1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
7 * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
10 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
11 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
12 #include <linux/kernel.h>
13 #include <linux/highmem.h>
14 #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
15 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
16 #include <linux/swap.h>
17 #include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
18 #include <linux/processor.h>
19 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
22 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
23 #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
31 #ifndef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
33 * When this config is not defined, SEV feature is not supported and APIs in
34 * this file are not used but this file still gets compiled into the KVM AMD
37 * We will not have MISC_CG_RES_SEV and MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES entries in the enum
38 * misc_res_type {} defined in linux/misc_cgroup.h.
40 * Below macros allow compilation to succeed.
42 #define MISC_CG_RES_SEV MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
43 #define MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
46 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
47 /* enable/disable SEV support */
48 static bool sev_enabled = true;
49 module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
51 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
52 static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
53 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
55 #define sev_enabled false
56 #define sev_es_enabled false
57 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
59 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
60 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
61 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
62 unsigned int max_sev_asid;
63 static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
64 static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
65 static unsigned int nr_asids;
66 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
67 static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
70 struct list_head list;
77 /* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown */
78 static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
80 int ret, asid, error = 0;
82 /* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
83 asid = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids, min_asid);
88 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
89 * so it must be guarded.
91 down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
94 ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
96 up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
99 pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
104 static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
106 return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
109 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
110 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
112 if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
115 /* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
116 bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
118 bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids);
123 static int sev_misc_cg_try_charge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
125 enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
126 return misc_cg_try_charge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
129 static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
131 enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
132 misc_cg_uncharge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
135 static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
137 int asid, min_asid, max_asid, ret;
140 WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg);
141 sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
142 ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(sev);
144 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
149 mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
152 * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
153 * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
155 min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid;
156 max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
158 asid = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_asid + 1, min_asid);
159 if (asid > max_asid) {
160 if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids(min_asid, max_asid)) {
164 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
169 __set_bit(asid, sev_asid_bitmap);
171 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
175 sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
176 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
181 static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
183 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
188 static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
190 struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
193 mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
195 __set_bit(sev->asid, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
197 for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
198 sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
199 sd->sev_vmcbs[sev->asid] = NULL;
202 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
204 sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
205 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
209 static void sev_decommission(unsigned int handle)
211 struct sev_data_decommission decommission;
216 decommission.handle = handle;
217 sev_guest_decommission(&decommission, NULL);
220 static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
222 struct sev_data_deactivate deactivate;
227 deactivate.handle = handle;
229 /* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */
230 down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
231 sev_guest_deactivate(&deactivate, NULL);
232 up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
234 sev_decommission(handle);
237 static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
239 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
242 if (kvm->created_vcpus)
246 if (unlikely(sev->active))
250 sev->es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
251 asid = sev_asid_new(sev);
256 ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
260 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
261 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->mirror_vms);
269 sev->es_active = false;
274 static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
276 struct sev_data_activate activate;
277 int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
280 /* activate ASID on the given handle */
281 activate.handle = handle;
282 activate.asid = asid;
283 ret = sev_guest_activate(&activate, error);
288 static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
297 ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
303 static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
305 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
307 return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
310 static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
312 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
313 struct sev_data_launch_start start;
314 struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
315 void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
316 int *error = &argp->error;
322 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
325 memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
328 if (params.dh_uaddr) {
329 dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
331 return PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
333 start.dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
334 start.dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
338 if (params.session_uaddr) {
339 session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
340 if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
341 ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
345 start.session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
346 start.session_len = params.session_len;
349 start.handle = params.handle;
350 start.policy = params.policy;
352 /* create memory encryption context */
353 ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, &start, error);
357 /* Bind ASID to this guest */
358 ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
360 sev_decommission(start.handle);
364 /* return handle to userspace */
365 params.handle = start.handle;
366 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
367 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
372 sev->handle = start.handle;
373 sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
382 static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
383 unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
386 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
387 unsigned long npages, size;
389 unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
391 unsigned long first, last;
394 lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
396 if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
397 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
399 /* Calculate number of pages. */
400 first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
401 last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
402 npages = (last - first + 1);
404 locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
405 lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
406 if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
407 pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
408 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
411 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX))
412 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
414 /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
415 size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
416 if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
417 pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
419 pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
422 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
424 /* Pin the user virtual address. */
425 npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
426 if (npinned != npages) {
427 pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
433 sev->pages_locked = locked;
439 unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned);
445 static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
446 unsigned long npages)
448 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
450 unpin_user_pages(pages, npages);
452 sev->pages_locked -= npages;
455 static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
457 uint8_t *page_virtual;
460 if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
464 for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
465 page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
466 clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
467 kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
471 static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx,
472 struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages)
474 unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
475 unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
477 /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
478 paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
480 next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
481 if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
492 static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
494 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i;
495 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
496 struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
497 struct sev_data_launch_update_data data;
498 struct page **inpages;
504 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
507 vaddr = params.uaddr;
509 vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
511 /* Lock the user memory. */
512 inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
514 return PTR_ERR(inpages);
517 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
518 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
520 sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
523 data.handle = sev->handle;
525 for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
529 * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
532 offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
534 /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
535 pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
537 len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
540 data.address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
541 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
546 next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
550 /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
551 for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
552 set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
553 mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
555 /* unlock the user pages */
556 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
560 static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
562 struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
564 /* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
565 if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (save->dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
568 /* Sync registgers */
569 save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
570 save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
571 save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
572 save->rdx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
573 save->rsp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
574 save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
575 save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
576 save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
578 save->r8 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
579 save->r9 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
580 save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
581 save->r11 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11];
582 save->r12 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12];
583 save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
584 save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
585 save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
587 save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
589 /* Sync some non-GPR registers before encrypting */
590 save->xcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.xcr0;
591 save->pkru = svm->vcpu.arch.pkru;
592 save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
593 save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
596 * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
597 * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
598 * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
599 * for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
601 memcpy(svm->sev_es.vmsa, save, sizeof(*save));
606 static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
609 struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
610 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
613 /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
614 ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
619 * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place encryption of
620 * the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region
621 * with the guest's key), so invalidate it first.
623 clflush_cache_range(svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
626 vmsa.handle = to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.handle;
627 vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
628 vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
629 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);
633 vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
637 static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
639 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
643 if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
646 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
647 ret = mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex);
651 ret = __sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, vcpu, &argp->error);
653 mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
661 static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
663 void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
664 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
665 struct sev_data_launch_measure data;
666 struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
667 void __user *p = NULL;
674 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params)))
677 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
679 /* User wants to query the blob length */
683 p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
685 if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
688 blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
692 data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
693 data.len = params.len;
697 data.handle = sev->handle;
698 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &data, &argp->error);
701 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
710 if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
715 params.len = data.len;
716 if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
723 static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
725 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
726 struct sev_data_launch_finish data;
731 data.handle = sev->handle;
732 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
735 static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
737 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
738 struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
739 struct sev_data_guest_status data;
745 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
747 data.handle = sev->handle;
748 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, &data, &argp->error);
752 params.policy = data.policy;
753 params.state = data.state;
754 params.handle = data.handle;
756 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
762 static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
763 unsigned long dst, int size,
764 int *error, bool enc)
766 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
767 struct sev_data_dbg data;
770 data.handle = sev->handle;
775 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
776 enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
780 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
781 unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
786 * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
787 * destination has enough space.
789 offset = src_paddr & 15;
790 src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
791 sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
793 return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
796 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
797 void __user *dst_uaddr,
798 unsigned long dst_paddr,
801 struct page *tpage = NULL;
804 /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
805 if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
806 !IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) ||
807 !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
808 tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
812 dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
815 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
821 if (copy_to_user(dst_uaddr, page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
832 static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
834 unsigned long dst_paddr,
835 void __user *dst_vaddr,
836 int size, int *error)
838 struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
839 struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
842 /* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
843 if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)vaddr, 16)) {
844 src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
848 if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage), vaddr, size)) {
849 __free_page(src_tpage);
853 paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
857 * If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
858 * - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
859 * - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
860 * - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
862 if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
865 dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
871 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
872 __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
877 * If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
880 dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
883 memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
884 page_address(src_tpage), size);
886 if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
893 paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
894 dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
895 len = round_up(size, 16);
898 ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
902 __free_page(src_tpage);
904 __free_page(dst_tpage);
908 static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
910 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
911 unsigned long dst_vaddr;
912 struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
913 struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
921 if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
924 if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr)
926 if (!debug.dst_uaddr)
929 vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
931 vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
932 dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
934 for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
935 int len, s_off, d_off;
937 /* lock userspace source and destination page */
938 src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
940 return PTR_ERR(src_p);
942 dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
944 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
945 return PTR_ERR(dst_p);
949 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT read or modify
950 * the pages; flush the destination too so that future accesses do not
953 sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
954 sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
957 * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
958 * offset within the page.
960 s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
961 d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
962 len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
965 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
966 __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
967 (void __user *)dst_vaddr,
968 __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
971 ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
972 __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
973 (void __user *)vaddr,
974 __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
975 (void __user *)dst_vaddr,
978 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
979 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n);
984 next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
985 dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
992 static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
994 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
995 struct sev_data_launch_secret data;
996 struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
1002 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1005 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
1008 pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
1010 return PTR_ERR(pages);
1013 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_SECRET encrypts pages in
1014 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
1016 sev_clflush_pages(pages, n);
1019 * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
1020 * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
1022 if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
1024 goto e_unpin_memory;
1027 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1029 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1030 data.guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
1031 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1033 blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
1035 ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
1036 goto e_unpin_memory;
1039 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
1040 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1042 hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
1047 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1048 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1050 data.handle = sev->handle;
1051 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, &data, &argp->error);
1058 /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
1059 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
1060 set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]);
1061 mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
1063 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
1067 static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1069 void __user *report = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
1070 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1071 struct sev_data_attestation_report data;
1072 struct kvm_sev_attestation_report params;
1077 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1080 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
1083 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1085 /* User wants to query the blob length */
1089 p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
1091 if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
1094 blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1098 data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
1099 data.len = params.len;
1100 memcpy(data.mnonce, params.mnonce, sizeof(params.mnonce));
1103 data.handle = sev->handle;
1104 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT, &data, &argp->error);
1106 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
1115 if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
1120 params.len = data.len;
1121 if (copy_to_user(report, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
1128 /* Userspace wants to query session length. */
1130 __sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
1131 struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
1133 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1134 struct sev_data_send_start data;
1137 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1138 data.handle = sev->handle;
1139 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
1141 params->session_len = data.session_len;
1142 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
1143 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1149 static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1151 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1152 struct sev_data_send_start data;
1153 struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
1154 void *amd_certs, *session_data;
1155 void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
1158 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1161 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1162 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1165 /* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
1166 if (!params.session_len)
1167 return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
1170 /* some sanity checks */
1171 if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
1172 !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
1175 /* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
1176 session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1180 /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
1181 pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
1182 params.pdh_cert_len);
1183 if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
1184 ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
1185 goto e_free_session;
1188 plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
1189 params.plat_certs_len);
1190 if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
1191 ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
1195 amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
1196 params.amd_certs_len);
1197 if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
1198 ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
1199 goto e_free_plat_cert;
1202 /* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
1203 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1204 data.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
1205 data.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
1206 data.plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
1207 data.plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
1208 data.amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
1209 data.amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
1210 data.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
1211 data.session_len = params.session_len;
1212 data.handle = sev->handle;
1214 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
1216 if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
1217 session_data, params.session_len)) {
1219 goto e_free_amd_cert;
1222 params.policy = data.policy;
1223 params.session_len = data.session_len;
1224 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms,
1225 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1235 kfree(session_data);
1239 /* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */
1241 __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
1242 struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params)
1244 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1245 struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
1248 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1249 data.handle = sev->handle;
1250 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
1252 params->hdr_len = data.hdr_len;
1253 params->trans_len = data.trans_len;
1255 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
1256 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
1262 static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1264 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1265 struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
1266 struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params;
1267 void *hdr, *trans_data;
1268 struct page **guest_page;
1272 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1275 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1276 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
1279 /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */
1280 if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len)
1281 return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, ¶ms);
1283 if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr ||
1284 !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr)
1287 /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
1288 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1289 if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
1292 /* Pin guest memory */
1293 guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
1295 if (IS_ERR(guest_page))
1296 return PTR_ERR(guest_page);
1298 /* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
1300 hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1304 trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1308 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1309 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1310 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1311 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data);
1312 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1314 /* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
1315 data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
1316 data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
1317 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1318 data.handle = sev->handle;
1320 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
1323 goto e_free_trans_data;
1325 /* copy transport buffer to user space */
1326 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr,
1327 trans_data, params.trans_len)) {
1329 goto e_free_trans_data;
1332 /* Copy packet header to userspace. */
1333 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr,
1342 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
1347 static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1349 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1350 struct sev_data_send_finish data;
1352 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1355 data.handle = sev->handle;
1356 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
1359 static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1361 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1362 struct sev_data_send_cancel data;
1364 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1367 data.handle = sev->handle;
1368 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL, &data, &argp->error);
1371 static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1373 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1374 struct sev_data_receive_start start;
1375 struct kvm_sev_receive_start params;
1376 int *error = &argp->error;
1381 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1384 /* Get parameter from the userspace */
1385 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1386 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start)))
1389 /* some sanity checks */
1390 if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len ||
1391 !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len)
1394 pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len);
1395 if (IS_ERR(pdh_data))
1396 return PTR_ERR(pdh_data);
1398 session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr,
1399 params.session_len);
1400 if (IS_ERR(session_data)) {
1401 ret = PTR_ERR(session_data);
1405 memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
1406 start.handle = params.handle;
1407 start.policy = params.policy;
1408 start.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data);
1409 start.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len;
1410 start.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
1411 start.session_len = params.session_len;
1413 /* create memory encryption context */
1414 ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, &start,
1417 goto e_free_session;
1419 /* Bind ASID to this guest */
1420 ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
1422 sev_decommission(start.handle);
1423 goto e_free_session;
1426 params.handle = start.handle;
1427 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1428 ¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) {
1430 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
1431 goto e_free_session;
1434 sev->handle = start.handle;
1435 sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
1438 kfree(session_data);
1445 static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1447 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1448 struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
1449 struct sev_data_receive_update_data data;
1450 void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
1451 struct page **guest_page;
1455 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1458 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1459 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
1462 if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
1463 !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
1464 !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
1467 /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
1468 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1469 if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
1472 hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
1474 return PTR_ERR(hdr);
1476 trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
1477 if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
1478 ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
1482 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1483 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1484 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1485 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
1486 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1488 /* Pin guest memory */
1489 guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
1491 if (IS_ERR(guest_page)) {
1492 ret = PTR_ERR(guest_page);
1497 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, the PSP
1498 * encrypts the written data with the guest's key, and the cache may
1499 * contain dirty, unencrypted data.
1501 sev_clflush_pages(guest_page, n);
1503 /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
1504 data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
1505 data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
1506 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1507 data.handle = sev->handle;
1509 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, &data,
1512 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
1522 static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1524 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1525 struct sev_data_receive_finish data;
1527 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1530 data.handle = sev->handle;
1531 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
1534 static bool is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(u32 cmd_id)
1537 * Allow mirrors VM to call KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA to enable SEV-ES
1538 * active mirror VMs. Also allow the debugging and status commands.
1540 if (cmd_id == KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ||
1541 cmd_id == KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS || cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT ||
1542 cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT)
1548 static int sev_lock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
1550 struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
1551 struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
1554 if (dst_kvm == src_kvm)
1558 * Bail if these VMs are already involved in a migration to avoid
1559 * deadlock between two VMs trying to migrate to/from each other.
1561 if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
1564 if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
1568 if (mutex_lock_killable(&dst_kvm->lock))
1570 if (mutex_lock_killable_nested(&src_kvm->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING))
1575 mutex_unlock(&dst_kvm->lock);
1577 atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
1579 atomic_set_release(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
1583 static void sev_unlock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
1585 struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
1586 struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
1588 mutex_unlock(&dst_kvm->lock);
1589 mutex_unlock(&src_kvm->lock);
1590 atomic_set_release(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
1591 atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
1595 static int sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
1597 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
1600 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
1601 if (mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex))
1608 kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm) {
1612 mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
1617 static void sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
1619 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
1622 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
1623 mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
1627 static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
1629 struct kvm_sev_info *dst = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
1630 struct kvm_sev_info *src = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
1631 struct kvm_sev_info *mirror;
1634 dst->asid = src->asid;
1635 dst->handle = src->handle;
1636 dst->pages_locked = src->pages_locked;
1637 dst->enc_context_owner = src->enc_context_owner;
1640 src->active = false;
1642 src->pages_locked = 0;
1643 src->enc_context_owner = NULL;
1645 list_cut_before(&dst->regions_list, &src->regions_list, &src->regions_list);
1648 * If this VM has mirrors, "transfer" each mirror's refcount of the
1649 * source to the destination (this KVM). The caller holds a reference
1650 * to the source, so there's no danger of use-after-free.
1652 list_cut_before(&dst->mirror_vms, &src->mirror_vms, &src->mirror_vms);
1653 list_for_each_entry(mirror, &dst->mirror_vms, mirror_entry) {
1654 kvm_get_kvm(dst_kvm);
1655 kvm_put_kvm(src_kvm);
1656 mirror->enc_context_owner = dst_kvm;
1660 * If this VM is a mirror, remove the old mirror from the owners list
1661 * and add the new mirror to the list.
1663 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(dst_kvm)) {
1664 struct kvm_sev_info *owner_sev_info =
1665 &to_kvm_svm(dst->enc_context_owner)->sev_info;
1667 list_del(&src->mirror_entry);
1668 list_add_tail(&dst->mirror_entry, &owner_sev_info->mirror_vms);
1672 static int sev_es_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst, struct kvm *src)
1675 struct kvm_vcpu *dst_vcpu, *src_vcpu;
1676 struct vcpu_svm *dst_svm, *src_svm;
1678 if (atomic_read(&src->online_vcpus) != atomic_read(&dst->online_vcpus))
1681 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, src_vcpu, src) {
1682 if (!src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
1686 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, src_vcpu, src) {
1687 src_svm = to_svm(src_vcpu);
1688 dst_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(dst, i);
1689 dst_svm = to_svm(dst_vcpu);
1692 * Transfer VMSA and GHCB state to the destination. Nullify and
1693 * clear source fields as appropriate, the state now belongs to
1696 memcpy(&dst_svm->sev_es, &src_svm->sev_es, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
1697 dst_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa;
1698 dst_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa;
1699 dst_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
1701 memset(&src_svm->sev_es, 0, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
1702 src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
1703 src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
1704 src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = false;
1706 to_kvm_svm(src)->sev_info.es_active = false;
1707 to_kvm_svm(dst)->sev_info.es_active = true;
1712 int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
1714 struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1715 struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev, *cg_cleanup_sev;
1716 struct file *source_kvm_file;
1717 struct kvm *source_kvm;
1718 bool charged = false;
1721 source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
1722 if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
1727 source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
1728 ret = sev_lock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
1732 if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
1737 src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
1739 dst_sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
1740 cg_cleanup_sev = dst_sev;
1741 if (dst_sev->misc_cg != src_sev->misc_cg) {
1742 ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(dst_sev);
1744 goto out_dst_cgroup;
1748 ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm);
1750 goto out_dst_cgroup;
1751 ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm);
1755 if (sev_es_guest(source_kvm)) {
1756 ret = sev_es_migrate_from(kvm, source_kvm);
1758 goto out_source_vcpu;
1761 sev_migrate_from(kvm, source_kvm);
1762 kvm_vm_dead(source_kvm);
1763 cg_cleanup_sev = src_sev;
1767 sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm);
1769 sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm);
1771 /* Operates on the source on success, on the destination on failure. */
1773 sev_misc_cg_uncharge(cg_cleanup_sev);
1774 put_misc_cg(cg_cleanup_sev->misc_cg);
1775 cg_cleanup_sev->misc_cg = NULL;
1777 sev_unlock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
1779 if (source_kvm_file)
1780 fput(source_kvm_file);
1784 int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
1786 struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
1795 if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
1798 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1800 /* Only the enc_context_owner handles some memory enc operations. */
1801 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm) &&
1802 !is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(sev_cmd.id)) {
1807 switch (sev_cmd.id) {
1808 case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
1809 if (!sev_es_enabled) {
1815 r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1817 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
1818 r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1820 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
1821 r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1823 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
1824 r = sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1826 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
1827 r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1829 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
1830 r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1832 case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
1833 r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1835 case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
1836 r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
1838 case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
1839 r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
1841 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
1842 r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1844 case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
1845 r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1847 case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
1848 r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1850 case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
1851 r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1853 case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
1854 r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1856 case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL:
1857 r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1859 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
1860 r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1862 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
1863 r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1865 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
1866 r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1873 if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
1877 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1881 int sev_mem_enc_register_region(struct kvm *kvm,
1882 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1884 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1885 struct enc_region *region;
1888 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1891 /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
1892 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
1895 if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
1898 region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1902 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1903 region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1);
1904 if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) {
1905 ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages);
1906 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1910 region->uaddr = range->addr;
1911 region->size = range->size;
1913 list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list);
1914 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1917 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
1918 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
1919 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
1922 sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
1931 static struct enc_region *
1932 find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1934 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1935 struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
1936 struct enc_region *i;
1938 list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
1939 if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
1940 i->size == range->size)
1947 static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
1948 struct enc_region *region)
1950 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
1951 list_del(®ion->list);
1955 int sev_mem_enc_unregister_region(struct kvm *kvm,
1956 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1958 struct enc_region *region;
1961 /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
1962 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
1965 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1967 if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
1972 region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
1979 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
1980 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
1981 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
1983 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
1985 __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
1987 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1991 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1995 int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
1997 struct file *source_kvm_file;
1998 struct kvm *source_kvm;
1999 struct kvm_sev_info *source_sev, *mirror_sev;
2002 source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
2003 if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
2008 source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
2009 ret = sev_lock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
2014 * Mirrors of mirrors should work, but let's not get silly. Also
2015 * disallow out-of-band SEV/SEV-ES init if the target is already an
2016 * SEV guest, or if vCPUs have been created. KVM relies on vCPUs being
2017 * created after SEV/SEV-ES initialization, e.g. to init intercepts.
2019 if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm) ||
2020 is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || kvm->created_vcpus) {
2026 * The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't
2027 * disappear until we're done with it
2029 source_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
2030 kvm_get_kvm(source_kvm);
2031 mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
2032 list_add_tail(&mirror_sev->mirror_entry, &source_sev->mirror_vms);
2034 /* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */
2035 mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm;
2036 mirror_sev->active = true;
2037 mirror_sev->asid = source_sev->asid;
2038 mirror_sev->fd = source_sev->fd;
2039 mirror_sev->es_active = source_sev->es_active;
2040 mirror_sev->handle = source_sev->handle;
2041 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->regions_list);
2042 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->mirror_vms);
2046 * Do not copy ap_jump_table. Since the mirror does not share the same
2047 * KVM contexts as the original, and they may have different
2052 sev_unlock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
2054 if (source_kvm_file)
2055 fput(source_kvm_file);
2059 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
2061 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
2062 struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
2063 struct list_head *pos, *q;
2065 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
2068 WARN_ON(!list_empty(&sev->mirror_vms));
2070 /* If this is a mirror_kvm release the enc_context_owner and skip sev cleanup */
2071 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
2072 struct kvm *owner_kvm = sev->enc_context_owner;
2074 mutex_lock(&owner_kvm->lock);
2075 list_del(&sev->mirror_entry);
2076 mutex_unlock(&owner_kvm->lock);
2077 kvm_put_kvm(owner_kvm);
2082 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
2083 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
2084 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
2086 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
2089 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
2090 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
2092 if (!list_empty(head)) {
2093 list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
2094 __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
2095 list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
2100 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
2104 void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
2107 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
2108 if (!sev_es_enabled)
2109 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
2112 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
2114 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
2115 unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
2116 bool sev_es_supported = false;
2117 bool sev_supported = false;
2119 if (!sev_enabled || !npt_enabled)
2123 * SEV must obviously be supported in hardware. Sanity check that the
2124 * CPU supports decode assists, which is mandatory for SEV guests to
2125 * support instruction emulation.
2127 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV) ||
2128 WARN_ON_ONCE(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS)))
2131 /* Retrieve SEV CPUID information */
2132 cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
2134 /* Set encryption bit location for SEV-ES guests */
2135 sev_enc_bit = ebx & 0x3f;
2137 /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
2142 /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
2144 sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
2147 * Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps. Allocate space for ASID 0 in the bitmap,
2148 * even though it's never used, so that the bitmap is indexed by the
2151 nr_asids = max_sev_asid + 1;
2152 sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
2153 if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
2156 sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
2157 if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
2158 bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
2159 sev_asid_bitmap = NULL;
2163 sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
2164 if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count))
2167 pr_info("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_asid_count);
2168 sev_supported = true;
2170 /* SEV-ES support requested? */
2171 if (!sev_es_enabled)
2174 /* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
2175 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
2178 /* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */
2179 if (min_sev_asid == 1)
2182 sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
2183 if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count))
2186 pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_es_asid_count);
2187 sev_es_supported = true;
2190 sev_enabled = sev_supported;
2191 sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
2195 void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
2200 /* No need to take sev_bitmap_lock, all VMs have been destroyed. */
2201 sev_flush_asids(1, max_sev_asid);
2203 bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
2204 bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
2206 misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, 0);
2207 misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, 0);
2210 int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
2215 sd->sev_vmcbs = kcalloc(nr_asids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
2223 * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
2224 * returning them to the system.
2226 static void sev_flush_guest_memory(struct vcpu_svm *svm, void *va,
2230 * If hardware enforced cache coherency for encrypted mappings of the
2231 * same physical page is supported, nothing to do.
2233 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT))
2237 * If the VM Page Flush MSR is supported, use it to flush the page
2238 * (using the page virtual address and the guest ASID).
2240 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH)) {
2241 struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
2242 unsigned long va_start;
2245 /* Align start and stop to page boundaries. */
2246 va_start = (unsigned long)va;
2247 start = (u64)va_start & PAGE_MASK;
2248 stop = PAGE_ALIGN((u64)va_start + len);
2251 sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info;
2253 while (start < stop) {
2254 wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH,
2263 WARN(1, "Address overflow, using WBINVD\n");
2267 * Hardware should always have one of the above features,
2268 * but if not, use WBINVD and issue a warning.
2270 WARN_ONCE(1, "Using WBINVD to flush guest memory\n");
2271 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
2274 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
2276 struct vcpu_svm *svm;
2278 if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
2283 if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
2284 sev_flush_guest_memory(svm, svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
2285 __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
2287 if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free)
2288 kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
2291 static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2293 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2296 /* Re-use the dump_invalid_vmcb module parameter */
2297 if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
2298 pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
2302 nbits = sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap) * 8;
2304 pr_err("GHCB (GPA=%016llx):\n", svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa);
2305 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_code",
2306 ghcb->save.sw_exit_code, ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb));
2307 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_1",
2308 ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1, ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb));
2309 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_2",
2310 ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2, ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb));
2311 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_scratch",
2312 ghcb->save.sw_scratch, ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb));
2313 pr_err("%-20s%*pb\n", "valid_bitmap", nbits, ghcb->save.valid_bitmap);
2316 static void sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2318 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2319 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2322 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
2324 * GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
2326 * Copy their values, even if they may not have been written during the
2327 * VM-Exit. It's the guest's responsibility to not consume random data.
2329 ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
2330 ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]);
2331 ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX]);
2332 ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX]);
2335 static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2337 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2338 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2339 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2343 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
2345 * GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
2349 * VMMCALL allows the guest to provide extra registers. KVM also
2350 * expects RSI for hypercalls, so include that, too.
2352 * Copy their values to the appropriate location if supplied.
2354 memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
2356 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(ghcb);
2357 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(ghcb);
2358 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(ghcb);
2359 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(ghcb);
2360 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(ghcb);
2362 svm->vmcb->save.cpl = ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(ghcb);
2364 if (ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb)) {
2365 vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
2366 kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
2369 /* Copy the GHCB exit information into the VMCB fields */
2370 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2371 control->exit_code = lower_32_bits(exit_code);
2372 control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
2373 control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
2374 control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
2376 /* Clear the valid entries fields */
2377 memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
2380 static bool sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2382 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
2387 ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2390 * Retrieve the exit code now even though it may not be marked valid
2391 * as it could help with debugging.
2393 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2395 /* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
2396 if (ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
2397 reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE;
2401 reason = GHCB_ERR_MISSING_INPUT;
2403 if (!ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2404 !ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2405 !ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb))
2408 switch (ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb)) {
2409 case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
2411 case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
2412 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
2415 case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
2417 case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
2418 if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2421 case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
2422 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2423 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2425 if (ghcb_get_rax(ghcb) == 0xd)
2426 if (!ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb))
2432 if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
2433 if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
2436 if (!(ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
2437 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
2442 if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2444 if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb)) {
2445 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2446 !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
2450 case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
2451 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2452 !ghcb_cpl_is_valid(ghcb))
2455 case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
2457 case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
2459 case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
2460 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2461 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2462 !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
2465 case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
2466 if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
2467 !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
2470 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
2471 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
2472 if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
2475 case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
2476 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
2477 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE:
2478 case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
2481 reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
2490 if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE) {
2491 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: ghcb usage %#x is not valid\n",
2493 } else if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT) {
2494 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx is not valid\n",
2497 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx input is not valid\n",
2502 /* Clear the valid entries fields */
2503 memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
2505 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
2506 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, reason);
2511 void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2513 if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
2516 if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
2518 * The scratch area lives outside the GHCB, so there is a
2519 * buffer that, depending on the operation performed, may
2520 * need to be synced, then freed.
2522 if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync) {
2523 kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
2524 ghcb_get_sw_scratch(svm->sev_es.ghcb),
2525 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
2526 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len);
2527 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
2530 kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
2531 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = NULL;
2532 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
2535 trace_kvm_vmgexit_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
2537 sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(svm);
2539 kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map, true);
2540 svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL;
2543 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
2545 struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
2546 int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
2548 /* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
2554 * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
2555 * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
2557 if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
2558 svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
2561 sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
2562 svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
2563 vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
2566 #define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT (16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
2567 static bool setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
2569 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2570 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2571 u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
2572 u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
2575 scratch_gpa_beg = ghcb_get_sw_scratch(ghcb);
2576 if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
2577 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
2581 scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
2582 if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
2583 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
2584 len, scratch_gpa_beg);
2588 if ((scratch_gpa_beg & PAGE_MASK) == control->ghcb_gpa) {
2589 /* Scratch area begins within GHCB */
2590 ghcb_scratch_beg = control->ghcb_gpa +
2591 offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
2592 ghcb_scratch_end = control->ghcb_gpa +
2593 offsetof(struct ghcb, reserved_1);
2596 * If the scratch area begins within the GHCB, it must be
2597 * completely contained in the GHCB shared buffer area.
2599 if (scratch_gpa_beg < ghcb_scratch_beg ||
2600 scratch_gpa_end > ghcb_scratch_end) {
2601 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area is outside of GHCB shared buffer area (%#llx - %#llx)\n",
2602 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end);
2606 scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2607 scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
2610 * The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
2613 if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
2614 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
2615 len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
2618 scratch_va = kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
2622 if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
2623 /* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
2624 pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
2631 * The scratch area is outside the GHCB. The operation will
2632 * dictate whether the buffer needs to be synced before running
2633 * the vCPU next time (i.e. a read was requested so the data
2634 * must be written back to the guest memory).
2636 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
2637 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = true;
2640 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
2641 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = len;
2646 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
2647 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_SCRATCH_AREA);
2652 static void set_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value, u64 mask,
2655 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa &= ~(mask << pos);
2656 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa |= (value & mask) << pos;
2659 static u64 get_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 mask, unsigned int pos)
2661 return (svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa >> pos) & mask;
2664 static void set_ghcb_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value)
2666 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
2669 static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2671 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2672 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2676 ghcb_info = control->ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK;
2678 trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
2681 switch (ghcb_info) {
2682 case GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ:
2683 set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
2687 case GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REQ: {
2688 u64 cpuid_fn, cpuid_reg, cpuid_value;
2690 cpuid_fn = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2691 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_MASK,
2692 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_POS);
2694 /* Initialize the registers needed by the CPUID intercept */
2695 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = cpuid_fn;
2696 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = 0;
2698 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_CPUID);
2700 /* Error, keep GHCB MSR value as-is */
2704 cpuid_reg = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2705 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_MASK,
2706 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_POS);
2708 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
2709 else if (cpuid_reg == 1)
2710 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
2711 else if (cpuid_reg == 2)
2712 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
2714 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
2716 set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, cpuid_value,
2717 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_MASK,
2718 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_POS);
2720 set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP,
2725 case GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ: {
2726 u64 reason_set, reason_code;
2728 reason_set = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2729 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK,
2730 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS);
2731 reason_code = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2732 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_MASK,
2733 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_POS);
2734 pr_info("SEV-ES guest requested termination: %#llx:%#llx\n",
2735 reason_set, reason_code);
2741 /* Error, keep GHCB MSR value as-is */
2745 trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
2746 control->ghcb_gpa, ret);
2751 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
2753 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
2754 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2755 u64 ghcb_gpa, exit_code;
2759 /* Validate the GHCB */
2760 ghcb_gpa = control->ghcb_gpa;
2761 if (ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
2762 return sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(svm);
2765 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: GHCB gpa is not set\n");
2767 /* Without a GHCB, just return right back to the guest */
2771 if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, ghcb_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map)) {
2772 /* Unable to map GHCB from guest */
2773 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: error mapping GHCB [%#llx] from guest\n",
2776 /* Without a GHCB, just return right back to the guest */
2780 svm->sev_es.ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
2781 ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
2783 trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, ghcb);
2785 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2787 if (!sev_es_validate_vmgexit(svm))
2790 sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
2791 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
2792 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
2795 switch (exit_code) {
2796 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
2797 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2))
2800 ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(vcpu,
2801 control->exit_info_1,
2802 control->exit_info_2,
2803 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
2805 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
2806 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, false, control->exit_info_2))
2809 ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(vcpu,
2810 control->exit_info_1,
2811 control->exit_info_2,
2812 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
2814 case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
2815 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
2817 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
2818 ret = kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(vcpu);
2820 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE: {
2821 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
2823 switch (control->exit_info_1) {
2825 /* Set AP jump table address */
2826 sev->ap_jump_table = control->exit_info_2;
2829 /* Get AP jump table address */
2830 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
2833 pr_err("svm: vmgexit: unsupported AP jump table request - exit_info_1=%#llx\n",
2834 control->exit_info_1);
2835 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
2836 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT);
2841 case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
2843 "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
2844 control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
2848 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
2854 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
2859 if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 > INT_MAX)
2862 count = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
2863 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(count, size, &bytes)))
2866 if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, bytes))
2869 return kvm_sev_es_string_io(&svm->vcpu, size, port, svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
2873 void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2875 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2877 svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
2878 svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
2881 * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
2882 * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
2883 * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
2885 svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
2887 /* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
2888 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
2889 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
2890 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_READ);
2891 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
2892 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
2893 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
2895 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
2897 /* Track EFER/CR register changes */
2898 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_EFER_WRITE);
2899 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR0_WRITE);
2900 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
2901 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
2903 /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
2904 clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
2906 /* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
2907 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
2909 /* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
2910 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
2911 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
2912 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
2913 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
2914 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
2915 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
2918 void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2921 * Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when emulating
2922 * vCPU RESET for an SEV-ES guest.
2924 set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
2929 void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vmcb_save_area *hostsa)
2932 * As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT,
2933 * of which one step is to perform a VMLOAD. KVM performs the
2934 * corresponding VMSAVE in svm_prepare_guest_switch for both
2935 * traditional and SEV-ES guests.
2938 /* XCR0 is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
2939 hostsa->xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
2941 /* PKRU is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
2942 hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
2944 /* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
2945 hostsa->xss = host_xss;
2948 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
2950 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
2952 /* First SIPI: Use the values as initially set by the VMM */
2953 if (!svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi) {
2954 svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi = true;
2959 * Subsequent SIPI: Return from an AP Reset Hold VMGEXIT, where
2960 * the guest will set the CS and RIP. Set SW_EXIT_INFO_2 to a
2963 if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
2966 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);