859 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2860 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2865 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2867 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2868 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2869 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2870 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2871 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2872 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2875 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
2877 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2878 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2880 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2881 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2882 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2883 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2888 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2892 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2895 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2897 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2898 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2899 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2900 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2902 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2903 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2905 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2907 if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
2908 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2911 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2912 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2916 /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
2917 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2923 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2924 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2930 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2931 struct sk_buff *skb)
2933 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2935 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2940 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2942 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2943 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2944 struct smp_chan *smp;
2951 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2952 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2956 code = skb->data[0];
2957 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2961 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2964 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2967 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2968 * pairing request and security request.
2970 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2974 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2975 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2978 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2979 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2983 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2984 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
2987 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
2988 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
2991 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
2992 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
2995 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
2996 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
2999 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
3000 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
3003 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
3004 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
3007 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
3008 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
3011 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
3012 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
3015 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
3016 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
3019 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
3020 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
3023 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
3024 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
3027 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
3028 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
3032 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
3033 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
3040 smp_failure(conn, reason);
3047 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
3053 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
3055 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3057 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3060 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
3063 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3066 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3068 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3069 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3070 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
3071 struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
3072 struct smp_chan *smp;
3074 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3076 /* Only new pairings are interesting */
3077 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
3080 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
3081 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3084 /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
3085 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
3088 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
3089 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
3092 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
3093 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
3094 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3097 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
3098 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
3101 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
3102 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
3105 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
3106 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
3109 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
3113 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
3115 bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
3119 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
3121 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR");
3123 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
3124 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
3126 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
3127 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
3129 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
3130 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
3133 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3135 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3136 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3137 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3139 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3141 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
3142 bredr_pairing(chan);
3149 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3152 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
3154 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
3157 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3159 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3160 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3162 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3164 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
3165 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
3166 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
3167 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3168 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3172 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3173 bredr_pairing(chan);
3176 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3180 bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
3182 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3184 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3187 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3189 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3195 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3196 unsigned long hdr_len,
3197 unsigned long len, int nb)
3199 struct sk_buff *skb;
3201 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3203 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3205 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3206 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3211 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3212 .name = "Security Manager",
3213 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
3214 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
3215 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3216 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
3217 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
3219 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3220 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3221 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3222 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3223 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3224 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3225 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3228 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3230 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3232 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3234 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3238 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
3239 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
3240 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
3241 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
3242 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
3243 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
3244 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
3246 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3247 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3248 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3251 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3253 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3258 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3259 .name = "Security Manager Root",
3260 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
3262 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3263 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3264 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3265 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3266 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3267 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3268 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3269 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3270 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3271 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3272 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3273 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3276 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3278 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3279 struct smp_dev *smp;
3280 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3281 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3283 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3288 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3290 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3292 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3293 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3294 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3295 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3296 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3299 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0);
3300 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3301 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3302 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3303 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3304 return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
3307 smp->local_oob = false;
3308 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3309 smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
3312 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3315 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3316 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3317 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3319 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3324 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3326 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3328 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3331 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3333 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3334 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3336 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3338 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3339 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3342 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3343 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3344 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3345 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3347 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3348 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3353 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3355 struct smp_dev *smp;
3357 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3362 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3363 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3364 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3367 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3370 int smp_force_bredr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bool enable)
3372 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3376 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3378 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3380 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3382 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3384 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3386 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3387 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3391 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3396 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3398 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3400 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
3402 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3403 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3405 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3408 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3409 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3410 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3414 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3416 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3418 hdev->smp_data = chan;
3420 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3421 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
3422 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3426 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3427 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3428 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3432 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3434 int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3435 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3436 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3441 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3446 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3448 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3450 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3451 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3452 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3456 if (hdev->smp_data) {
3457 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3458 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3463 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3465 static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3470 err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
3474 err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
3478 if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
3484 static int __init test_ah(void)
3486 const u8 irk[16] = {
3487 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3488 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3489 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3490 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3494 err = smp_ah(irk, r, res);
3498 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
3504 static int __init test_c1(void)
3507 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3508 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3510 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3511 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3512 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3513 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3514 const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3515 const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3516 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3517 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3518 const u8 exp[16] = {
3519 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3520 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3524 err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3528 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3534 static int __init test_s1(void)
3537 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3538 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3540 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3542 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3543 const u8 exp[16] = {
3544 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3545 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3549 err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res);
3553 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3559 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3562 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3563 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3564 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3565 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3567 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3568 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3569 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3570 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3572 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3573 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3575 const u8 exp[16] = {
3576 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3577 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3581 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3585 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3591 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3594 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3595 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3596 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3597 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3599 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3600 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3602 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3603 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3604 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3605 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3606 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3607 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3608 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3609 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3610 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3611 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3612 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3615 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3619 if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3622 if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3628 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3631 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3632 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3634 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3635 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3637 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3638 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3640 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3641 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3642 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3643 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3644 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3645 const u8 exp[16] = {
3646 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3647 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3651 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3655 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3661 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3664 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3665 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3666 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3667 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3669 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3670 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3671 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3672 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3674 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3675 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3677 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3678 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3679 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3683 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3693 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3696 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3697 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3698 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3699 const u8 exp[16] = {
3700 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3701 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3705 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3709 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3715 static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3717 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3718 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3720 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3721 strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3724 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3725 .open = simple_open,
3726 .read = test_smp_read,
3727 .llseek = default_llseek,
3730 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
3731 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3733 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3734 unsigned long long duration;
3737 calltime = ktime_get();
3739 err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
3741 BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
3747 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3753 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3759 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3763 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3765 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3769 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3771 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3775 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3777 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3781 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3783 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3787 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3789 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3793 rettime = ktime_get();
3794 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3795 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3797 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3801 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3802 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3804 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3806 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3812 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3814 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3815 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3818 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3819 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3820 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3821 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3824 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0);
3825 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3826 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3827 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3828 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
3831 err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
3833 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3834 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);