2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
23 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <linux/crypto.h>
26 #include <crypto/aes.h>
27 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
28 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
29 #include <crypto/hash.h>
30 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
32 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
33 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
34 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
35 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
37 #include "ecdh_helper.h"
40 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
41 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
43 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
44 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
45 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
48 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
51 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
55 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
57 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
58 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
60 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
62 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
64 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
66 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
67 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
79 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
86 /* Secure Connections OOB data */
92 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
93 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
97 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
98 struct delayed_work security_timer;
99 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
101 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
102 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
103 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
104 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
105 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
106 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
107 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
108 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
114 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
115 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
117 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
118 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
124 /* Secure Connections variables */
130 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
131 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
134 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
135 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
138 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
139 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
140 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
141 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
142 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
144 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
145 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
146 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
147 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
150 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
151 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
152 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
153 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
154 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
157 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
161 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
162 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
165 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
166 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
169 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
170 size_t len, u8 mac[16])
172 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
173 SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
176 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
180 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
186 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
187 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
188 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
190 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
191 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
193 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
195 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
199 err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
200 shash_desc_zero(desc);
202 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
206 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
208 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
213 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
214 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
219 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
220 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
221 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
224 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
225 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
227 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
231 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
236 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
237 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
238 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
240 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
241 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
242 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
243 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
246 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
247 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
248 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
249 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
253 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
254 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
255 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
257 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
261 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
263 memcpy(m, length, 2);
264 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
265 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
266 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
267 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
268 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
270 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
272 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
276 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
278 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
280 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
284 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
289 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
290 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
291 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
297 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
298 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
299 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
302 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
303 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
304 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
305 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
306 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
308 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
312 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
317 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
318 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
323 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
324 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
325 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
328 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
329 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
331 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
335 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
338 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
343 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
344 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
348 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
350 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
354 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
359 static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
360 const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
364 SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
366 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
370 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
375 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
379 static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r)
381 struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
382 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
385 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
387 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
388 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
390 err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16);
392 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
396 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
397 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
399 aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data);
401 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
402 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
404 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
406 memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof (ctx));
410 static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16],
411 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
412 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
417 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
418 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
419 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
423 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
426 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
427 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
429 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
432 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
434 /* res = e(k, res) */
437 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
441 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
443 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
444 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
446 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
448 /* res = res XOR p2 */
449 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
451 /* res = e(k, res) */
454 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
459 static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16],
460 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
464 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
466 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
470 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
475 static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
480 /* r' = padding || r */
482 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
484 err = smp_e(irk, _res);
486 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
490 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
491 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
492 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
493 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
496 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
501 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
502 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
504 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
509 if (!chan || !chan->data)
514 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
516 err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
520 return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
523 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
525 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
529 if (!chan || !chan->data)
534 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
536 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
537 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
539 err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
543 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
548 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
550 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
554 if (!chan || !chan->data)
559 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
560 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
561 err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
564 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
565 smp->debug_key = true;
568 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
569 err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
573 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
574 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
576 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
579 smp->debug_key = false;
582 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
583 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
585 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
587 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
588 smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
592 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
594 smp->local_oob = true;
599 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
601 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
602 struct smp_chan *smp;
609 BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
611 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
614 iv[1].iov_base = data;
617 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
619 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iv, 2, 1 + len);
621 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
628 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
629 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
632 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
634 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
635 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
636 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
638 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
640 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
644 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
647 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
648 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
649 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
650 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
651 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
653 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
657 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
658 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
659 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
661 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
662 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
663 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
664 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
665 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
667 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
668 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
669 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
670 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
672 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
675 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
676 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
678 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
679 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
681 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
682 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
683 struct oob_data *oob_data;
686 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
687 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
688 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
691 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
692 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
694 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
696 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
698 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
699 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
700 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
701 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
702 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
703 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
704 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
708 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
712 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
713 req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
714 req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
715 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
716 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
717 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
719 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
723 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
724 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
725 rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
726 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
727 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
728 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
730 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
733 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
735 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
736 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
737 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
739 if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
740 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
741 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
743 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
748 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
750 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
751 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
752 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
757 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
759 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
760 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
763 kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
764 kzfree(smp->link_key);
766 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
767 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
769 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
770 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
772 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
773 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
774 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
775 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
779 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
782 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
783 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
786 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
787 list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
788 kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
791 if (smp->remote_irk) {
792 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
793 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
802 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
804 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
805 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
808 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
811 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
814 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
817 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
818 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
819 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
820 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
822 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
825 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
826 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
827 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
828 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
829 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
830 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
833 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
834 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
835 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
836 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
837 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
838 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
841 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
843 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
844 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
846 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
847 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
850 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
851 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
853 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
856 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
857 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
859 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
860 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
861 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
865 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
866 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
867 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
869 BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
871 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
872 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
873 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
874 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
877 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
878 smp->method = JUST_CFM;
880 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
882 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
883 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
885 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
887 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
888 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
889 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
890 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
892 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
893 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
894 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
898 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
899 * can only recover the just-works case.
901 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
904 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
905 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
906 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
907 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
908 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
911 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
912 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
914 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
915 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
916 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
918 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
921 /* Generate random passkey. */
922 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
923 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
924 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
926 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
927 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
928 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
931 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
932 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
933 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
934 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
935 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
936 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
939 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
940 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
946 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
948 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
949 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
952 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
954 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
955 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
956 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
959 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
961 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
963 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
966 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
968 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
973 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
975 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
976 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
980 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
982 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
983 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
984 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
986 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
988 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
989 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
990 "(confirmation values mismatch)");
991 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
999 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
1001 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1002 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1004 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
1005 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
1006 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1012 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1015 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1017 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1022 /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
1023 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
1024 * STK never needs to be stored).
1026 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1027 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1033 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1035 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1036 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1037 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1038 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1039 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1040 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1043 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1044 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1047 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1050 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1051 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1052 * authentication requests.
1054 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1058 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1059 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1061 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1062 * identity address track the connection based on it
1063 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1065 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1066 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1067 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1068 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
1073 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1074 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1075 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1078 if (smp->slave_csrk) {
1079 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1080 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1081 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
1085 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1086 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1087 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1090 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
1091 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1092 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1093 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
1096 if (smp->link_key) {
1097 struct link_key *key;
1100 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1101 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1102 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1103 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1105 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1107 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1108 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1110 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1112 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1115 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1116 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1117 list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1118 kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1124 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1126 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1129 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1130 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1132 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1134 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1139 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1140 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1144 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1146 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
1147 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1149 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1153 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1154 /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
1155 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1157 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
1158 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1159 smp->link_key = NULL;
1163 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
1164 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1166 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1167 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1168 smp->link_key = NULL;
1173 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1174 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1175 smp->link_key = NULL;
1180 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1182 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1183 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1184 * them in the correct order.
1186 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1187 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1188 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1189 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1190 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1191 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1194 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1196 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
1197 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1198 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1199 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1200 struct link_key *key;
1202 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1204 bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
1208 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1209 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1211 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1212 /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
1213 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1215 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
1218 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
1219 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1221 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1225 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1231 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1233 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1234 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1235 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1236 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1239 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1241 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1243 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1244 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1245 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1249 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1252 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1253 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1255 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1256 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1259 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1260 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1261 sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1262 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1263 sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1265 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1266 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1269 BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1271 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1272 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1273 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
1274 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1279 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1280 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1281 * of the value to zeroes.
1283 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1284 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1285 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1287 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1288 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1290 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1292 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1293 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1294 SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1295 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1296 smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
1301 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
1303 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1306 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1307 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1308 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1310 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1312 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1314 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1315 * after the connection has been established.
1317 * This is true even when the connection has been
1318 * established using a resolvable random address.
1320 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1321 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1323 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1326 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1329 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1330 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1331 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1333 /* Generate a new random key */
1334 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1336 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1338 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1339 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1341 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1342 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1344 smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
1346 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1348 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1351 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1352 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1353 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1357 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1358 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1360 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1363 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1365 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1366 security_timer.work);
1367 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1369 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1371 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1374 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1376 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1377 struct smp_chan *smp;
1379 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1383 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1384 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1385 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1389 smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
1390 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
1391 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
1398 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1400 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1402 hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
1407 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
1413 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1415 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1416 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1426 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1427 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1428 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1429 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1431 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1434 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1436 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1437 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1438 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1439 u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1441 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1442 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1443 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1444 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1449 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1453 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1456 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1458 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1459 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1461 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1462 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1464 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1465 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1467 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1470 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1472 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1473 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1474 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1477 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1480 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1482 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1484 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1486 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1491 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1493 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1494 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1495 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1498 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1499 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1503 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1504 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1507 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1509 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1511 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1512 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1514 smp->passkey_round++;
1516 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1517 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1518 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1519 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1522 /* The round is only complete when the initiator
1523 * receives pairing random.
1526 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1527 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1528 if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1529 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1531 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1535 /* Start the next round */
1536 if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1537 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1539 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1540 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1541 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1545 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1546 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1547 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1551 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1554 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1555 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1559 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1561 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1563 /* Initiating device starts the round */
1567 BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
1568 smp->passkey_round + 1);
1570 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1572 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1578 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1580 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1581 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1584 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1587 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1588 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1590 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1591 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1593 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1594 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1595 smp->passkey_round = 0;
1597 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1598 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1602 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1608 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1610 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1611 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1612 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1613 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1620 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1622 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1623 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1624 struct smp_chan *smp;
1637 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1645 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1646 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1651 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1652 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1653 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1654 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
1655 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1657 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1658 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1660 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1661 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1662 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1666 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1673 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1674 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1675 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1677 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1681 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1685 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1686 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1687 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1689 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1690 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1691 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1693 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1694 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1695 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1698 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1699 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1701 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1702 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1705 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1707 req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1708 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
1709 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
1710 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1712 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1717 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1719 rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1720 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1721 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1722 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1724 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1727 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1729 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1730 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1731 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1732 struct smp_chan *smp;
1733 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1736 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1738 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1739 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1741 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1742 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1745 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1750 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1752 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1753 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1755 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1756 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1757 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1759 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1760 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1762 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1763 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1764 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1766 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1767 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1768 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1770 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1771 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1773 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1774 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1775 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1776 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1777 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1778 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1780 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1782 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1784 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1785 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1787 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1788 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1789 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1791 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1792 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1794 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1795 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1796 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1798 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1802 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1804 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
1805 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1807 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1808 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1811 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1812 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1814 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1816 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1817 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1819 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1820 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1823 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1824 req->io_capability);
1825 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1826 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1829 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1830 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1831 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1833 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1835 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1836 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1838 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1840 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1842 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1843 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1844 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1845 * positive SC enablement.
1847 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1849 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1850 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1851 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1852 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1853 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1857 /* Request setup of TK */
1858 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1860 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1865 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1867 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1871 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1872 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1873 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1875 if (!chan || !chan->data)
1876 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1878 smp_dev = chan->data;
1880 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1881 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1883 if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1884 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1889 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1890 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
1891 if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
1892 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1893 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1894 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1897 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
1898 if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
1899 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1901 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1902 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
1904 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
1910 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1911 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1913 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1918 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1920 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1921 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1922 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1923 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1927 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1929 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1930 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1932 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1933 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1935 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1937 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1939 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1940 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1941 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1943 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1945 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1946 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1948 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1949 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1950 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1952 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1953 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1955 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1956 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1958 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1959 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1961 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1963 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
1964 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1966 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1967 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1968 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1969 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1970 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1974 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1975 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1976 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1977 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1979 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1980 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1983 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
1984 rsp->io_capability);
1985 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1986 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1989 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1991 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1992 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1994 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1996 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1997 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1998 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1999 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2000 return sc_send_public_key(smp);
2003 auth |= req->auth_req;
2005 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
2007 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2009 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2011 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
2012 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2013 return smp_confirm(smp);
2018 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
2020 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2024 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2025 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2027 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2028 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2030 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2036 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
2037 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
2038 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
2040 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
2042 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2043 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2044 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2045 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2048 /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
2050 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2052 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2053 bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2054 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2057 bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2059 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2060 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2062 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2063 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2065 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2067 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2068 bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2069 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2072 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2077 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2079 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2080 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2082 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
2084 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2085 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2087 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2088 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2090 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2093 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2094 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2095 return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2097 BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2099 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2104 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2105 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2107 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2111 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2112 return smp_confirm(smp);
2114 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2119 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2121 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2122 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2123 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2124 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
2128 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2130 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2131 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2133 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2134 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2136 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2137 return smp_random(smp);
2140 pkax = smp->local_pk;
2141 pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2145 pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2146 pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2151 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2153 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2154 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2155 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2156 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2159 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2160 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2161 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2166 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2169 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2171 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2172 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2174 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2176 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2180 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2181 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2183 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2185 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2187 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2188 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2193 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2195 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2197 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2198 hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
2200 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2202 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2207 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2209 struct smp_ltk *key;
2210 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2212 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2216 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2219 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2222 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2223 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2225 /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
2226 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2231 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2232 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2234 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2237 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2238 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2239 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2240 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2241 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2243 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2244 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2245 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2248 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2254 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2256 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2257 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2258 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2259 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2260 struct smp_chan *smp;
2263 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2265 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2266 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2268 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2269 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2271 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2273 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2274 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2276 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2277 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2279 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2281 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
2282 /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
2283 * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
2286 smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
2290 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2291 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2293 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2296 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2298 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2300 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2301 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2302 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2304 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2306 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2307 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2309 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2310 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2312 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2313 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2318 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2320 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2321 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2322 struct smp_chan *smp;
2326 BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
2328 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2332 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2335 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2338 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2339 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2341 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2342 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2347 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
2351 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2353 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2359 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2365 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2367 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
2368 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
2369 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
2370 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
2373 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2376 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2377 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2378 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
2380 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2381 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2383 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2384 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2385 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2387 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2388 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2390 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2391 cp.auth_req = authreq;
2392 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2393 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2396 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2400 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2404 int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
2407 struct hci_conn *hcon;
2408 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
2409 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2410 struct smp_chan *smp;
2413 err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2414 hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2416 hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2420 conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2428 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2432 /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
2433 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
2435 smp->slave_ltk = NULL;
2436 smp->remote_irk = NULL;
2438 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2439 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2441 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
2445 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2451 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2453 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2454 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2455 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2457 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2459 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2460 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2462 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
2464 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2466 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2471 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2473 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2474 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2475 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2476 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2477 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2478 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2481 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2483 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2484 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2486 /* Mark the information as received */
2487 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2489 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2490 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2491 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2492 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2494 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2496 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2497 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2498 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2499 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2501 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2502 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2507 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2509 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2510 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2511 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2515 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2516 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2518 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2520 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2522 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2527 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2528 struct sk_buff *skb)
2530 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2531 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2532 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2533 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2538 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2539 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2541 /* Mark the information as received */
2542 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2544 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2545 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2547 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2549 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2550 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2551 * as "identity information". However, since such
2552 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2553 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2554 * received an IRK for such a device.
2556 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2557 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2559 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2560 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2561 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
2565 /* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is
2566 * providing different address as identity information.
2568 * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug.
2570 if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) &&
2571 (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) ||
2572 info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) {
2573 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev,
2574 "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address");
2578 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2579 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2581 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2582 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2584 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2586 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2587 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2590 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2591 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2596 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2598 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2599 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2600 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2601 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2603 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2605 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2606 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2608 /* Mark the information as received */
2609 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2611 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2613 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2615 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2616 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2618 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2619 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2622 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2627 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2629 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2630 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2631 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2632 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2634 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2635 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2638 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2639 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2640 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2641 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2644 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2645 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2647 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2648 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2651 local_io = local->io_capability;
2652 remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2654 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2655 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2657 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2658 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2660 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2661 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2663 method = JUST_WORKS;
2665 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2666 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2667 method = JUST_WORKS;
2672 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2674 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2675 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2676 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2677 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2678 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2679 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
2680 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2683 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2685 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2686 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2688 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2690 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2691 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2692 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2694 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2696 if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2697 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2700 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2701 * the key from the initiating device.
2704 err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2709 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2710 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2712 /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
2713 * key was set/generated.
2715 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2716 struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data;
2717 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
2719 if (!hchan || !hchan->data)
2720 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2722 smp_dev = hchan->data;
2724 tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
2726 tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
2729 if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
2730 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2732 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2734 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2736 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2738 BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
2740 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2741 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2742 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2744 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2746 if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2747 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2749 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2750 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2751 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2752 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2753 hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2754 smp->passkey_round = 0;
2755 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2757 hcon->passkey_notify,
2758 hcon->passkey_entered))
2759 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2760 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2761 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2764 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2766 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2767 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2769 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2775 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2777 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2778 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2780 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2781 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2782 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2786 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2787 * send the confirm value.
2789 if (conn->hcon->out)
2792 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2793 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2795 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2797 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2798 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2803 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2805 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2806 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2807 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2808 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2809 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2810 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2813 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2815 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2816 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2818 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2819 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2820 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2821 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2826 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2830 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2833 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2835 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2836 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2837 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2838 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2840 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2841 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2843 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2845 if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
2846 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2849 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2850 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2854 /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
2855 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2861 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2862 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2868 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2869 struct sk_buff *skb)
2871 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2873 BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2878 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2880 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2881 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2882 struct smp_chan *smp;
2889 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2890 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2894 code = skb->data[0];
2895 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2899 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2902 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2905 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2906 * pairing request and security request.
2908 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2912 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2913 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2916 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2917 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2921 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2922 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
2925 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
2926 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
2929 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
2930 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
2933 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
2934 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
2937 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
2938 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
2941 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
2942 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
2945 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
2946 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
2949 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
2950 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
2953 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
2954 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
2957 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
2958 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
2961 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
2962 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
2965 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
2966 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
2970 BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
2971 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2978 smp_failure(conn, reason);
2985 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
2991 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
2993 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2995 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2998 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
3001 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3004 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3006 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3007 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3008 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
3009 struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
3010 struct smp_chan *smp;
3012 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3014 /* Only new pairings are interesting */
3015 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
3018 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
3019 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3022 /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
3023 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
3026 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
3027 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
3030 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
3031 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
3032 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3035 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
3036 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
3039 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
3040 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
3043 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
3044 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
3047 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
3051 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
3053 bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
3057 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
3059 BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
3061 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
3062 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
3064 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
3065 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
3067 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
3068 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
3071 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3073 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3074 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3075 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3077 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3079 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
3080 bredr_pairing(chan);
3087 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3090 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
3092 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
3095 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3097 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3098 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3100 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3102 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
3103 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
3104 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
3105 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3106 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3110 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3111 bredr_pairing(chan);
3114 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3118 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3120 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3122 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3125 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3127 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3133 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3134 unsigned long hdr_len,
3135 unsigned long len, int nb)
3137 struct sk_buff *skb;
3139 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3141 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3143 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3144 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3149 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3150 .name = "Security Manager",
3151 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
3152 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
3153 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3154 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
3155 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
3157 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3158 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3159 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3160 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3161 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3162 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3163 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3166 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3168 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3170 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3172 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3176 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
3177 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
3178 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
3179 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
3180 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
3181 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
3182 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
3184 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3185 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3186 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3189 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3191 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3196 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3197 .name = "Security Manager Root",
3198 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
3200 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3201 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3202 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3203 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3204 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3205 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3206 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3207 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3208 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3209 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3210 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3211 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3214 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3216 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3217 struct smp_dev *smp;
3218 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3219 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3221 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3226 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3228 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3230 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3231 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3232 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3234 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3237 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
3238 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3239 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3240 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3242 return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
3245 smp->local_oob = false;
3246 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3247 smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
3250 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3253 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3254 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3257 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3262 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3264 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3266 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3269 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3271 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3272 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3274 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3276 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3277 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3280 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3281 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3282 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3283 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3285 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3286 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3291 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3293 struct smp_dev *smp;
3295 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3300 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3301 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3305 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3308 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
3309 char __user *user_buf,
3310 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3312 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3315 buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
3318 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
3321 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
3322 const char __user *user_buf,
3323 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3325 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3329 err = kstrtobool_from_user(user_buf, count, &enable);
3333 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3337 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3339 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3341 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3343 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3345 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3347 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3348 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3352 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3357 static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
3358 .open = simple_open,
3359 .read = force_bredr_smp_read,
3360 .write = force_bredr_smp_write,
3361 .llseek = default_llseek,
3364 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3365 char __user *user_buf,
3366 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3368 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3371 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", hdev->le_min_key_size);
3373 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3376 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3377 const char __user *user_buf,
3378 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3380 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3382 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3385 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3388 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3390 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3392 if (key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
3393 key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
3396 hdev->le_min_key_size = key_size;
3401 static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = {
3402 .open = simple_open,
3403 .read = le_min_key_size_read,
3404 .write = le_min_key_size_write,
3405 .llseek = default_llseek,
3408 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3409 char __user *user_buf,
3410 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3412 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3415 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", hdev->le_max_key_size);
3417 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3420 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3421 const char __user *user_buf,
3422 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3424 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3426 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3429 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3432 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3434 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3436 if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
3437 key_size < hdev->le_min_key_size)
3440 hdev->le_max_key_size = key_size;
3445 static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = {
3446 .open = simple_open,
3447 .read = le_max_key_size_read,
3448 .write = le_max_key_size_write,
3449 .llseek = default_llseek,
3452 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3454 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3456 BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
3458 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3459 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3461 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3464 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3465 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3466 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3470 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3472 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3474 hdev->smp_data = chan;
3476 debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3477 &le_min_key_size_fops);
3478 debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3479 &le_max_key_size_fops);
3481 /* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
3482 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
3484 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
3485 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
3486 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
3488 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3489 debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
3490 hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
3492 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
3493 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3497 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3498 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3499 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3503 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3505 int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3506 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3507 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3512 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3517 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3519 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3521 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3522 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3523 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3527 if (hdev->smp_data) {
3528 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3529 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3534 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3536 static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3541 err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
3545 err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
3549 if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
3555 static int __init test_ah(void)
3557 const u8 irk[16] = {
3558 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3559 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3560 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3561 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3565 err = smp_ah(irk, r, res);
3569 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
3575 static int __init test_c1(void)
3578 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3579 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3581 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3582 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3583 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3584 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3585 const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3586 const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3587 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3588 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3589 const u8 exp[16] = {
3590 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3591 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3595 err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3599 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3605 static int __init test_s1(void)
3608 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3609 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3611 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3613 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3614 const u8 exp[16] = {
3615 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3616 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3620 err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res);
3624 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3630 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3633 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3634 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3635 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3636 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3638 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3639 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3640 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3641 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3643 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3644 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3646 const u8 exp[16] = {
3647 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3648 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3652 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3656 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3662 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3665 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3666 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3667 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3668 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3670 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3671 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3673 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3674 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3675 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3676 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3677 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3678 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3679 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3680 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3681 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3682 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3683 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3686 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3690 if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3693 if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3699 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3702 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3703 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3705 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3706 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3708 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3709 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3711 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3712 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3713 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3714 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3715 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3716 const u8 exp[16] = {
3717 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3718 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3722 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3726 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3732 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3735 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3736 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3737 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3738 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3740 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3741 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3742 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3743 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3745 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3746 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3748 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3749 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3750 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3754 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3764 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3767 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3768 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3769 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3770 const u8 exp[16] = {
3771 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3772 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3776 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3780 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3786 static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3788 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3789 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3791 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3792 strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3795 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3796 .open = simple_open,
3797 .read = test_smp_read,
3798 .llseek = default_llseek,
3801 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
3802 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3804 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3805 unsigned long long duration;
3808 calltime = ktime_get();
3810 err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
3812 BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
3818 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3824 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3830 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3834 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3836 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3840 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3842 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3846 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3848 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3852 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3854 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3858 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3860 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3864 rettime = ktime_get();
3865 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3866 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3868 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3872 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3873 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3875 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3877 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3883 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3885 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3886 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3889 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3890 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3891 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3892 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3895 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
3896 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3897 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3898 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3899 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
3902 err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
3904 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3905 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);