1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
7 * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
10 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
11 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
12 #include <linux/kernel.h>
13 #include <linux/highmem.h>
14 #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
15 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
16 #include <linux/swap.h>
17 #include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
18 #include <linux/processor.h>
19 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
20 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
22 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
30 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
32 #ifndef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
34 * When this config is not defined, SEV feature is not supported and APIs in
35 * this file are not used but this file still gets compiled into the KVM AMD
38 * We will not have MISC_CG_RES_SEV and MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES entries in the enum
39 * misc_res_type {} defined in linux/misc_cgroup.h.
41 * Below macros allow compilation to succeed.
43 #define MISC_CG_RES_SEV MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
44 #define MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
47 /* enable/disable SEV support */
48 static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
49 module_param(sev, int, 0444);
51 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
52 static int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
53 module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
55 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
56 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
57 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
58 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
59 unsigned int max_sev_asid;
60 static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
61 static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
62 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
63 static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
66 struct list_head list;
73 static int sev_flush_asids(void)
78 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
79 * so it must be guarded.
81 down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
84 ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
86 up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
89 pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
94 static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
96 return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
99 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
100 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
104 /* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
105 pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
109 if (sev_flush_asids())
112 /* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
113 bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
115 bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid);
120 static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
122 int pos, min_asid, max_asid, ret;
124 enum misc_res_type type;
126 type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
127 WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg);
128 sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
129 ret = misc_cg_try_charge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
131 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
136 mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
139 * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
140 * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
142 min_asid = sev->es_active ? 0 : min_sev_asid - 1;
143 max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
145 pos = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
146 if (pos >= max_asid) {
147 if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids(min_asid, max_asid)) {
151 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
156 __set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
158 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
162 misc_cg_uncharge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
163 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
168 static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
170 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
175 static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
177 struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
179 enum misc_res_type type;
181 mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
184 __set_bit(pos, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
186 for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
187 sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
188 sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
191 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
193 type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
194 misc_cg_uncharge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
195 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
199 static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
201 struct sev_data_decommission decommission;
202 struct sev_data_deactivate deactivate;
207 deactivate.handle = handle;
209 /* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */
210 down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
211 sev_guest_deactivate(&deactivate, NULL);
212 up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
214 /* decommission handle */
215 decommission.handle = handle;
216 sev_guest_decommission(&decommission, NULL);
219 static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
221 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
222 bool es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
225 if (kvm->created_vcpus)
229 if (unlikely(sev->active))
232 sev->es_active = es_active;
233 asid = sev_asid_new(sev);
238 ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
244 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
252 sev->es_active = false;
256 static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
258 struct sev_data_activate activate;
259 int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
262 /* activate ASID on the given handle */
263 activate.handle = handle;
264 activate.asid = asid;
265 ret = sev_guest_activate(&activate, error);
270 static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
279 ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
285 static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
287 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
289 return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
292 static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
294 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
295 struct sev_data_launch_start start;
296 struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
297 void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
298 int *error = &argp->error;
304 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
307 memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
310 if (params.dh_uaddr) {
311 dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
313 return PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
315 start.dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
316 start.dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
320 if (params.session_uaddr) {
321 session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
322 if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
323 ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
327 start.session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
328 start.session_len = params.session_len;
331 start.handle = params.handle;
332 start.policy = params.policy;
334 /* create memory encryption context */
335 ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, &start, error);
339 /* Bind ASID to this guest */
340 ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
344 /* return handle to userspace */
345 params.handle = start.handle;
346 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
347 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
352 sev->handle = start.handle;
353 sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
362 static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
363 unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
366 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
367 unsigned long npages, size;
369 unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
371 unsigned long first, last;
374 lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
376 if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
377 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
379 /* Calculate number of pages. */
380 first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
381 last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
382 npages = (last - first + 1);
384 locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
385 lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
386 if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
387 pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
388 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
391 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX))
392 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
394 /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
395 size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
396 if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
397 pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
399 pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
402 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
404 /* Pin the user virtual address. */
405 npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
406 if (npinned != npages) {
407 pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
413 sev->pages_locked = locked;
419 unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned);
425 static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
426 unsigned long npages)
428 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
430 unpin_user_pages(pages, npages);
432 sev->pages_locked -= npages;
435 static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
437 uint8_t *page_virtual;
440 if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
444 for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
445 page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
446 clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
447 kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
451 static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx,
452 struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages)
454 unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
455 unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
457 /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
458 paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
460 next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
461 if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
472 static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
474 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i;
475 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
476 struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
477 struct sev_data_launch_update_data data;
478 struct page **inpages;
484 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
487 vaddr = params.uaddr;
489 vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
491 /* Lock the user memory. */
492 inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
494 return PTR_ERR(inpages);
497 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
498 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
500 sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
503 data.handle = sev->handle;
505 for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
509 * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
512 offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
514 /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
515 pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
517 len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
520 data.address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
521 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
526 next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
530 /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
531 for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
532 set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
533 mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
535 /* unlock the user pages */
536 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
540 static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
542 struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
544 /* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
545 if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (save->dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
548 /* Sync registgers */
549 save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
550 save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
551 save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
552 save->rdx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
553 save->rsp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
554 save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
555 save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
556 save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
558 save->r8 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
559 save->r9 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
560 save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
561 save->r11 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11];
562 save->r12 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12];
563 save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
564 save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
565 save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
567 save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
569 /* Sync some non-GPR registers before encrypting */
570 save->xcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.xcr0;
571 save->pkru = svm->vcpu.arch.pkru;
572 save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
575 * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
576 * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
577 * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
578 * for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
580 memcpy(svm->vmsa, save, sizeof(*save));
585 static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
587 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
588 struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
589 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
592 if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
597 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
598 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
600 /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
601 ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
606 * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place
607 * encryption of the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write
608 * the same memory region with the guest's key), so invalidate
611 clflush_cache_range(svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
613 vmsa.handle = sev->handle;
614 vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->vmsa);
615 vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
616 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa,
621 svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected = true;
627 static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
629 void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
630 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
631 struct sev_data_launch_measure data;
632 struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
633 void __user *p = NULL;
640 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params)))
643 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
645 /* User wants to query the blob length */
649 p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
651 if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
654 blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
658 data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
659 data.len = params.len;
663 data.handle = sev->handle;
664 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &data, &argp->error);
667 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
676 if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
681 params.len = data.len;
682 if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
689 static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
691 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
692 struct sev_data_launch_finish data;
697 data.handle = sev->handle;
698 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
701 static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
703 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
704 struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
705 struct sev_data_guest_status data;
711 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
713 data.handle = sev->handle;
714 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, &data, &argp->error);
718 params.policy = data.policy;
719 params.state = data.state;
720 params.handle = data.handle;
722 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
728 static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
729 unsigned long dst, int size,
730 int *error, bool enc)
732 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
733 struct sev_data_dbg data;
736 data.handle = sev->handle;
741 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
742 enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
746 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
747 unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
752 * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
753 * destination has enough space.
755 offset = src_paddr & 15;
756 src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
757 sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
759 return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
762 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
763 unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
764 unsigned long dst_paddr,
767 struct page *tpage = NULL;
770 /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
771 if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
772 !IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) ||
773 !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
774 tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
778 dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
781 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
787 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
788 page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
799 static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
800 unsigned long __user vaddr,
801 unsigned long dst_paddr,
802 unsigned long __user dst_vaddr,
803 int size, int *error)
805 struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
806 struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
809 /* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
810 if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) {
811 src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
815 if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage),
816 (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
817 __free_page(src_tpage);
821 paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
825 * If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
826 * - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
827 * - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
828 * - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
830 if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
833 dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
839 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
840 __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
845 * If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
848 dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
851 memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
852 page_address(src_tpage), size);
854 if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
855 (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
861 paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
862 dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
863 len = round_up(size, 16);
866 ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
870 __free_page(src_tpage);
872 __free_page(dst_tpage);
876 static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
878 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
879 unsigned long dst_vaddr;
880 struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
881 struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
889 if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
892 if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr)
894 if (!debug.dst_uaddr)
897 vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
899 vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
900 dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
902 for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
903 int len, s_off, d_off;
905 /* lock userspace source and destination page */
906 src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
908 return PTR_ERR(src_p);
910 dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
912 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
913 return PTR_ERR(dst_p);
917 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT read or modify
918 * the pages; flush the destination too so that future accesses do not
921 sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
922 sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
925 * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
926 * offset within the page.
928 s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
929 d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
930 len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
933 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
934 __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
936 __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
939 ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
940 __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
942 __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
946 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
947 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n);
952 next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
953 dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
960 static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
962 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
963 struct sev_data_launch_secret data;
964 struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
973 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
976 pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
978 return PTR_ERR(pages);
981 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_SECRET encrypts pages in
982 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
984 sev_clflush_pages(pages, n);
987 * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
988 * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
990 if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
995 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
997 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
998 data.guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
999 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1001 blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
1003 ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
1004 goto e_unpin_memory;
1007 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
1008 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1010 hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
1015 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1016 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1018 data.handle = sev->handle;
1019 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, &data, &argp->error);
1026 /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
1027 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
1028 set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]);
1029 mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
1031 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
1035 static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1037 void __user *report = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
1038 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1039 struct sev_data_attestation_report data;
1040 struct kvm_sev_attestation_report params;
1045 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1048 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
1051 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1053 /* User wants to query the blob length */
1057 p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
1059 if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
1062 blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1066 data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
1067 data.len = params.len;
1068 memcpy(data.mnonce, params.mnonce, sizeof(params.mnonce));
1071 data.handle = sev->handle;
1072 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT, &data, &argp->error);
1074 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
1083 if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
1088 params.len = data.len;
1089 if (copy_to_user(report, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
1096 /* Userspace wants to query session length. */
1098 __sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
1099 struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
1101 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1102 struct sev_data_send_start data;
1105 data.handle = sev->handle;
1106 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
1110 params->session_len = data.session_len;
1111 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
1112 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1118 static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1120 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1121 struct sev_data_send_start data;
1122 struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
1123 void *amd_certs, *session_data;
1124 void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
1127 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1130 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1131 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1134 /* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
1135 if (!params.session_len)
1136 return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
1139 /* some sanity checks */
1140 if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
1141 !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
1144 /* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
1145 session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1149 /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
1150 pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
1151 params.pdh_cert_len);
1152 if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
1153 ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
1154 goto e_free_session;
1157 plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
1158 params.plat_certs_len);
1159 if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
1160 ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
1164 amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
1165 params.amd_certs_len);
1166 if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
1167 ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
1168 goto e_free_plat_cert;
1171 /* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
1172 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1173 data.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
1174 data.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
1175 data.plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
1176 data.plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
1177 data.amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
1178 data.amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
1179 data.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
1180 data.session_len = params.session_len;
1181 data.handle = sev->handle;
1183 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
1185 if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
1186 session_data, params.session_len)) {
1188 goto e_free_amd_cert;
1191 params.policy = data.policy;
1192 params.session_len = data.session_len;
1193 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms,
1194 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1204 kfree(session_data);
1208 /* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */
1210 __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
1211 struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params)
1213 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1214 struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
1217 data.handle = sev->handle;
1218 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
1222 params->hdr_len = data.hdr_len;
1223 params->trans_len = data.trans_len;
1225 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
1226 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
1232 static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1234 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1235 struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
1236 struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params;
1237 void *hdr, *trans_data;
1238 struct page **guest_page;
1242 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1245 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1246 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
1249 /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */
1250 if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len)
1251 return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, ¶ms);
1253 if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr ||
1254 !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr)
1257 /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
1258 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1259 if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
1262 /* Pin guest memory */
1263 guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
1268 /* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
1270 hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1274 trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1278 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1279 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1280 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1281 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data);
1282 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1284 /* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
1285 data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
1286 data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
1287 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1288 data.handle = sev->handle;
1290 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
1293 goto e_free_trans_data;
1295 /* copy transport buffer to user space */
1296 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr,
1297 trans_data, params.trans_len)) {
1299 goto e_free_trans_data;
1302 /* Copy packet header to userspace. */
1303 ret = copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr,
1311 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
1316 static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1318 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1319 struct sev_data_send_finish data;
1321 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1324 data.handle = sev->handle;
1325 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
1328 static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1330 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1331 struct sev_data_send_cancel data;
1333 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1336 data.handle = sev->handle;
1337 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL, &data, &argp->error);
1340 static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1342 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1343 struct sev_data_receive_start start;
1344 struct kvm_sev_receive_start params;
1345 int *error = &argp->error;
1350 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1353 /* Get parameter from the userspace */
1354 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1355 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start)))
1358 /* some sanity checks */
1359 if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len ||
1360 !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len)
1363 pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len);
1364 if (IS_ERR(pdh_data))
1365 return PTR_ERR(pdh_data);
1367 session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr,
1368 params.session_len);
1369 if (IS_ERR(session_data)) {
1370 ret = PTR_ERR(session_data);
1374 memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
1375 start.handle = params.handle;
1376 start.policy = params.policy;
1377 start.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data);
1378 start.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len;
1379 start.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
1380 start.session_len = params.session_len;
1382 /* create memory encryption context */
1383 ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, &start,
1386 goto e_free_session;
1388 /* Bind ASID to this guest */
1389 ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
1391 goto e_free_session;
1393 params.handle = start.handle;
1394 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1395 ¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) {
1397 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
1398 goto e_free_session;
1401 sev->handle = start.handle;
1402 sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
1405 kfree(session_data);
1412 static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1414 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1415 struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
1416 struct sev_data_receive_update_data data;
1417 void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
1418 struct page **guest_page;
1422 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1425 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1426 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
1429 if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
1430 !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
1431 !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
1434 /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
1435 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1436 if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
1439 hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
1441 return PTR_ERR(hdr);
1443 trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
1444 if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
1445 ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
1449 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1450 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1451 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1452 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
1453 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1455 /* Pin guest memory */
1457 guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
1462 /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
1463 data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
1464 data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
1465 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1466 data.handle = sev->handle;
1468 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, &data,
1471 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
1481 static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1483 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1484 struct sev_data_receive_finish data;
1486 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1489 data.handle = sev->handle;
1490 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
1493 int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
1495 struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
1498 if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev)
1504 if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
1507 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1509 /* enc_context_owner handles all memory enc operations */
1510 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
1515 switch (sev_cmd.id) {
1516 case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
1523 r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1525 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
1526 r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1528 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
1529 r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1531 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
1532 r = sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1534 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
1535 r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1537 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
1538 r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1540 case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
1541 r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1543 case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
1544 r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
1546 case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
1547 r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
1549 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
1550 r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1552 case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
1553 r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1555 case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
1556 r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1558 case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
1559 r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1561 case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
1562 r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1564 case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL:
1565 r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1567 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
1568 r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1570 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
1571 r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1573 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
1574 r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1581 if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
1585 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1589 int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
1590 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1592 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1593 struct enc_region *region;
1596 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1599 /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
1600 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
1603 if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
1606 region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1610 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1611 region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1);
1612 if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) {
1613 ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages);
1614 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1618 region->uaddr = range->addr;
1619 region->size = range->size;
1621 list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list);
1622 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1625 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
1626 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
1627 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
1630 sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
1639 static struct enc_region *
1640 find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1642 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1643 struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
1644 struct enc_region *i;
1646 list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
1647 if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
1648 i->size == range->size)
1655 static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
1656 struct enc_region *region)
1658 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
1659 list_del(®ion->list);
1663 int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
1664 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1666 struct enc_region *region;
1669 /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
1670 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
1673 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1675 if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
1680 region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
1687 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
1688 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
1689 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
1691 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
1693 __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
1695 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1699 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1703 int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
1705 struct file *source_kvm_file;
1706 struct kvm *source_kvm;
1707 struct kvm_sev_info *mirror_sev;
1711 source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
1712 if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
1717 source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
1718 mutex_lock(&source_kvm->lock);
1720 if (!sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
1722 goto e_source_unlock;
1725 /* Mirrors of mirrors should work, but let's not get silly */
1726 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || source_kvm == kvm) {
1728 goto e_source_unlock;
1731 asid = to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info.asid;
1734 * The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't
1735 * disappear until we're done with it
1737 kvm_get_kvm(source_kvm);
1739 fput(source_kvm_file);
1740 mutex_unlock(&source_kvm->lock);
1741 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1743 if (sev_guest(kvm)) {
1745 goto e_mirror_unlock;
1748 /* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */
1749 mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1750 mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm;
1751 mirror_sev->asid = asid;
1752 mirror_sev->active = true;
1754 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1758 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1759 kvm_put_kvm(source_kvm);
1762 mutex_unlock(&source_kvm->lock);
1764 fput(source_kvm_file);
1768 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
1770 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1771 struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
1772 struct list_head *pos, *q;
1774 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1777 /* If this is a mirror_kvm release the enc_context_owner and skip sev cleanup */
1778 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
1779 kvm_put_kvm(sev->enc_context_owner);
1783 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1786 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
1787 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
1788 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
1790 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
1793 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
1794 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
1796 if (!list_empty(head)) {
1797 list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
1798 __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
1799 list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
1804 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1806 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
1810 void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
1813 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
1815 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
1818 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
1820 unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
1821 bool sev_es_supported = false;
1822 bool sev_supported = false;
1824 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev || !npt_enabled)
1827 /* Does the CPU support SEV? */
1828 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
1831 /* Retrieve SEV CPUID information */
1832 cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
1834 /* Set encryption bit location for SEV-ES guests */
1835 sev_enc_bit = ebx & 0x3f;
1837 /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
1840 if (!svm_sev_enabled())
1843 /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
1845 sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
1847 /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps */
1848 sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
1849 if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
1852 sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
1853 if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
1854 bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
1855 sev_asid_bitmap = NULL;
1859 sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
1860 if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count))
1863 pr_info("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_asid_count);
1864 sev_supported = true;
1866 /* SEV-ES support requested? */
1870 /* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
1871 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
1874 /* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */
1875 if (min_sev_asid == 1)
1878 sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
1879 if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count))
1882 pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_es_asid_count);
1883 sev_es_supported = true;
1886 sev = sev_supported;
1887 sev_es = sev_es_supported;
1890 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
1892 if (!svm_sev_enabled())
1895 bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
1896 bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
1897 misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, 0);
1898 misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, 0);
1904 * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
1905 * returning them to the system.
1907 static void sev_flush_guest_memory(struct vcpu_svm *svm, void *va,
1911 * If hardware enforced cache coherency for encrypted mappings of the
1912 * same physical page is supported, nothing to do.
1914 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT))
1918 * If the VM Page Flush MSR is supported, use it to flush the page
1919 * (using the page virtual address and the guest ASID).
1921 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH)) {
1922 struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
1923 unsigned long va_start;
1926 /* Align start and stop to page boundaries. */
1927 va_start = (unsigned long)va;
1928 start = (u64)va_start & PAGE_MASK;
1929 stop = PAGE_ALIGN((u64)va_start + len);
1932 sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info;
1934 while (start < stop) {
1935 wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH,
1944 WARN(1, "Address overflow, using WBINVD\n");
1948 * Hardware should always have one of the above features,
1949 * but if not, use WBINVD and issue a warning.
1951 WARN_ONCE(1, "Using WBINVD to flush guest memory\n");
1952 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
1955 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
1957 struct vcpu_svm *svm;
1959 if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
1964 if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
1965 sev_flush_guest_memory(svm, svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
1966 __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->vmsa));
1968 if (svm->ghcb_sa_free)
1969 kfree(svm->ghcb_sa);
1972 static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
1974 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->ghcb;
1977 /* Re-use the dump_invalid_vmcb module parameter */
1978 if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
1979 pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
1983 nbits = sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap) * 8;
1985 pr_err("GHCB (GPA=%016llx):\n", svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa);
1986 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_code",
1987 ghcb->save.sw_exit_code, ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb));
1988 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_1",
1989 ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1, ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb));
1990 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_2",
1991 ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2, ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb));
1992 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_scratch",
1993 ghcb->save.sw_scratch, ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb));
1994 pr_err("%-20s%*pb\n", "valid_bitmap", nbits, ghcb->save.valid_bitmap);
1997 static void sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
1999 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2000 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->ghcb;
2003 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
2005 * GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
2007 * Copy their values, even if they may not have been written during the
2008 * VM-Exit. It's the guest's responsibility to not consume random data.
2010 ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
2011 ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]);
2012 ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX]);
2013 ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX]);
2016 static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2018 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2019 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2020 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->ghcb;
2024 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
2026 * GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
2030 * VMMCALL allows the guest to provide extra registers. KVM also
2031 * expects RSI for hypercalls, so include that, too.
2033 * Copy their values to the appropriate location if supplied.
2035 memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
2037 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(ghcb);
2038 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(ghcb);
2039 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(ghcb);
2040 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(ghcb);
2041 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(ghcb);
2043 svm->vmcb->save.cpl = ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(ghcb);
2045 if (ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb)) {
2046 vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
2047 kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
2050 /* Copy the GHCB exit information into the VMCB fields */
2051 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2052 control->exit_code = lower_32_bits(exit_code);
2053 control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
2054 control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
2055 control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
2057 /* Clear the valid entries fields */
2058 memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
2061 static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2063 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
2069 /* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
2070 if (ghcb->ghcb_usage)
2074 * Retrieve the exit code now even though is may not be marked valid
2075 * as it could help with debugging.
2077 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2079 if (!ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2080 !ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2081 !ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb))
2084 switch (ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb)) {
2085 case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
2087 case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
2088 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
2091 case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
2093 case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
2094 if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2097 case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
2098 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2099 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2101 if (ghcb_get_rax(ghcb) == 0xd)
2102 if (!ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb))
2108 if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
2109 if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
2112 if (!(ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
2113 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
2118 if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2120 if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb)) {
2121 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2122 !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
2126 case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
2127 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2128 !ghcb_cpl_is_valid(ghcb))
2131 case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
2133 case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
2135 case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
2136 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2137 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2138 !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
2141 case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
2142 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2143 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2146 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
2147 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
2148 if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
2151 case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
2152 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
2153 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE:
2154 case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
2165 if (ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
2166 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: ghcb usage %#x is not valid\n",
2169 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit reason %#llx is not valid\n",
2174 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
2176 vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
2177 vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_code;
2178 vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
2183 static void pre_sev_es_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2188 if (svm->ghcb_sa_free) {
2190 * The scratch area lives outside the GHCB, so there is a
2191 * buffer that, depending on the operation performed, may
2192 * need to be synced, then freed.
2194 if (svm->ghcb_sa_sync) {
2195 kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
2196 ghcb_get_sw_scratch(svm->ghcb),
2197 svm->ghcb_sa, svm->ghcb_sa_len);
2198 svm->ghcb_sa_sync = false;
2201 kfree(svm->ghcb_sa);
2202 svm->ghcb_sa = NULL;
2203 svm->ghcb_sa_free = false;
2206 trace_kvm_vmgexit_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, svm->ghcb);
2208 sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(svm);
2210 kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->ghcb_map, true);
2214 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
2216 struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
2217 int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
2219 /* Perform any SEV-ES pre-run actions */
2220 pre_sev_es_run(svm);
2222 /* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
2228 * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
2229 * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
2231 if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
2232 svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
2235 sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
2236 svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
2237 vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
2240 #define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT (16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
2241 static bool setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
2243 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2244 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->ghcb;
2245 u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
2246 u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
2249 scratch_gpa_beg = ghcb_get_sw_scratch(ghcb);
2250 if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
2251 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
2255 scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
2256 if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
2257 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
2258 len, scratch_gpa_beg);
2262 if ((scratch_gpa_beg & PAGE_MASK) == control->ghcb_gpa) {
2263 /* Scratch area begins within GHCB */
2264 ghcb_scratch_beg = control->ghcb_gpa +
2265 offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
2266 ghcb_scratch_end = control->ghcb_gpa +
2267 offsetof(struct ghcb, reserved_1);
2270 * If the scratch area begins within the GHCB, it must be
2271 * completely contained in the GHCB shared buffer area.
2273 if (scratch_gpa_beg < ghcb_scratch_beg ||
2274 scratch_gpa_end > ghcb_scratch_end) {
2275 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area is outside of GHCB shared buffer area (%#llx - %#llx)\n",
2276 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end);
2280 scratch_va = (void *)svm->ghcb;
2281 scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
2284 * The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
2287 if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
2288 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
2289 len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
2292 scratch_va = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
2296 if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
2297 /* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
2298 pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
2305 * The scratch area is outside the GHCB. The operation will
2306 * dictate whether the buffer needs to be synced before running
2307 * the vCPU next time (i.e. a read was requested so the data
2308 * must be written back to the guest memory).
2310 svm->ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
2311 svm->ghcb_sa_free = true;
2314 svm->ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
2315 svm->ghcb_sa_len = len;
2320 static void set_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value, u64 mask,
2323 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa &= ~(mask << pos);
2324 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa |= (value & mask) << pos;
2327 static u64 get_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 mask, unsigned int pos)
2329 return (svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa >> pos) & mask;
2332 static void set_ghcb_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value)
2334 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
2337 static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2339 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2340 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2344 ghcb_info = control->ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK;
2346 trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
2349 switch (ghcb_info) {
2350 case GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ:
2351 set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
2355 case GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REQ: {
2356 u64 cpuid_fn, cpuid_reg, cpuid_value;
2358 cpuid_fn = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2359 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_MASK,
2360 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_POS);
2362 /* Initialize the registers needed by the CPUID intercept */
2363 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = cpuid_fn;
2364 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = 0;
2366 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_CPUID);
2372 cpuid_reg = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2373 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_MASK,
2374 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_POS);
2376 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
2377 else if (cpuid_reg == 1)
2378 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
2379 else if (cpuid_reg == 2)
2380 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
2382 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
2384 set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, cpuid_value,
2385 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_MASK,
2386 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_POS);
2388 set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP,
2393 case GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ: {
2394 u64 reason_set, reason_code;
2396 reason_set = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2397 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK,
2398 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS);
2399 reason_code = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2400 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_MASK,
2401 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_POS);
2402 pr_info("SEV-ES guest requested termination: %#llx:%#llx\n",
2403 reason_set, reason_code);
2410 trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
2411 control->ghcb_gpa, ret);
2416 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
2418 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
2419 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2420 u64 ghcb_gpa, exit_code;
2424 /* Validate the GHCB */
2425 ghcb_gpa = control->ghcb_gpa;
2426 if (ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
2427 return sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(svm);
2430 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: GHCB gpa is not set\n");
2434 if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, ghcb_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &svm->ghcb_map)) {
2435 /* Unable to map GHCB from guest */
2436 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: error mapping GHCB [%#llx] from guest\n",
2441 svm->ghcb = svm->ghcb_map.hva;
2442 ghcb = svm->ghcb_map.hva;
2444 trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, ghcb);
2446 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2448 ret = sev_es_validate_vmgexit(svm);
2452 sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
2453 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
2454 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
2457 switch (exit_code) {
2458 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
2459 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2))
2462 ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(vcpu,
2463 control->exit_info_1,
2464 control->exit_info_2,
2467 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
2468 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, false, control->exit_info_2))
2471 ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(vcpu,
2472 control->exit_info_1,
2473 control->exit_info_2,
2476 case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
2477 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
2479 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
2480 ret = kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(vcpu);
2482 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE: {
2483 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
2485 switch (control->exit_info_1) {
2487 /* Set AP jump table address */
2488 sev->ap_jump_table = control->exit_info_2;
2491 /* Get AP jump table address */
2492 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
2495 pr_err("svm: vmgexit: unsupported AP jump table request - exit_info_1=%#llx\n",
2496 control->exit_info_1);
2497 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 1);
2498 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb,
2500 SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT |
2507 case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
2509 "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
2510 control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
2513 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
2519 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
2521 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2))
2524 return kvm_sev_es_string_io(&svm->vcpu, size, port,
2525 svm->ghcb_sa, svm->ghcb_sa_len, in);
2528 void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2530 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2532 svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
2533 svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
2536 * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
2537 * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
2538 * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
2540 svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->vmsa);
2542 /* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
2543 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
2544 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
2545 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_READ);
2546 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
2547 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
2548 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
2550 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
2552 /* Track EFER/CR register changes */
2553 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_EFER_WRITE);
2554 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR0_WRITE);
2555 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
2556 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
2558 /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
2559 clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
2561 /* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
2562 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
2564 /* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
2565 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
2566 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
2567 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
2568 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
2569 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
2570 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
2573 void sev_es_create_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2576 * Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when creating
2577 * a vCPU for an SEV-ES guest.
2579 set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
2584 void sev_es_prepare_guest_switch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned int cpu)
2586 struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
2587 struct vmcb_save_area *hostsa;
2590 * As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT,
2591 * of which one step is to perform a VMLOAD. Since hardware does not
2592 * perform a VMSAVE on VMRUN, the host savearea must be updated.
2594 vmsave(__sme_page_pa(sd->save_area));
2596 /* XCR0 is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
2597 hostsa = (struct vmcb_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
2598 hostsa->xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
2600 /* PKRU is restored on VMEXIT, save the curent host value */
2601 hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
2603 /* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
2604 hostsa->xss = host_xss;
2607 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
2609 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
2611 /* First SIPI: Use the values as initially set by the VMM */
2612 if (!svm->received_first_sipi) {
2613 svm->received_first_sipi = true;
2618 * Subsequent SIPI: Return from an AP Reset Hold VMGEXIT, where
2619 * the guest will set the CS and RIP. Set SW_EXIT_INFO_2 to a
2625 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->ghcb, 1);