2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
23 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <linux/crypto.h>
26 #include <crypto/aes.h>
27 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
28 #include <crypto/hash.h>
29 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
31 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
32 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
33 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
34 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
36 #include "ecdh_helper.h"
39 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
40 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
42 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
43 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
44 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
47 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
50 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
54 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
56 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
57 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
59 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
61 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
63 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
65 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
66 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
78 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
85 /* Secure Connections OOB data */
91 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
92 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
96 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
97 struct delayed_work security_timer;
98 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
100 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
101 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
102 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
103 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
104 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
105 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
106 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
107 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
113 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
114 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
116 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
117 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
123 /* Secure Connections variables */
129 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
130 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
133 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
134 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
137 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
138 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
139 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
140 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
141 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
143 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
144 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
145 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
146 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
149 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
150 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
151 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
152 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
153 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
156 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
160 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
161 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
164 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
165 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
168 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
169 size_t len, u8 mac[16])
171 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
174 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
178 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
182 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
183 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
184 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
186 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
187 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
189 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
191 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
195 err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
197 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
201 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
203 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
208 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
209 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
214 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
215 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
216 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
219 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
220 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
222 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
226 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
231 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
232 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
233 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
235 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
236 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
237 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
238 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
241 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
242 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
243 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
244 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
248 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
249 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
250 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
252 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
256 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
258 memcpy(m, length, 2);
259 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
260 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
261 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
262 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
263 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
265 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
267 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
271 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
273 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
275 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
279 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
284 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
285 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
286 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
292 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
293 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
294 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
297 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
298 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
299 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
300 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
301 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
303 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
307 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
312 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
313 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
318 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
319 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
320 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
323 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
324 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
326 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
330 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
333 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
338 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
339 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
343 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
345 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
349 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
354 static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
355 const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
359 SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
361 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
365 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
370 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
374 static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r)
376 struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
377 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
380 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
382 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
383 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
385 err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16);
387 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
391 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
392 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
394 aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data);
396 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
397 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
399 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
401 memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof (ctx));
405 static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16],
406 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
407 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
412 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
413 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
414 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
418 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
421 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
422 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
424 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
427 crypto_xor_cpy(res, r, p1, sizeof(p1));
429 /* res = e(k, res) */
432 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
436 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
438 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
439 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
441 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
443 /* res = res XOR p2 */
444 crypto_xor(res, p2, sizeof(p2));
446 /* res = e(k, res) */
449 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
454 static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16],
455 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
459 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
461 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
465 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
470 static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
475 /* r' = padding || r */
477 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
479 err = smp_e(irk, _res);
481 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
485 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
486 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
487 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
488 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
491 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
496 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
497 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
499 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
503 if (!chan || !chan->data)
506 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
508 err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
512 return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
515 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
517 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
520 if (!chan || !chan->data)
523 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
525 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
526 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
528 err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
532 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa);
537 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
539 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
543 if (!chan || !chan->data)
548 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
549 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
550 err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
553 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
554 smp->debug_key = true;
557 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
558 err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
562 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
563 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
565 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
568 smp->debug_key = false;
571 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
572 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
574 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
576 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
577 smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
581 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
583 smp->local_oob = true;
588 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
590 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
591 struct smp_chan *smp;
598 BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
600 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
603 iv[1].iov_base = data;
606 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
608 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iv, 2, 1 + len);
610 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
617 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
618 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
621 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
623 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
624 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
625 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
627 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
629 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
633 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
636 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
637 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
638 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
639 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
640 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
642 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
646 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
647 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
648 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
650 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
651 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
652 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
653 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
654 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
656 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
657 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
658 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
659 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
661 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
664 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
665 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
667 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
668 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
670 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
671 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
672 struct oob_data *oob_data;
675 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
676 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
677 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
680 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
681 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
683 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
685 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
687 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
688 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
689 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
690 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
691 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
692 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
693 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
697 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
701 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
702 req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
703 req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
704 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
705 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
706 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
708 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
712 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
713 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
714 rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
715 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
716 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
717 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
719 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
722 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
724 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
725 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
726 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
728 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
729 max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
730 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
732 if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
733 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
734 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
736 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
741 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
743 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
744 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
745 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
750 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
752 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
753 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
755 kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
756 kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk);
757 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
759 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
760 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
762 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
763 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
765 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
766 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
767 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
768 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
772 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
775 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
776 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
779 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
780 list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
781 kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
784 if (smp->remote_irk) {
785 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
786 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
791 kfree_sensitive(smp);
795 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
797 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
798 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
801 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
804 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
807 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
810 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
811 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
812 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
813 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
815 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
818 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
819 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
820 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
821 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
822 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
823 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
826 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
827 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
828 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
829 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
830 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
831 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
834 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
836 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
837 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
839 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
840 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
843 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
844 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
846 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
849 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
850 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
852 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
853 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
854 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
858 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
859 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
860 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
862 BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
864 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
865 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
866 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
867 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
870 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
871 smp->method = JUST_CFM;
873 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
875 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
876 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
878 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
880 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
881 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
882 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
883 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
885 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for
887 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
888 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
894 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
898 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
899 * can only recover the just-works case.
901 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
904 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
905 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
906 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
907 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
908 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
911 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
912 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
914 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
915 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
916 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
918 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
921 /* Generate random passkey. */
922 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
923 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
924 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
926 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
927 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
928 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
931 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
932 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
933 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
934 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
935 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
936 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
939 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
940 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
946 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
948 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
949 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
952 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
954 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
955 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
956 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
959 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
961 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
963 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
966 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
968 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
973 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
975 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
976 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
980 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
982 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
983 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
984 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
986 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
988 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
989 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
990 "(confirmation values mismatch)");
991 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
999 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
1001 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1002 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1004 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
1005 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
1006 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1012 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1015 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1017 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1022 /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
1023 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
1024 * STK never needs to be stored).
1026 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1027 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1033 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1035 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1036 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1037 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1038 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1039 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1040 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1043 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1044 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1047 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1050 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1051 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1052 * authentication requests.
1054 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1058 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1059 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1061 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1062 * identity address track the connection based on it
1063 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1065 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1066 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1067 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1068 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
1073 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1074 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1075 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1078 if (smp->slave_csrk) {
1079 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1080 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1081 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
1085 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1086 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1087 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1090 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
1091 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1092 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1093 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
1096 if (smp->link_key) {
1097 struct link_key *key;
1100 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1101 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1102 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1103 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1105 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1107 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1108 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1110 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1112 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1115 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1116 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1117 list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1118 kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1124 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1126 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1129 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1130 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1132 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1134 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1139 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1140 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1144 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1146 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
1147 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1149 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1153 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1154 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
1155 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1157 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
1158 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1159 smp->link_key = NULL;
1163 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
1164 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1166 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1167 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1168 smp->link_key = NULL;
1173 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1174 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
1175 smp->link_key = NULL;
1180 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1182 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1183 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1184 * them in the correct order.
1186 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1187 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1188 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1189 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1190 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1191 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1194 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1196 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
1197 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1198 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1199 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1200 struct link_key *key;
1202 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1204 bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
1208 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1209 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1211 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1212 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
1213 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1215 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
1218 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
1219 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1221 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1225 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1231 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1233 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1234 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1235 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1236 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1239 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1241 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1243 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1244 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1245 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1249 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1252 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1253 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1255 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1256 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1259 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1260 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1261 sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1262 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1263 sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1265 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1266 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1269 BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1271 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1272 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1273 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
1274 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1279 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1280 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1281 * of the value to zeroes.
1283 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1284 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1285 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1287 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1288 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1290 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1292 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1293 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1294 SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1295 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1296 smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
1301 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
1303 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1306 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1307 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1308 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1310 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1312 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1314 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1315 * after the connection has been established.
1317 * This is true even when the connection has been
1318 * established using a resolvable random address.
1320 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1321 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1323 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1326 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1329 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1330 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1331 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1333 /* Generate a new random key */
1334 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1336 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1338 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1339 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1341 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1342 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1344 smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
1346 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1348 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1351 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1352 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1353 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1357 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1358 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1360 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1363 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1365 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1366 security_timer.work);
1367 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1369 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1371 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1374 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1376 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1377 struct smp_chan *smp;
1379 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1383 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1384 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1385 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1389 smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
1390 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
1391 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
1398 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1400 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1402 hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
1407 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
1409 kfree_sensitive(smp);
1413 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1415 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1416 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1426 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1427 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1428 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1429 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1431 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1434 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1436 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1437 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1438 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1439 u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1441 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1442 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1443 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1444 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1449 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1453 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1456 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1458 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1459 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1461 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1462 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1464 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1465 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1467 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1470 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1472 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1473 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1474 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1477 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1480 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1482 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1484 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1486 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1491 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1493 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1494 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1495 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1498 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1499 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1503 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1504 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1507 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1509 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1511 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1512 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1514 smp->passkey_round++;
1516 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1517 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1518 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1519 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1522 /* The round is only complete when the initiator
1523 * receives pairing random.
1526 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1527 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1528 if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1529 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1531 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1535 /* Start the next round */
1536 if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1537 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1539 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1540 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1541 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1545 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1546 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1547 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1551 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1554 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1555 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1559 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1561 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1563 /* Initiating device starts the round */
1567 BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
1568 smp->passkey_round + 1);
1570 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1572 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1578 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1580 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1581 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1584 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1587 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1588 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1590 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1591 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1593 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1594 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1595 smp->passkey_round = 0;
1597 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1598 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1602 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1608 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1610 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1611 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1612 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1613 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1620 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1622 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1623 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1624 struct smp_chan *smp;
1637 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1645 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1646 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1651 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1652 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1653 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1654 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
1655 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1657 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1658 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1660 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1661 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1662 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1666 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1673 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1674 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1675 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1677 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1681 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1685 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1686 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1687 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1689 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1690 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1691 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1693 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1694 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1695 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1698 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1699 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1701 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1702 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1705 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1707 req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1708 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
1709 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
1710 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1712 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1717 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1719 rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1720 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1721 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1722 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1724 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1727 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1729 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1730 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1731 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1732 struct smp_chan *smp;
1733 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1736 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1738 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1739 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1741 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1742 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1745 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1750 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1752 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1753 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1755 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1756 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1757 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1759 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1760 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1762 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1763 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1764 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1766 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1767 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1768 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1770 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1771 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1773 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1774 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1775 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1776 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1777 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1778 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1780 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1782 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1784 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1785 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1787 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1788 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1789 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1791 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1792 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1794 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1795 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1796 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1798 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1802 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1804 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
1805 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1807 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1808 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1811 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1812 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1814 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1816 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1817 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1819 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1820 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1823 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1824 req->io_capability);
1825 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1826 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1829 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1830 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1831 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1833 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1835 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1836 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1838 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1840 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1842 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1843 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1844 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1845 * positive SC enablement.
1847 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1849 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1850 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1851 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1852 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1853 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1857 /* Request setup of TK */
1858 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1860 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1865 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1867 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1869 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
1871 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1872 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1873 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1875 if (!chan || !chan->data)
1876 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1878 smp_dev = chan->data;
1880 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1881 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1883 if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1884 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1889 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1890 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
1891 if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
1892 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1893 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1894 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1897 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
1898 if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
1899 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1901 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1902 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
1904 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
1910 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1911 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1913 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1918 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1920 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1921 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1922 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1923 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1927 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1929 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1930 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1932 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1933 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1935 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1937 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1939 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1940 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1941 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1943 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1945 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1946 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1948 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1949 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1950 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1952 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1953 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1955 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1956 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1958 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1959 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1961 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1963 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
1964 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1966 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1967 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1968 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1969 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1970 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1974 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1975 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1976 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1977 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1979 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1980 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1983 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
1984 rsp->io_capability);
1985 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1986 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1989 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1991 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1992 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1994 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1996 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1997 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1998 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1999 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2000 return sc_send_public_key(smp);
2003 auth |= req->auth_req;
2005 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
2007 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2009 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2011 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
2012 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2013 return smp_confirm(smp);
2018 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
2020 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2024 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2025 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2027 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2028 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2030 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2036 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
2037 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
2038 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
2040 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
2042 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2043 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2044 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2045 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2048 /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
2050 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2052 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2053 bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2054 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2057 bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2059 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2060 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2062 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2063 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2065 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2067 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2068 bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2069 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2072 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2077 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2079 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2080 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2082 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
2084 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2085 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2087 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2088 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2090 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2093 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2094 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2095 return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2097 BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2099 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2104 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2105 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2107 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2111 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2112 return smp_confirm(smp);
2114 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2119 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2121 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2122 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2123 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2124 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint;
2128 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2130 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2131 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2133 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2134 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2136 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2137 return smp_random(smp);
2140 pkax = smp->local_pk;
2141 pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2145 pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2146 pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2151 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2153 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2154 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2155 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2156 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2159 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2160 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2161 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2166 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2169 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2171 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2172 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2174 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2176 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2178 /* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
2179 if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
2180 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2182 /* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave
2183 * the decision to user space since the remote device could
2184 * be legitimate or malicious.
2186 if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
2188 /* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since
2189 * it'll be ignored anyway.
2198 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2199 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2201 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2203 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2205 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2206 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2211 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2213 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2218 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS)
2221 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2222 hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint);
2224 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2226 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2231 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2233 struct smp_ltk *key;
2234 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2236 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2240 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2243 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2246 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2247 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2249 /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
2250 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2255 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2256 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2258 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2261 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2262 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2263 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2264 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2265 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2267 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2268 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2269 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2272 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2278 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2280 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2281 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2282 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2283 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2284 struct smp_chan *smp;
2287 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2289 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2290 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2292 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2293 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2295 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2297 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2298 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2300 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2301 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2303 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2305 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
2306 /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
2307 * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
2310 smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
2314 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2315 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2317 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2320 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2322 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2324 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2325 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2326 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2328 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2330 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2331 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2333 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2334 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2336 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2337 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2342 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2344 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2345 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2346 struct smp_chan *smp;
2350 BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
2352 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2356 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2359 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2362 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2363 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2365 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2366 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2371 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
2375 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2377 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2383 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2389 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2391 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
2392 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
2393 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
2394 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
2397 /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs
2398 * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C
2400 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) {
2401 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2404 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2405 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2406 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
2409 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2410 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2412 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2413 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2414 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2416 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2417 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2419 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2420 cp.auth_req = authreq;
2421 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2422 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2425 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2429 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2433 int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
2436 struct hci_conn *hcon;
2437 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
2438 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2439 struct smp_chan *smp;
2442 err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2443 hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2445 hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2449 conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2457 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2461 /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
2462 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
2464 smp->slave_ltk = NULL;
2465 smp->remote_irk = NULL;
2467 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2468 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2470 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
2474 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2480 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2482 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2483 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2484 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2486 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2488 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2489 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2491 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
2492 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK,
2494 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
2495 "LTK blocked for %pMR",
2497 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2500 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
2502 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2504 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2509 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2511 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2512 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2513 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2514 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2515 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2516 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2519 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2521 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2522 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2524 /* Mark the information as received */
2525 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2527 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2528 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2529 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2530 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2532 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2534 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2535 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2536 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2537 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2539 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2540 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2545 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2547 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2548 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2549 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2553 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2554 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2556 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
2557 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK,
2559 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
2560 "Identity key blocked for %pMR",
2562 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2565 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2567 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2569 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2574 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2575 struct sk_buff *skb)
2577 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2578 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2579 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2580 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2585 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2586 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2588 /* Mark the information as received */
2589 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2591 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2592 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2594 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2596 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2597 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2598 * as "identity information". However, since such
2599 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2600 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2601 * received an IRK for such a device.
2603 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2604 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2606 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2607 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2608 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
2612 /* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is
2613 * providing different address as identity information.
2615 * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug.
2617 if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) &&
2618 (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) ||
2619 info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) {
2620 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev,
2621 "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address");
2625 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2626 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2628 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2629 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2631 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2633 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2634 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2637 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2638 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2643 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2645 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2646 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2647 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2648 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2650 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2652 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2653 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2655 /* Mark the information as received */
2656 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2658 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2660 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2662 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2663 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2665 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2666 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2669 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2674 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2676 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2677 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2678 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2679 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2681 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2682 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2685 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2686 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2687 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2688 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2691 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2692 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2694 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2695 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2698 local_io = local->io_capability;
2699 remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2701 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2702 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2704 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2705 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2707 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2708 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2710 method = JUST_WORKS;
2712 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2713 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2714 method = JUST_WORKS;
2719 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2721 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2722 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2723 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2724 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2725 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2726 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
2727 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2730 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2732 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2733 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2735 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2737 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2738 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2739 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2741 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2743 if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2744 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2747 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2748 * the key from the initiating device.
2751 err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2756 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2757 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2759 /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
2760 * key was set/generated.
2762 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2763 struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data;
2764 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
2766 if (!hchan || !hchan->data)
2767 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2769 smp_dev = hchan->data;
2771 tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
2773 tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
2776 if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
2777 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2779 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2781 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2783 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2785 BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
2787 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2788 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2789 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2791 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2793 if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2794 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2796 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2797 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2798 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2799 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2800 hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2801 smp->passkey_round = 0;
2802 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2804 hcon->passkey_notify,
2805 hcon->passkey_entered))
2806 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2807 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2808 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2811 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2813 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2814 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2816 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2822 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2824 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2825 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2827 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2828 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2829 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2833 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2834 * send the confirm value.
2836 if (conn->hcon->out)
2839 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2840 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2842 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2844 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2845 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2850 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2852 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2853 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2854 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2855 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2856 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2857 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2860 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2862 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2863 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2865 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2866 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2867 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2868 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2873 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2877 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2880 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2882 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2883 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2884 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2885 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2887 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2888 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2890 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2892 if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
2893 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2896 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2897 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2901 /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
2902 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2908 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2909 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2915 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2916 struct sk_buff *skb)
2918 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2920 BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2925 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2927 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2928 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2929 struct smp_chan *smp;
2936 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2937 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2941 code = skb->data[0];
2942 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2946 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2949 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2952 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2953 * pairing request and security request.
2955 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2959 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2960 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2963 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2964 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2968 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2969 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
2972 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
2973 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
2976 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
2977 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
2980 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
2981 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
2984 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
2985 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
2988 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
2989 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
2992 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
2993 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
2996 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
2997 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
3000 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
3001 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
3004 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
3005 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
3008 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
3009 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
3012 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
3013 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
3017 BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
3018 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
3025 smp_failure(conn, reason);
3032 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
3038 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
3040 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3042 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3045 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
3048 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3051 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3053 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3054 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3055 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
3056 struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
3057 struct smp_chan *smp;
3059 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3061 /* Only new pairings are interesting */
3062 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
3065 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
3066 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3069 /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
3070 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
3073 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
3074 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
3077 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
3078 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
3079 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3082 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
3083 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
3086 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
3087 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
3090 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
3091 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
3094 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
3098 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
3100 bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
3104 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
3106 BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
3108 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
3109 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
3111 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
3112 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
3114 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
3115 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
3118 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3120 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3121 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3122 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3124 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3126 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
3127 bredr_pairing(chan);
3134 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3137 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
3139 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
3142 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3144 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3145 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3147 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3149 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
3150 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
3151 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
3152 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3153 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3157 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3158 bredr_pairing(chan);
3161 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3165 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3167 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3169 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3172 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3174 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3180 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3181 unsigned long hdr_len,
3182 unsigned long len, int nb)
3184 struct sk_buff *skb;
3186 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3188 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3190 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3191 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3196 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3197 .name = "Security Manager",
3198 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
3199 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
3200 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3201 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
3202 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
3204 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3205 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3206 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3207 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3208 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3209 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3210 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3213 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3215 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3217 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3219 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3223 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
3224 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
3225 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
3226 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
3227 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
3228 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
3229 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
3231 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3232 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3233 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3236 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3238 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3243 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3244 .name = "Security Manager Root",
3245 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
3247 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3248 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3249 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3250 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3251 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3252 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3253 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3254 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3255 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3256 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3257 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3258 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3261 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3263 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3264 struct smp_dev *smp;
3265 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3266 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3268 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3273 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3275 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3277 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3278 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3279 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3280 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3281 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3284 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
3285 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3286 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3287 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3288 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3289 return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
3292 smp->local_oob = false;
3293 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3294 smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
3297 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3300 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3301 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3302 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3304 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3309 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3311 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3313 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3316 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3318 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3319 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3321 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3323 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3324 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3327 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3328 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3329 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3330 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3332 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3333 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3338 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3340 struct smp_dev *smp;
3342 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3347 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3348 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3349 kfree_sensitive(smp);
3352 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3355 int smp_force_bredr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bool enable)
3357 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3361 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3363 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3365 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3367 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3369 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3371 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3372 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3376 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3381 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3383 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3385 BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
3387 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3388 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3390 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3393 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3394 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3395 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3399 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3401 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3403 hdev->smp_data = chan;
3405 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3406 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
3407 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3411 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3412 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3413 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3417 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3419 int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3420 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3421 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3426 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3431 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3433 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3435 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3436 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3437 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3441 if (hdev->smp_data) {
3442 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3443 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3448 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3450 static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3455 err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
3459 err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
3463 if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
3469 static int __init test_ah(void)
3471 const u8 irk[16] = {
3472 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3473 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3474 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3475 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3479 err = smp_ah(irk, r, res);
3483 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
3489 static int __init test_c1(void)
3492 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3493 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3495 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3496 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3497 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3498 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3499 const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3500 const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3501 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3502 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3503 const u8 exp[16] = {
3504 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3505 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3509 err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3513 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3519 static int __init test_s1(void)
3522 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3523 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3525 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3527 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3528 const u8 exp[16] = {
3529 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3530 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3534 err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res);
3538 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3544 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3547 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3548 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3549 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3550 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3552 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3553 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3554 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3555 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3557 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3558 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3560 const u8 exp[16] = {
3561 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3562 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3566 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3570 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3576 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3579 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3580 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3581 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3582 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3584 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3585 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3587 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3588 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3589 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3590 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3591 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3592 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3593 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3594 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3595 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3596 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3597 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3600 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3604 if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3607 if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3613 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3616 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3617 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3619 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3620 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3622 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3623 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3625 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3626 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3627 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3628 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3629 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3630 const u8 exp[16] = {
3631 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3632 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3636 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3640 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3646 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3649 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3650 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3651 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3652 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3654 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3655 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3656 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3657 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3659 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3660 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3662 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3663 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3664 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3668 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3678 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3681 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3682 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3683 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3684 const u8 exp[16] = {
3685 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3686 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3690 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3694 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3700 static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3702 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3703 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3705 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3706 strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3709 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3710 .open = simple_open,
3711 .read = test_smp_read,
3712 .llseek = default_llseek,
3715 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
3716 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3718 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3719 unsigned long long duration;
3722 calltime = ktime_get();
3724 err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
3726 BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
3732 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3738 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3744 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3748 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3750 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3754 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3756 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3760 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3762 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3766 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3768 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3772 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3774 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3778 rettime = ktime_get();
3779 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3780 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3782 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3786 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3787 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3789 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3791 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3797 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3799 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3800 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3803 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3804 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3805 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3806 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3809 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
3810 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3811 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3812 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3813 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
3816 err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
3818 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3819 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);